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This dissertation explores the ways in which institutional organizational theory can 
enhance our understanding of how organizational structures that shape social 
inequality emerge, diffuse, and persist over time. More specifically, in three distinct 
papers, I examine the institutionalization of stock-based compensation practices in the 
contemporary global economy and the implications of these practices for broader 
patterns of income and wealth inequality. The first paper connects recent theories of 
managerial power to neoinstitutional theory in order to examine changes to executive 
stock option practices in the wake of the recent corporate scandals. In the second 
paper, I analyze how broad-based stock option practices are transferring from the US 
to India as technology production becomes more global. Finally, the third paper 
focuses directly on the consequences of employee ownership by analyzing variation in 
patterns of access to, and wealth generated by, different types of broad-based stock 
compensation for different demographic groups. Taken together, the three papers 
constitute a general inquiry into the emergence of stock-based compensation in the 
global economy and the consequences for inequality, and reveal how institutional 
organizational theory can provide important and novel insights into the structuration of 
new forms of wealth accumulation and stratification within contemporary capitalism. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most neglected and undertheorized areas of research in sociology exists at 
the intersection of organizations and social stratification. Despite the increasing 
sophistication of work in both of these subdisciplines, connections between the two 
are rare. The literature on  stratification, for example, provides an incomplete view of 
how organizational-level forces such as reward systems, opportunity structures, and 
how organizations place employees within these structures shape wealth and income 
outcomes (Baron, 1994). Moreover, this literature has continued to neglect how these 
organizational-level structures and processes are themselves shaped by broader 
organizational field level processes that have been the primary analytical foci of 
institutional organizational theory, despite calls for such integration made by Baron 
and Cook (1992). Likewise, a large body of institutional research has examined the 
multiple mechanisms shaping the institutionalization of a diverse range of 
organizational practices (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker 1983, Cole 1985, Ruef and Scott 
1998, Rao and Sivakumar 1999), but have seldom examined how practices that drive 
inequality outcomes, such as executive compensation, employee ownership, and 
workplace authority structures become institutionalized. Since it is likely that the 
institutionalization of organizational practices that shape the allocation of important 
economic and social resources is subject to active contestation by a number of 
organizational and field-level actors, the neoinstitutional theoretical framework, and 
particularly more recent work that has forged deeper theoretical connections between 
institutional organizational theory and social movement theory, is well-positioned to 
provide a deeper understanding of how these practices diffuse, become challenged, 
and persist or become deinstitutionalized over time. Such an understanding is essential 
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for enhancing our views of the fundamental ways in which social inequality is shaped 
by organizations. 
 The goal of this dissertation is to explore the ways in which institutional 
organizational theory can enhance our understanding of how new organizational 
structures that shape social inequality emerge, diffuse, and persist over time. More 
specifically, in three distinct papers, I examine the institutionalization of stock-based 
compensation practices in the contemporary global economy, and the implications of 
these practices for broader patterns of income and wealth inequality. Stock-based 
compensation includes a number of different mechanisms through which employees 
and managers acquire stock of their employing companies. These mechanisms are all 
malleable, and corporations have a great deal of flexibility in terms of deciding how 
and which employees receive stock, as well as the amount of stock that is allocated to 
different employees. Although worker cooperatives have existed since the 19th century 
and a broad strata of executives have received stock as part of their compensation 
since the 1950s, it was not until the late 1980s that stock became a primary component 
of executive compensation and two new forms of stock-based compensation that 
included broad groups of nonmanagement employees (i.e., employee ownership) 
began to diffuse widely: employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and broad-based 
stock option plans (BBSOPs). Since stock-based compensation broadens corporate 
ownership and how financial returns of this ownership are distributed, its spread likely 
has important consequences for income and wealth inequality. Therefore, 
understanding the ways in which these practices are structured and diffuse, and the 
forces shaping their persistence or transformation over time, will provide important 
and novel insights into new forms of wealth accumulation and stratification within 
contemporary capitalism. The three papers that comprise this dissertation all aim to 
demonstrate this potential.  
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 The first paper, “Executive Stock Options After the Scandals: Exploring 
Challenges to Legitimacy and the Dynamics of Institutional Persistence,” connects 
recent theories of managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) to neoinstitutional 
theory in order to examine changes to executive stock option practices in the wake of 
the recent corporate scandals. The scandals generated substantial challenges to the 
legitimacy of executive compensation practices, and in particular, executive stock 
options. This setting provides an excellent one for analyzing the forces shaping the 
persistence or transformation of a form of stock-based compensation that drove the 
substantial escalation in executive compensation during the 1990s. Using archival 
panel data of executive compensation at the S&P 500 between 2001 and 2005, this 
paper examines the conditions under which these challenges led to changes in the 
levels of different components of executive compensation. The findings reveal that 
during this period, corporations facing investigations for corporate fraud and 
shareholder activism provided executives with less valuable stock option grants. In 
addition, CEOs faced constraints in their power to extract rent through their 
compensation arrangements, and independent directors wielded substantial influence 
over executive compensation. However, the results also suggest that these changes 
were short-lived and that the postscandal challenges to the legitimacy of executive 
stock options did not lead to substantive changes in the corporate governance 
structures that determine executive compensation practices. 
 In the 1990s, executives were not the only occupational group who received 
stock options. The economic prosperity of this period was driven in large part by the 
rise of a dynamic and innovative high-tech sector, particularly a diverse group of 
industries based in the Silicon Valley of California. One of the most important 
organizational innovations pioneered by these companies was their very liberal grants 
of stock options to most or all nonmanagement employees (Saxenian 1996, Blasi and 
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Kruse 2003). By the end of the 1990s, the practice had become deeply institutionalized 
within the technology sector, but high-tech production began to move overseas to 
cheaper labor markets such as India. In the second paper, “Exploring the Limits of 
Convergence in the Global Technology Sector: The Institutionalization of Employee 
Stock Options in India and the United States,” I examine how broad-based stock 
option practices are transferring from the US to India as technology production 
becomes more global. The cross-cultural setting is particularly useful for illuminating 
the organizational and environmental conditions that shape the diffusion of stock 
compensation practices more generally. Using data I collected in interviews conducted 
with managers and consultants in the Indian software industry, the results indicate that 
although ESOs diffused among Indian software companies during the late 1990s, 
Indian companies did not grant stock options as deeply within their organizational 
hierarchies as did technology companies in the U.S. The findings reveal how labor 
market conditions, cultural perceptions of stock ownership and consumption, and 
human resource professionals shaped the translation of ESOs within the Indian 
context. This paper thus demonstrates the role of institutional, cultural, and economic 
environments in shaping how specific actors interpret the meaning of organizational 
practices in the process of translation, as well as how practice that structure patterns of 
wealth distribution in the global economy become institutionalized.  
 The first two papers focus specifically on the process of institutionalization of 
specific stock-based compensation practices and assume, but do not directly 
demonstrate, that these practices have measurable consequences on employee 
outcomes. The third paper, “Who Benefits from Employee Ownership? The  
Stratification of Wealth in Companies with Employee Ownership,” focuses directly on 
the consequences of these practices by analyzing variation in patterns of access to, and 
wealth generated by, different types of broad-based stock compensation and employee 
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ownership practices for different demographic groups, such as women and nonwhites. 
The quantitative analysis is based on a unique dataset of over 40,000 employees in 14 
US companies that have different forms of employee ownership. More specifically, 
this paper examines stratification in patterns of access to different forms of employee 
ownership programs, financial returns from these programs, and access to workplace 
power and authority. The results reveal substantial disparities between the outcomes of 
women and men, nonwhite and whites, and employees with and without disabilities in 
terms of access to employee ownership and the financial value provided by this 
participation. Although many of these effects appear to stem from existing 
mechanisms of occupational segregation, women and African Americans have lower 
plan values, even accounting for differences in education, occupation, and salary. The 
analysis provides a more mixed view of barriers to power and authority because 
formal structures of employee involvement appear to open up access to workplace 
power for some groups. This paper thus contributes to a lengthy tradition of research 
exploring the organizational context of inequality, but focuses on a relatively new 
form of compensation and wealth generation. 
 Each of these three papers focuses on a diverse range of social and 
organizational phenomena, employs a different research design, involves different 
methods of data collection and analysis, and makes a unique theoretical contribution. 
Taken together, however, they constitute a general inquiry into the emergence of 
stock-based compensation in the global economy and the consequences of this 
development for inequality. The first paper examines challenges to executive stock 
options; the second paper focuses on the global diffusion of stock-based compensation 
that provide wealth generation to a range of nonexecutive employees; and the third 
analyzes the actual consequences of broad-based stock compensation for nonexecutive 
employees. One of the primary goals of this dissertation is to show how stock-based 
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compensation has not emerged and diffused simply as an efficient solution to the 
human resource needs of the contemporary firm. Like all organizational practices, 
stock-based compensation acquires legitimacy, diffuses, and becomes open to 
contestation through dynamic social, political, and cultural processes both inside and 
outside of organizations. With this in mind, this dissertation intends to show how the 
analytical framework of institutional organizational theory provides a productive 
approach for understanding the development of systems of compensation, and 
ultimately, for understanding how the contemporary capitalist firm  distributes 
economic wealth to different stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS AFTER THE SCANDALS: EXPLORING 
CHALLENGES TO LEGITIMACY AND THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSISTENCE 
 
Introduction 
In the last two decades in the United States, the compensation of CEOs and other top 
ranking corporate executives has increased dramatically. This increase has been driven 
primarily by the diffusion of stock options as a component of executive compensation 
among publicly traded companies (Murphy 1999, Frydman and Saks 2003). The 
meteoric spike in the U.S. stock market during the 1990s, coupled with a steady 
increase in the number of shares that executives could purchase via stock options, 
pushed average levels of total executive compensation into the millions and even 
hundreds of millions of dollars. The boom in the value of executive compensation 
occurred alongside a stagnation/decrease in the wage levels of employees in many 
nonexecutive occupations and professions. According to the AFL-CIO, the ratio of 
CEO compensation to that of the average worker increased from 42 in 1980 to 411 in 
2005, peaking in 2000 at 525. The rise in executive compensation, and in particular 
the use of executive stock options, therefore, has functioned as an integral source of 
the expansion of inequality in the United States in the last two decades (Morgan and 
Cha 2006). 
 The recent corporate scandals at Enron and other companies generated 
widespread debate and criticism of executive compensation. Although executive 
compensation levels dropped moderately between 2000 and 2003, they have started to 
increase again since 2005. Hence, despite the extensive criticism of executive 
compensation and the new scrutiny of corporate governance practices generated by the 
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scandals, the evidence suggests that little has changed with respect to the ways in 
which executives are compensated. Focusing on broad trends, however, likely 
obscures both substantial organizational level variation in how corporations reacted to 
the scandals with respect to executive compensation as well as the more complex set 
of organizational and environmental factors likely shaping variation in these reactions. 
This paper seeks to better understand these factors and argues that such an 
understanding is essential for expanding our theoretical views of how organizational 
practices that structure income and wealth inequality become institutionalized, and 
persist or change in the face of criticism and challenges. 
 As Bebchuk and Fried (2004) have observed, most of the large body of 
existing research on executive compensation has accepted the tenets of agency theory 
that executive compensation arrangements are the efficient outcomes of arms-length 
negotiations between corporate boards of directors and executives. In challenging this 
view, Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) managerial power perspective focuses attention on 
the ways in which corporate governance structures allow executives to extract 
significant rents through compensation arrangements. In contrast to the assumptions of 
agency theory, they argue that boards of directors do not engage in arms-length 
bargaining in negotiating efficient executive compensation arrangements that create 
incentives for executives to act in the long-term interest of shareholders. Instead, 
directors have few incentives to design such executive compensation arrangements or 
oppose arrangements that, for example, do not closely link executive pay to corporate 
performance. The managerial power view has illuminated significant weaknesses in 
the ability of agency theory to explain executive compensation and revealed the 
potency of a more complex, sociological view of the ways in which executive 
compensation practices are structured. However, its focus has been primarily on 
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internal organizational dynamics and, therefore, has a limited view of how broader 
organizational environments shape organizational decision-making.  
 I contend that in the context of the recent corporate scandals, the institutional 
environment played a key role in shaping changes to executive compensation and that 
combining the managerial power perspective view with the analytical framework of 
neoinstitutional organizational theory is essential for understanding these changes. 
More specifically, I  incorporate insights from institutional theory regarding the role of 
coercive and normative pressures in an organization’s environment in order to analyze 
executive compensation in the wake of the scandals. Since this period was defined by 
extensive criticism and challenges to specific corporate practices such as executive 
compensation, systems of corporate governance, and broader market institutions, a 
singular focus on the ways in which internal governance structures shaped changes in 
executive compensation is inadequate. Such moments of destabilization generate 
conflict over existing market institutions, including a range of organizational practices 
such as executive compensation, and can lead to significant changes in these 
institutions and practices (Fligstein 2001). In addition to the critical discourse 
generated by the scandals, institutional investors and individual shareholder activists 
placed substantial pressure on corporate boards to alter the structure of executive 
compensation. Institutional theory provides a logical framework for theorizing how 
these sociopolitical forces may have influenced executive compensation practices. 
How did companies respond to these pressures? Did executive compensation levels 
decrease? Did organizations resist these pressures and maintain or increase the levels 
and mix of executive compensation? What types of organizational and environmental 
forces shaped variation in different organizational responses? 
 In this paper, I use both the managerial power perspective and institutional 
theory to examine these questions by analyzing changes made to executive 
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compensation between 2001 and 2005, focusing primarily on executive stock options, 
but also considering other forms of executive compensation such as salary, restricted 
stock units, and cash-based bonuses. This paper first examine trends in executive 
compensation in the prescandal era from 1992 to 2000, followed by a brief 
institutional history of executive stock options, which became the dominant form of 
executive compensation during this period. I then examine the broad changes that 
occurred in the years following the scandals that emerged with the collapse of Enron 
at the end of 2001, and place these in the broader context of the challenges to 
executive compensation that emerged after the scandals. This sets up the context for 
motivating my hypothesis and the empirical analysis that follows.  
  
Executive Compensation Before the Scandals: The Rise of Stock Options 
The typical compensation package for executives is composed of different elements, 
most of which executives receive on an annual basis. Cash based salaries, the most 
obvious and easy to understand component, represent only one element. Executives 
also often receive stock options, which provide them with the right to purchase a fixed 
number of shares at a fixed price for a fixed period of time. Another component is 
restricted stock, which is a mechanism that gives executives shares of stock directly. 
Executives can not sell these shares, however, until they meet certain conditions 
relating to performance or tenure. Executives also usually receive cash-based bonuses 
linked to performance criteria. Beyond these core elements are others, such as long-
term incentive plans, which provide a cash payout based on longer term corporate 
performance measures. In addition, executives can receive signing bonuses, tax 
reimbursements, severance payments if they leave the company, homes and 
apartments, and a range of other perks. Each of these different components have 
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different tax implications for executives and corporations, and a different accounting 
treatment for the company.  
 The level and types of compensation that executives receive is determined by 
boards of directors. In most firms, a smaller group of directors, the compensation 
committee, has the responsibility to design and approve executive compensation 
arrangements. These committees typically work with a company’s human resources 
department and compensation consultants (Bebchuk and Fried 2004, Thomas and 
Martin 1999), and the entire board will approve the final package. When designing 
executive compensation arrangements, corporations have a great deal of flexibility in 
terms of deciding how much to provide to executives, how different elements will be 
linked to corporate or executive performance, and the relative mix of different 
elements as parts of total compensation.  
 To examine broad trends in executive compensation before the scandals, I 
analyzed data from Execucomp, a database maintained by Standard & Poor’s that 
provides detailed information about different forms of executive compensation for the 
five highest paid executives in the S&P 500 from 1992 to 2000. Since 1992, all 
publicly traded companies have had to report specific standardized details about 
executive compensation. I first calculated the sum of the four primary forms of 
executive compensation: salary, bonus, the value of stock options granted each year, 
and the value of restricted stock units granted each year. I also used a summary 
measure of total compensation, which includes these four components in addition to 
all other forms of cash payments received by executives, and payouts from long-term 
incentive plans. After calculating the sum of these four components and total 
compensation, I calculated annual means for all companies for each year, yielding the 
aggregate measures detailed in the figures below. Figure 1 shows the trends in total  
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compensation and its individual components between 1992 and 2000. All values are 
adjusted for inflation.  
 As Figure 1 shows, total executive compensation (top line) for the top five 
executives at the average S&P 500 firm increased dramatically between 1995 and  
2000. When the top line is decomposed into individual elements, it is clear that most  
Figure 1: Average Value of Aggregate, Firm-Level Compensation of  
Five Highest Paid Executives, S&P 500, 1992 - 2000 
 
of the increase in total compensation in be attributed to the growth in the value of 
stock options (second line from the top one). When compared to the dramatic growth 
in the value of stock options, the value of the other components of executive 
compensation represented by the bottom three lines in (salary, bonus, and the value of 
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restricted stock), remained relatively flat throughout the entire period. Obviously, the 
surge in the stock market during the late 1990s was a primary reason for the dramatic 
surge in the value of executive stock options during this period. However, Figure 2 
shows the average total number of options granted to all of the top five executives in  
Figure 2: Average Aggregate Number of Stock Options, 
Top Five Executives, S&P 500, 1992 - 2000 
 
the average S&P500 firm over this same period. This figure clearly shows that the 
increase in the value of stock options was not only driven by a surging stock market, 
but by substantial increases in the number of options executives were receiving from 
1994 to 2000. Although stock options have been a component of executive 
compensation since the 1950s, it was not until the 1980s that the practice became more 
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widespread and, as the Execucomp data show, it was not until the 1990s that 
executives received a great deal of value from options. Why did stock options become 
so important during the 1990s? In the next part of the discussion, I trace out a brief 
institutional history of executive stock options. 
 A stock option is a contract issued by a company that provides an employee 
with the right to purchase a fixed number of shares at a fixed price for a fixed number 
of years, subject to certain conditions, usually continued employment. In the majority 
of stock option contracts, the price at which an employee can purchase stock is set at 
the market price of the stock on the day the contract is offered. For example, 
Executive A receives the right to purchase 5,000 shares at $10 per share (market price 
of the stock on the day of grant) for the next 10 years. Usually, the terms of the option 
require that the executive remains employed for at least 3 – 5 years in order to receive 
the right to “exercise” the options, or purchase the shares. The financial benefit of an 
option occurs when the company’s stock price subsequently increases because a stock 
option allows them to purchase shares at the lower fixed price and either sell them 
immediately, realizing a gain based on the difference between the grant price of the 
option and the market price on the date of sale, or hold onto the shares in hopes of an 
additional increase in the stock price. Executives are not required to exercise their 
options, however. If the stock price declines after the grant date of the options, the 
employee can simply allow the option to expire. Hence, a stock option is only risky if 
an executive purchases the shares and holds onto them, and the stock price 
subsequently declines.  
 Corporations have always had a great deal of flexibility in designing these 
plans in terms of who gets options, how many, and how often. While most publicly 
traded companies grant stock options to only to their top managers, there is substantial 
cross-organizational variation in the broadness of grants beyond this small groups of 
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executives. Some companies, for example, grant to their entire management teams 
(including middle and lower lever managers), while others grant to all managers and a 
select group of nonmanagement employees. Other companies have implemented 
broad-based stock option programs (BBSOPs) that grant to a majority or all 
employees. However, in most companies, executives and other top managers are the 
sole recipients of stock options, even in companies with broad-based plans (Weeden et 
al. 2001). 
 Like most organizational practices, executive stock options have become 
institutionalized over a long period of time. The history of executive stock options 
began in 1950, with the passage of legislation that allowed gains from the exercise of 
stock options to be taxed at the capital gains rate, provided that the employee met 
certain conditions. At the time, the capital gains tax rate was 25%, dramatically lower 
than the highest personal income tax rate of  91%. While almost none of the largest 50 
companies granted stock options in 1950, by 1952, over half had granted for the first 
time (Frydman and Saks 2004). The subsequent stock market boom in the 1950s 
allowed executives to realize substantial financial gains from their stock options, and 
this not only bolstered the legitimacy of the practice for executives and corporate 
compensation advisors, but provoked the first criticism of the practice (Blasi et al., 
2003). In 1964, in response to this criticism, Congress “enacted a variety of strict rules 
for stock options, which made them virtually useless” (Blasi et al. 2003: 70). Despite 
this legislative action, by 1969, only three of the largest 50 companies had not 
established a executive stock option plan by 1969 (Frydman and Saks 2004).  
 Blasi et al. (2003) highlight two events in the 1970s that established the 
foundation for the explosion in the use of executive stock options in the 1980s and 
1990s. The first was the publication of an article by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes 
(Black & Scholes 1973) in the Journal of Political Economy, which provided a 
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mathematical model for the valuation of equities, a model that could be applied to the 
valuation of stock options. In the same year, the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
opened to provide a trading market for stock options of publicly traded companies. 
Although these options are different than employee stock options, which can not be 
publicly traded, these two developments laid a stronger foundation for the  legitimacy 
of the general mechanism of a stock option. In 1976, however, Congress eliminated 
the capital gains tax treatment of stock options, and with the stock market in a 
downturn, interest in executive stock options waned (Fox 1997).  
 This ebb in interest was short-lived as the use of executive stock options 
expanded dramatically between 1982 and 1991 (Murphy 1999). Blasi et al. (2003) 
attribute this growth first to Congress reinstating the capital gains treatment for stock 
options in 1981 and the stock market boom of the 1980s. Both of these events made 
the mechanism more attractive to executives. At the same time, a wave of takeover 
activity, downsizing, and mass layoffs once again brought high executive salaries 
under criticism. Since the general knowledge level about stock options was low at the 
time, this criticism focused primarily on cash compensation. This criticism of cash 
compensation and the lack of awareness about stock options made the latter attractive 
to executives as an alternative form of compensation, in part for their ability to 
obfuscate actual levels of executive pay. Finally, in 1987, executives of Toys “R” Us 
reaped substantial gains for exercising their stock options, with CEO Charles Lazarus 
earning a $56 million profit, which at that time represented the largest single gain from 
the exercise of stock options. This high profile windfall sparked intensive interest in 
options among corporate executives (Blasi et al. 2003).  
 As the Execucomp data presented above revealed, between 1992 and 2000, this 
spark ignited into a blaze as both the number of companies granting executive stock 
options and the size and value of these grants increased dramatically  A number of 
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forces led to this increase. In the early 1990s, excessive executive compensation again 
came under heavy criticism in the media, and this generated political pressure for 
legislative action (Murphy 1999). The legislative response was incorporated into the 
Tax Reform Act of 1993, which limited the amount of cash compensation that 
corporations could take a tax deduction for to $1 million. As in earlier rounds of 
criticism of excessive executive compensation, the focus was on cash compensation 
rather than stock options or other forms of executive compensation. The Act excluded 
those forms of executive compensation that were in some way linked to company 
performance, such as stock options. Ironically, the limits on the deductibility of 
executive compensation, which were originally intended to places constraints on 
executive compensation, fueled intense interest among executives in stock options and 
was a primary catalyst for the diffusion of the practice in the 1990s. With the 
subsequent boom in the stock market, executives were able to reap substantial 
financial gains by exercising their stock options. However, it was not just executives 
who became seriously interested in stock options and helped propel the practice’s 
diffusion. As the shareholder conception of corporate control became dominant in the 
1990s (Fligstein 2001), institutional investors and other shareholder groups, informed 
by agency theory, pushed for new compensation mechanisms to link executive pay to 
corporate performance. This group of actors viewed stock options as just such a 
mechanism. Finally, the growth in the use of stock options in the 1990s was also 
driven by their accounting treatment. Until 2004, companies were not required to 
recognize a compensation expense for options, thus making them free from an 
accounting perspective.  
 The evidence presented in the section has revealed that the diffusion and 
institutionalization of executive stock options has been shaped by macroeconomic 
conditions, the performance of the stock market, changes in tax law regarding both 
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personal and capital gains, and the favorable accounting treatment of options, and the 
widespread acceptance of agency theory among business intellectuals, shareholders, 
and corporate managers (Murphy 1999) as the shareholder conception of the firm 
became dominant (Fligstein 2001). This brief history of suggests an inevitable and 
uncontested process of institutionalization, but other researchers have suggested a 
more complex picture by illuminating how different groups of actors conflicted at 
various times over the meaning and use of the practice. For example, in their analysis 
of the role of CEOs in the expansion of stock options, Englander and Kaufman (2004) 
use statements and actions by the Corporate Roundtable, a powerful lobbying group 
for CEOs, to argue that CEOs were initially resistant to the growing power of 
shareholders and their calls for the expanded use of stock options. However, as CEOs 
came to realize that stock options might be a potentially lucrative source of wealth, 
they  supported increases in the number of stock options they received. To deflect 
criticism of the excessive use of stock options, CEOs were able to point out that they 
were simply responding to the desires of shareholders. The support of shareholders for 
stock options, therefore, provided CEOs with a logical cover for implementing 
lucrative compensation structures (Boyer 2005). This raises the key point that 
although shareholders and other groups can influence the structure and levels of 
executive compensation, executives (and CEOs especially) have a great deal of power 
in setting their own compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2004).  
 In addition to conflict over the actual structure and level of executive 
compensation programs, the legitimacy of executive stock options has encountered 
periods of challenge, such as the attempt by accounting regulators to require 
companies to expense stock options in the mid-1990s. These regulators faced stiff 
opposition from shareholders, who believed that the practice linked pay and 
performance, and executives, particularly from the technology sector, who eventually 
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placed enough pressure on Congress to block the requirement. Then in the late 1990s, 
unions and their pension funds began to more vocally criticize the practice, primarily 
due to the dramatic increases in overall executive compensation generated during the 
technology boom. Furthermore, when the market dipped in 1997 and companies 
reacted by resetting the exercise price of executive stock options (a.k.a. repricing), 
institutional investors became very vocal in their criticism of executive compensation 
being disconnected to executive performance. It was not until the recent scandals, 
however, that the legitimacy of the practice faced a serious challenge as executive 
compensation came under renewed criticism.  
 
Challenges to the Legitimacy of Executive Stock Options 
The collapse of Enron generated extensive public debate about some of the central 
market institutions of American capitalism, including systems of financial reporting, 
accounting, and auditing; corporate governance structures; executive compensation 
practices; and the shareholder conception of control. The Enron scandal also 
illuminated conflicts of interest within the financial conglomerates that emerged with 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagel Act in 1999, raised the possibility of increased 
punishment for those engaged in corporate fraud, and questioned the efficacy of 
various regulatory agencies. The reform movement that Enron and subsequent 
scandals set in motion had potentially powerful consequences (Levitt 2002). For 
example, the swift collapse of prominent firms such as Enron and Arthur Andersen 
revealed that the legitimacy and survival of organizations engaged in criminal activity 
were indeed at risk. In addition, the accelerated passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the immediate wake of the scandals was a sign that regulators and legislators were in a 
position to make significant changes to the institutions governing capitalist market 
behavior.  
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 In the discourse visible in the mainstream business press, an immediate tension 
emerged between groups calling for new regulations and legislation, and other groups 
who claimed that Enron and other companies were just bad apples within an otherwise 
law-abiding universe of corporations. The initial calls for reform were sounded by the 
SEC, Democratic legislators, and the accounting industry itself, and focused on the 
problem of insuring transparency for investors. Corporate leaders and the Bush 
Administration quickly tried to emphasize the limited reach of the behaviors 
connected to the scandals. As the magnitude of the problems of Enron came into 
sharper focus and scandals emerged in other companies, more actors entered into the 
debates. Ultimately, the exposure of accounting fraud at WorldCom in June 2002 
provided reformers and critics who claimed that the situation of Enron was not an 
aberration, but the result of more systemic problems relating to corporate reporting, 
governance, and regulation, with the upper hand. WorldCom forced President Bush to 
publicly engage these issues more directly and hastened the passage of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, which established new laws relating to auditing processes, the auditing 
industry, corporate reporting, insider trading, and protecting investors. 
 With respect to executive compensation, the scandals generated extensive 
debate about the legitimacy of executive compensation practices, and in particular 
stock options, as well as criticism of the overall levels of executive compensation. 
Figure 3 tracks the number of negative articles in the media about executive 
compensation between 1992 and 2006.1  This figure clearly shows a dramatic spike in 
the number of articles in 2002 and 2003, followed by a moderate decline and then an 
increase in 2006. Stock options definitely came under the heaviest scrutiny as a 
                                                 
1 Using the ABI Inform/Proquest media database, I counted the number of articles by searching with the 
terms “executive compensation” and  “unreasonable” or “excessive” in the title or abstract.  
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number of institutional investors, legislators and regulators, labor unions, business 
intellectuals, and economic and social justice groups criticized options as providing  
 
Figure 3: Number of Media Articles Criticizing Executive Compensation, 
1992 – 2006 
 
incentives for executives to become involved in fraudulent activities to boost short-
term stock valuations. Many institutional investors, particularly public pension funds 
and labor unions, also voiced strong critiques of the disconnect between overall CEO 
pay and performance, a lack of clear disclosure procedures, an inadequate number of 
independent directors on boards, and conflicts of interest between compensation 
consultants advising on executive compensation while maintaining other business 
relationships with the company. Labor unions, and economic and social justice groups 
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Stock-based compensation, which had been viewed positively as a way to link the 
interests of executives to the long-term interests of shareholders, came under fresh 
attack in the wake of the scandals.  
 An editorial in the New York Times on April 14, 2002 encapsulated much of 
the criticism of executive compensation. The editorial, entitled “The Executive Pay 
Scam,” highlighted the lack of connection between pay and performance: although 
executives did well during the boom market of the 1990s, most executives were still 
doing well in the face of the market downturn. The editorial criticized stock option 
packages as “outlandish” and pointed to the “acquiescence of boards of directors” as 
“servants of management”(New York Times 2002) in creating the problems relating to 
executive compensation.  Even Michael Jensen, one of the original academic 
proponents of executive stock options as a solution to the agency problem, 
acknowledged in 2005 that the way in which stock options were used, i.e., executives 
were granted too many and grants were not linked to increases in actual corporate 
value, created the wrong incentives (Deutsch 2005). 
 A central focus of the criticism of executive stock options was their accounting 
treatment. Prior to 2004, companies were not required to recognize a compensation 
expense for stock options granted to executives or other employees. In March and 
April 2002, a number of articles appeared in the mainstream business press describing 
and analyzing a growing movement in support of stock option expensing (e.g., 
Gleckman, 2002; Henry, 2002; Hitt and Schlesinger, 2002; Jenkins, 2002; Whitman 
2002). Through their use of such sources as government officials, executives, 
compensation consultants, industry and trade association representatives, institutional 
investors, and academics, these articles articulated the primary explanation that these 
actors were offering about the connection between executive stock options, their 
accounting treatment, and the scandals. This explanation had two parts. First, the 
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excessive use of stock options as a component of executive compensation motivated a 
variety of practices through which executives attempted to bolster short-term earnings, 
which, in turn, fueled the escalation of the stock market in the late 1990s. As the Wall 
Street Journal, in describing the critics of stock options, noted: “options have bred a 
culture of irresponsible greed” (Hitt and Schlesinger, 2002: 21). The system of 
accounting machinations at Enron was an example of this culture taken to its logical 
extreme, with executives making large profits on their stock options as they ran the 
company into bankruptcy and hid behind arcane and fraudulent accounting schemes.  
 The second part of the explanation linking stock options and their accounting 
treatment to the scandals was that the lack of a formal requirement to expense stock 
options created an incentive for boards of directors to increase the size of executive 
stock option grants, which in turn exacerbated the incentives for executives to boost 
short-term stock prices and more generally stigmatized their use as fraudulent, or as 
the Council of Institutional Investors described it, stock options “[turned] companies 
into Ponzi schemes” (Lohse, 2002: 1). Defenders of stock options, such as many 
corporate executives, large technology companies, some legislators and regulators, 
and the Bush Administration argued that the scandals stemmed from a few bad apples, 
rather than the broader structure of incentives created by executive stock options. 
Ultimately, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) implemented a 
requirement in 2004 that companies formally take a charge to earnings for the value of 
stock options granted to executives and employees. Other than this new stock option 
expensing requirement, the scandals did not lead to significant regulative or legislative 
changes with respect to executive compensation. It appears that such efforts were put 
on hold while regulatory agencies dealt with the issues at the accounting issues at the 
center of the scandals: Sarbanes-Oxley, for example did not address executive 
compensation at all (Boyle 2004).   
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 This section has demonstrated how, in the wake of the scandals, executives and 
the ways in which they were compensated came under renewed scrutiny and criticism. 
The attention focused on excessive compensation following the stock market 
downturn and subsequent scandals, the lack of connection between pay and 
performance, and the complicity of boards of directors in creating a system of 
incentives that encouraged fraudulent accounting. The strongest critiques were leveled 
on executive stock options, and these critiques constituted serious threats to the 
practice’s legitimacy. Despite the lack of new regulations relating to executive 
compensation, the scandals generated serious criticism of executives and boards of 
directors from the business press and institutional investors, the latter of which became 
very active in challenging executive compensation practices after 2002. Such were the 
contours of the broader political and cultural environment in which corporations 
evaluated and potentially made changes to their stock option programs in the wake of 
the scandals. What impact did these pressures have on executive compensation?  
 
Executive Compensation After the Scandals: A New Regime or Business as Usual?  
To explore broad trends in executive compensation after the scandals, I again rely on 
compensation data available from Execucomp on the five highest paid executives in 
the S&P 500, but now extend this to 2006. I first calculated the sum of the four 
primary forms of executive compensation: salary, bonus, the value of stock options 
granted each year, and the value of restricted stock units granted each year, as well as 
a summary measure of total compensation. After calculating the sum of these four 
components and total compensation, I calculated annual means for all companies for 
each year, yielding the aggregate measures detailed in the figures below. Figure 4 
shows the trends in total compensation and its individual components between 1992 
and 2006. All values are adjusted for inflation. As Figure 4 shows, in the wake of the 
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 Figure 4: Average Value of Aggregate, Firm-Level Compensation, 
Five Highest Paid Executives, S&P 500, 1992 - 2006 
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executive compensation represented by the bottom three lines (salary, bonus, and the 
value of restricted stock), remained relatively flat between 2000 and 2006. However, 
Figure 5 provides a more complicated picture by showing the trends in these three 
forms in sharper relief.  
 Figure 5 reveals that salary levels remained relatively constant between 1992 
and 2006. This is most likely do the federal limits on non-performance based pay put 
in place in 1993. The average value of bonuses increased steadily between 1992 and  
 
Figure 5: Average Value of Aggregate, Firm-Level Compensation, 
Five Highest Paid Executives: S&P 500, 1992 – 2006 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
Year
D
o
ll
a
rs
 (
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
Salary Bonus Restricted Stock
  
 
29 
2000, dropped for two years, and then increased sharply after 2002. The average value 
of restricted stock units followed a similar trends as that of bonuses, but with a sharp 
increase between 1996 and 1998, followed by a sharp decline in 1999, a subsequent 
leveling off through 2002, and then a steady increase through 2006. Most importantly, 
however, when compared to the trend in stock option value and total compensation in 
Figure 4, Figure 5 shows that between 2002 and 2006, the value of both bonuses and 
restricted stock units for the top five executives at the average S&P 500 firm increased 
substantially. Considering that the drop in total compensation that began in 2000 
flattened out in 2003, but that the value of stock options did not increase, these 
findings suggests that firms were replacing cutbacks in the use of stock options with 
increases in these other two forms. Also, the noticeable increase in total compensation 
in 2006 parallels a sharp increase in the value of bonuses and restricted stock units in 
2006.  
 What accounts for these trends in executive compensation? First, the 
substantial increase in executive compensation during the 1990s, as previous research 
has found, can be largely attributed to stock options becoming the dominant form of 
executive compensation in the late 1990s. As further evidence, Figure 6 shows stock 
options and the three other forms of compensation as percentages of total 
compensation from 1992 – 2006. This graph shows that from 1995 to 2001, the 
percentage of total compensation value represented by stock options increased from 
about 30% to over 50%, followed by a sharp and steady decline back down to 30% by 
2006. The trend in the percentage of total compensation represented by salary went in 
the opposite direction from 1992 and 2000, falling from about 45% to just above 20% 
by 2000. The percentages of total compensation represented by both restricted stock 
and bonuses increased steadily from 2001 to 2006, providing additional evidence that 
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decreases in stock options were offset by increases in these two other forms of 
compensation. 
 
 Figure 6: Components of Executive Compensation as a % of Total, 
Compensation, S&P 500, 1992 - 2006 
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compensation levels from 2003 to 2006. If such replacement occurred, it may indicate 
that corporate executives and boards of directors were attempting to halt the overall 
decline in executive compensation that resulted from the decline of the stock market 
and reduced used of stock options by replacing them with other forms. Figure 6 also 
provides evidence of the shifting of total compensation between different mechanisms 
as the percentages of each component has been converging since 2001. This suggests 
that S&P 500 firms are moving towards a more even mix of compensation 
mechanisms in the post-scandal environment. 
 These broad trends are illuminating, but most likely hide substantial 
organizational level variation in changes to executive compensation practices. 
Obviously, substantial changes in executive compensation occurred after 2000, but it 
is too simple to suggest that everything either decreased or increased. There were 
some shifts, but on the whole, executive compensation levels were still very high. To 
dive deeper below the surface of these broad trends, it is necessary to examine the 
conditions under which executive compensation changed. What accounts for 
organizational level changes that defines these aggregate level trends? How did the 
criticism of executive compensation and stock options generated by the scandals turn 
into actual pressures on organizations to change these practices and how did 
companies react to these pressures? Why did some organizations reduce executive 
stock options? Why did other companies increase their stock option use? Were they 
resistant to these pressures? What explains the increase in the value of bonuses and 
restricted stock options during this time? Why did salary levels stay the same? In the 
next section, I develop hypotheses from the existing literature on executive 
compensation and neoinstitutional theory to set up the empirical analysis of what 
drove changes in executive compensation in the post-scandal environment.  
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Forces Shaping Executive Compensation 
In this section, I draw on both the managerial power perspective and institutional 
theory to motivate the hypotheses tested in the quantitative analysis. I focus attention 
on how existing theory would predict changes to executive stock options because, as 
the discussion of the postscandal criticism of executive compensation revealed, it was 
the compensation mechanism that received the most scrutiny. Therefore, it was likely 
the most sensitive to change during this period. More specifically, the scrutiny and 
criticism exerted pressures on companies to restructure and reduce stock option grants 
to executives. 
 
The Social Environment of Boards and Managerial Power 
According to agency theory, boards of directors play the key role in monitoring 
executive compensation and will act as the guardians of shareholders’ interests by 
insuring that compensation arrangements provide incentives for corporate managers to 
act in the long-term interests of shareholders. The validity of agency theory for 
explaining executive compensation has been recently challenged by the managerial 
power perspective advanced by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). This perspective contests 
the core tenet of agency theory that boards of directors insure efficient compensation 
packages by operating at “arms-length from the executives whose pay arrangements 
they decide” (Bebchuk and Fried 2004: 2). The managerial power perspective argues 
that corporate executives can actually exert substantial influence over the decisions 
made by boards of directors relating to executive compensation, and therefore, these 
arrangements are often not negotiated as an arms-length transaction.  
 More specifically, directors, even those defined as independent, have few 
incentives to challenge high executive compensation levels and weak links between 
compensation and  performance. Directors enjoy a number of benefits by serving on a 
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board, including direct financial compensation, stock ownership, stock options, and 
related perks. In addition, board positions offer a number of social and career benefits 
in addition to compensation. Directors often have close social and/or business 
relationships with other directors, and serving on a board strengthens these 
relationships and creates opportunities for new ones. All of these benefits make 
directorships very desirable, and in most cases, the CEO and corporate management 
have the most say about which directors are nominated and renominated to the board. 
Once on a slate of directors, a person is “virtually assured of being reelected” because 
of the difficulties that shareholders face in proposing their own slates of candidates 
(Bebchuk and Fried 2004: 25). Directors can therefore suffer substantial negative 
consequences for opposing executive compensation (i.e., not being nominated for 
reelection), and often these negative consequences outweigh the few positive 
consequences for directors fulfilling their role as guardians of shareholder interests. 
Furthermore, the collegiality of boards, and similar professional and social 
backgrounds of directors and executives, create further disincentives for directors to 
act as the agents of shareholders to challenge executive compensation practices that 
may not be in the long-term interest of shareholders. 
 Although directors can and do oppose and influence executive compensation 
arrangements, this is less likely when managers have more power over directors 
(Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Core et al. (1999) and Cyert et al (2002), for example, 
found that CEO compensation is higher in firms in which CEOs had more power. This 
is in line with existing institutional research on the diffusion of executive 
compensation practices. Zajac and Westphal (1994) found that companies in which 
CEOs had more influence over the board were more likely to symbolically adopt, but 
not implement, long-term incentive programs that shareholders favored. Wade et al. 
(1990) found that more powerful CEOs were more likely to have golden parachutes, 
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while Westphal and Zajac (2001) found that firms with more powerful CEOs were 
more likely to decouple adoption and implementation of stock repurchase programs 
that shareholders favor. Even though stock options came under heavy criticism after 
the scandals, the mechanism still offered executives the greatest potential for future 
wealth, given the dramatic increase in wealth that options had generated prior to the 
scandals. In addition, from the point of view of executives, it is desirable to receive 
new options when the stock price is low because the fixed price at which they can 
purchase the stock is usually set at the market price on the day of grant. If this fixed 
price is low, the greater the gain if and when the option is exercised. This leads to the 
first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The value of executive stock options is higher in companies in which 
CEOs have more power over the board of directors. 
 
 In addition to CEO power, boards also have characteristics that function as 
checks on CEO power. The most obvious one is the presence of outside, independent 
directors. Board members are classified as independent if they are not and have never 
been employees of the company and have no other affiliation through the firm, such as 
through consulting. Boards with higher percentages of outside directors should be able 
to exercise more control over CEOs (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). However, Core et al 
(1999) found that CEOs actually had higher levels of compensation in companies with 
more outside directors. Cyert at al. (2002) found similar results for salary and 
discretionary compensation. Westphal and Zajac (1994) found no effect for the 
proportion of outsiders on the decoupling long-term incentive plans for executives. 
Despite these findings counter to the theory of managerial power, it is likely that in the 
wake of the scandals, boards with higher percentages of directors felt the most 
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pressure to closely scrutinize and restructure executive compensation, and in 
particular, stock options, and that boards with larger numbers of independent directors 
were more likely to take action. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The value of executive stock options is lower in companies  with more 
independent directors.  
 
 Corporate ownership patterns may also influence executive compensation. If 
institutional investors own more stock, this can serve as a constraint on managerial 
power (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Pollock et al (2002), for example, found that higher 
levels of institutional ownership made firms less likely to reprice executive stock 
options. Davis (1991) found that higher levels of institutional ownership led to an 
increase in the likelihood of firms to adopt poison pills. Finally, Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) found that institutional ownership was negatively related to the level of 
executive compensation and positively related to the pay for performance sensitivity 
of executive compensation. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The value of executive stock options is lower in firms with   
Larger holdings by institutional investors. 
 
 According to agency theory, direct ownership of stock by CEOs will align the 
interests of CEOs to that of shareholders (Murphy 1999). Pollock et al. (2002) found 
that higher levels of CEO ownership made firms less likely to reprice stock options 
under certain conditions. Core et. al (1999) found that CEO compensation was a 
decreasing function of the level of CEO ownership, and Khan et al. (2005) found that 
CEO ownership was positively related to salary levels and negatively related to stock 
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option compensation. In the postscandal environment, shareholders were very 
interested in restructuring executive compensation, and in particular stock options. 
CEOs who were more closely aligned with shareholders, therefore, should also favor 
these goals. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The value of executive stock options is lower in firms in which CEOs 
own more stock. 
 
The Role of the Institutional Environment 
The managerial power perspective provides a persuasive critique of the fundamental 
assumptions of agency theory, and a variety of previous studies have found empirical 
support for it (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). This perspective draws attention to the ways 
in which the internal social structure of boards of directors creates an environment in 
which it is very difficult for directors to act in the best interests of shareholders. 
Boards of directors, however, do not operate and make decisions in isolation of an 
organization’s environment, and are likely influenced by factors in these environments 
when making decisions about designing and approving executive compensation 
packages. Although the managerial power perspective does not provide insight into 
how these factors may influence executive compensation, a logical framework that 
does is the vast body of research on the role of institutional environments in the 
adoption and structuring of organizational practices.  
 The institutional approach, first articulated by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and since significantly expanded by a diverse 
community of scholars, highlights the role of noneconomic forces (i.e., institutional) in 
an organization’s environment. A central theme of this framework is that 
organizations seek to acquire and maintain legitimacy by adopting practices that are 
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considered to be legitimate within broad, culturally-defined rules and theories of 
management more proximate field-level norms of appropriateness , as well as formal 
legal rules and regulations. A diverse group of extra-organizational actors confer 
organizational legitimacy, including customers, suppliers, competitors, the state, the 
professions, the media, labor unions, and social movement organizations. One stream 
of institutional research has focused on the effects of institutional influences on 
organizational action (Scott 2001) by examining how practices that are considered 
appropriate by one or more important constituents diffuse across groups of 
organizations.  A second stream of literature has examined how organizational 
practices acquire legitimacy and symbolic meaning, and become institutionalized 
through dynamic social, political, and cultural processes at the field-level (e.g., Baron, 
Dobbin, and Jennings, 1986; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch, 2003; Ruef and Scott 
1998).  
 In this paper, I am interested in the effects of different institutional forces on 
executive compensation practices and especially stock options. Existing research has 
demonstrated the relevance of institutional theory for understanding executive 
compensation practices as unique sites of contestation between corporate executives, 
boards of directors, and shareholders. Zajac and Westphal (1994), for example, 
researched the conditions under which companies symbolically adopted, but did not 
implement, long-term incentive programs that shareholders favored during the battles 
over corporate governance in the 1990s. Similarly, Wade et al. (1998), Porac et al. 
(1999) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) examined how, during the same period, 
corporate leaders symbolically managed the adoption of executive compensation 
practices through the use of different types of verbal accounts. This research has 
demonstrated how political contestations over control of the corporation can shape the 
diffusion and symbolic management of executive compensation. 
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 Similar conflicts between executives, regulators, shareholders, and other 
organizational constituents emerged in the wake of the scandals. The institutional 
crisis of the postscandal environment was characterized in part by regulators, 
enforcement agencies, and shareholders to exert controls on executive behavior, but 
also by new debates about the legitimacy of accounting practices and corporate 
governance practices at the core of the shareholder value conception. As specific 
executives came under scrutiny, criticism, and investigation for behavior and actions 
that led to the collapse of companies like WorldCom and Enron, the legitimacy of 
executive compensation practices, and stock options in particular, also came under 
challenge. More broadly, the scandals raised issues about corporate governance and 
the ineffectiveness of boards to function as monitors of executive behavior. In this 
environment, it is likely that directors felt more pressure to scrutinize and make 
substantive changes to executive compensation, either by reducing it or by 
strengthening the connections between pay and performance. Hence, organizations 
that were under more pressure due to these changes in the institutional environment 
would be more likely to make reductions to executive compensation, and specifically 
stock options. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal reported on April 14, 2003 and June 21, 
2004 that boards of directors were devoting new attention to executive 
compensation.(Lublin 2003, Spors 2004). What types of pressures generated by the 
scandals were the most salient? I look at investigations, class action lawsuits, and 
shareholder activism.   
 Scott (2001) has identified three types of institutions that shape organizational 
behavior: the regulative, normative, and cognitive. The first two are relevant for 
theorizing the types of pressures that may have influenced executive compensation 
practices during this period. Regulative pressures emanate from informal institutions 
that regulate behavior in small groups and formal institutions such as legal systems. 
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The primary types of organizational and executive behavior that came under scrutiny 
at Enron and other companies can be broadly defined as corporate fraud. The first 
annual report of the Corporate Fraud Task Force (CFTF), an interagency task force 
created by the Bush Administration in July 2002 to coordinate investigative and 
enforcement actions by a number of federal agencies, defines corporate fraud as: “(1) 
the falsification of corporate financial information; (2) self-dealing by corporate 
insiders; or (3) obstruction of justice, perjury, or tampering or other obstructive 
behavior relating to either of the categories mentioned above” (CFTC, 2003: 2.2). 
Executives and other corporate representatives who engage in fraudulent behavior can 
be subject to investigation, fines, and criminal prosecution. If anyone at a company 
came under investigation for corporate fraud, it is likely that this would generate 
pressure on boards of directors to be more attentive to their role as guardians of the 
interests of shareholders. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The value of executive stock options is lower in firms facing direct 
investigations for corporate fraud.  
 
 Another regulative pressure consisted of securities class action lawsuits. Such 
lawsuits, in which shareholders sue corporations and their executives for securities 
fraud, are often set in motion by large institutional investors, who act as lead plaintiffs. 
When shareholders win these cases, the outcome is often a financial settlement, with 
damages, to shareholders. According to the Stanford Law School’s Securities Class 
Action Lawsuit Clearinghouse, between 2001 and 2005, 1,409 companies were the 
targets of such lawsuits. This amount represented a 48% increase from the 952 
lawsuits for 1996 to 2000. Although such lawsuits are generally not as visible as direct 
investigations, they represented a way for shareholders to expose potentially illegal 
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actions of executives, which could have put pressure on boards to scrutinize and make 
changes to executive compensation.   
 
Hypothesis 6: The value of executive stock options is lower in firms that facing 
securities class action lawsuits.  
 
 Institutional forces can also pressure organizations to adhere to specific values 
and norms to which organizational leaders are expected to conform. In the wake of the 
scandals, new norms for financial transparency and constraints on self-serving 
executive behavior were emphasized by a number of actors, one of the most important 
of which were shareholders. One of the products of  the battles for corporate control in 
the 1980s and 1990s was the emergence of shareholder activism, which entailed 
shareholders asserting pressure on corporate leaders to make changes to improve 
corporate performance or to implement better governance practices (Davis and 
Thompson 1994, Useem 1999). Shareholders can assert pressure in a number of 
different ways, including filing shareholder resolutions to promote specific changes to 
corporate policies and structures, waging publicity campaigns to expose companies 
targeted for reform, engaging in class action lawsuits against corporate management 
and/or directors, and direct negotiations with corporate management.  
 Although the evidence of the effect of shareholder pressure on stock prices is 
mixed (see Karpoff 1998 for a review), a growing body of literature has found that 
companies respond to shareholder resolutions by adopting and restructuring corporate 
governance practices. Bizjak and Marquette (1998), for example, found that 
companies were more likely to restructure or rescind poison pill provisions when 
faced with a shareholder resolution to rescind these plans. In their study of the 
adoption of investor relations departments during the initial battles for corporate 
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control in the 1980s and 1990s, Rao and Sivakumar (1998) found that organizations 
that were the target of anti-management shareholder resolutions were more likely to 
establish these departments as a way to recognized the new role of shareholders in 
governance. In terms of the influence of shareholder activism on executive 
compensation, Johnson and Shackell (1997) found no evidence that shareholder 
proposals had an effect on subsequent changes in executive compensation. Thomas 
and Martin (1999) find some support that shareholder proposals targeting executive 
compensation have a negative impact on levels of executive compensation in the year 
following the proposal, as compared to firms in a similar industry. However, Wade et 
al (1997) and Porac et al (1999) both found that shareholder resolutions influenced the 
ways in which companies symbolically managed executive compensation in terms of 
the types of justifications they used and the industry peers they compared themselves 
to in SEC filings.  
 In the wake of the scandals, a variety of institutional investors and 
shareholders, particularly public pension fund and labor unions (Borrus 2006), voiced 
strong criticism of existing executive compensation arrangements, especially the 
excessive use of stock options that were not tied to direct measures of executive 
performance. Shareholders expressed this criticism through press releases and 
statements, but more importantly by submitting shareholder resolutions that called for 
a variety specific changes to executive compensation (e.g., requiring a majority of 
independent directors, establishing rescinding poison pills, creating independent 
compensation committees, linking executive pay to performance, implementing new 
restriction on stock options, and abolishing stock options.) Such resolutions are voted 
on by shareholders, and although companies are not legally required to adopt the 
changes pushed for by resolutions that receive majority votes, the presence of 
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shareholder resolutions likely put directors under scrutiny and acted as a pressure on 
directors to closely examine and make changes to executive compensation. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 7: The value of executive stock options is lower in firms in which 
shareholders submitted resolutions relating to corporate governance practices.  
  
Method 
To test these hypotheses, I created a longitudinal dataset of executive compensation 
practices between 2001 and 2005, and used standard OLS regression models for panel 
data. In this section, I describe the data and modeling framework in more detail.  
 
Sample 
I examined changes in executive compensation practices among firms that make up 
the S&P 500, which is an index of firms that have approximately $10 billion or more 
in market capitalization. The final sample included 384 companies that were in the 
S&P 500 for all five years (2001 – 2005) and had complete data.  
 
Dependent Variables 
My primary outcome variable is the sum of the Black-Scholes value of all annual 
stock option grants to the five highest paid executives for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 
2005. The Black-Scholes valuation method models the present value of stock options 
and is based on the number of options granted, the expiration of the option, the grant 
price of the option, the historic volatility of the company’s stock price, and the risk-
free interest rate. In order to provide a comparison to stock option values, I also 
collected data on executive salaries, the value of restricted stock units, and bonuses. I 
collected all of this data from the Execucomp database. For each of these four 
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measures, I calculated the sum for all five executives for each firm, yielding four 
aggregate organizational measures for each firm in the sample. In the models 
presented below, I used the natural log of all four variables in order to control for the 
effect of outliers.  
 
Independent Variables 
I collected data from a variety of archival sources to measure the independent 
variables of interest.  
 Investigations: I measured investigations by federal agencies using two 
sources. The first source was the annual reports released in 2003 and 2004 by the 
Corporate Fraud Task Force (CFTF), an interagency task force created by the Bush 
Administration in July 2002 to coordinate investigative and enforcement actions by a 
number of federal agencies. These reports provide details on “significant cases” being 
pursued by either the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of 
Justice, Department of Labor, Internal Revenue Service, and other federal agencies, 
although the first two represented the bulk of the investigative activity (CFTF 2003, 
CFTF 2004). I supplemented the list of CFTF significant actions with all enforcement 
actions listed by the SEC in its “Selected Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases,” a list published annually on its website. This list includes actions related to 
fraudulent financial reporting and includes both litigation and administrative 
proceedings pursued by the SEC. The same measurement of financial fraud has been 
used by Farber (2005) and Beasley (1996) as a measure of extreme cases of fraud. I 
created a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if a company appeared as the target of 
enforcement action on either of these lists. I effectively lagged the effect of 
enforcement action by measuring this variable during the year following the 
enforcement action. For example, for a company that came under investigation during 
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2001, I coded this variable as 1 in the 2002 panel and not the 2001 panel. After 
removing duplicate cases that appeared on both lists, a total of 79 companies in the 
sample came under investigation at some point between 2000 and 2004. Over half (47) 
of these were started in 2002.  
 Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits: I created a dichotomous variable coded as 
1 if a company was the target of a securities class action lawsuit and 0 otherwise. Data 
on lawsuits was collected from the website of the Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse of the Stanford Law School.2 This variable was effectively lagged by 
one year using the same measurement approach as the investigations variable. A total 
of 128 companies in the S&P 500 became the targets of class action lawsuits during 
this time.  
 Shareholder Resolutions: I measured shareholder resolutions using a 
continuous measure of all shareholder resolutions relating to corporate governance 
actions submitted to the sample firms during 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Data 
on shareholder resolutions was collected from reports issued by Georgeson 
Shareholder, a shareholder advising and consulting firm (Georgeson Shareholder 
2000, Georgeson Shareholder 2001, Georgeson Shareholder 2002, Georgeson 
Shareholder 2003, Georgeson Shareholder 2004). This measurement of this variable 
was also effectively lagged by one year. A total of 1,097 resolutions were submitted 
by shareholders between 2000 and 2004: 38 in 2000, 177 in 2001, 224 in 2003, 360 in 
2003, and 338 in 2004. Forty-one percent of all resolutions were submitted by union 
pension funds, while 47% were submitted by individual investors. The remainder were 
submitted by public employees’ pension funds, socially responsible mutual funds, and 
social movement organizations.  
 
                                                 
2 http://securities.stanford.edu/companies.html. Accessed March 17, 2008. 
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CEO Power and Board Structure: There a number of potential measures of CEO 
power available. I used the ones that were the most salient, based on existing research. 
All were collected was collected from the Corporate Library’s Board Analyst 
database, and all variables were measured, unlagged, for each year in the sample. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) have argued that large boards create free rider problems for 
monitoring executive compensation arrangements and therefore give CEOs more 
power. Along these lines, Core et al. (1999) found that CEO compensation is higher in 
companies with larger boards. I therefore created a continuous variable which 
measured the total number of directors serving on a company’s board. My second 
measure of CEO power was whether or not the CEO also held the position of 
chairman of the board. Studies by Core et al. (1999), Cyert et al.(2002), and Wade et 
al. (2006) have shown that CEO compensation is higher in companies in which the 
CEO is also the chairman. Similarly, work by Pollack at al (2002) found that 
companies with dual CEO chairmen were more likely to reprice their stock options. I 
created a dichotomous variable to measure coded as 1 if the CEO was also the 
chairman.  
 The third measure of CEO power was CEO tenure relative to average board 
tenure. The longer a CEO holds the position, the more likely that he or she will be able 
to exert influence over directors. Also the longer the CEO tenure, the more directors 
he or she is likely to have appointed, and such directors are less likely to challenge a 
CEO (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Existing research has found that companies with 
longer CEO tenure were more likely to decouple the adoption of long-term incentive 
plans (Wesphal and Zajac 1994) and  tock repurchase programs (Westphal and Zajac 
2001), both favored by shareholders, from their actual implementation. I created a 
continuous variable that measured the ratio of the length of the CEO’s tenure to the 
average board tenure. The fourth measure of CEO power was the percentage of 
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directors who served on four or more boards. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) identified this 
as a source of CEO power because directors with more obligations have less time and 
are less likely to monitor and challenge executive compensation arrangements. I 
created a measure of the percentage of the total number of directors who served on 
four or more boards. Finally, I measured the influence of independent directors by 
creating a continuous measure of the percentage of the total number of director that 
were independent.  
 Corporate Ownership: I measured CEO stock ownership as the percentage of 
all shares outstanding owned by the CEO. I measured institutional holdings as the 
percentage of all shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Data for these 
three variables were collected from the Corporate Library’s Board Analyst database.  
Control Variables: Conyon and Peck (1998), Daily et al. (1998), Cyert et al (2002), 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Khan et al. (2005) found that firms size was positively 
related to CEO compensation. The rationale is that large firms are more complex and 
more difficult to manage, and CEOs will be worth more. I measured size using the 
natural log of sales. Previous research also found a positive relationship between 
company performance and CEO compensation (Conyon and Peck 1998, Daily et al. 
1998, Cyert et al. 2002). I measured performance using a the average of total 
shareholder return for the previous three years. Finally, Cyert et al. (2002) and Khan et 
al. (2005) found that CEO compensation was higher in firms with more growth 
opportunities. I controlled for growth opportunities by using Tobin’s Q, a standard 
measure of market value divided by total assets (Khan et al. 2005). Data for all three 
of these variables were collected from the Execucomp database, and I measured all 
three for each year of the observation period. 
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Modeling Strategy 
To take advantage of the time-series structure of the Execucomp data on executive 
compensation, I used fixed-effects regression models. Such models allow the 
researcher to use multiple observations of the same unit over time to control of 
unobserved heterogeneity between units. In this study, I am most interested in the 
effects of the independent variables over the entire time period and less interested in 
whether the effects of these variables changed during the time period. Fixed-effects 
models are the preferred choice in these situations (Halaby 2004). Although random-
effects models can provide more efficient estimates than fixed-effects models, I used 
the test developed by Hausman (1978) to compare the efficiency of the fixed-effects 
estimators with those generated by random-effects models. The test indicated that the 
random-effects models produced a set of estimators that was not statistically different 
from those produced by the fixed-effects models, and thus, the fixed-effects models 
were also statistically justifiable.  
 
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive data and correlation matrix.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Independent Variables 
 
Number Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Investigations 79 - - - - 
Class Action Lawsuits 128 - - - - 
CEO as Chairman 305 - - - - 
Shareholder Resolutions - 0.46 1.05 0.00 9.00 
Size of Board - 10.97 2.65 5.00 25.00 
Percentage of Outside Directors - 0.83 0.10 0.25 1.00 
CEO Tenure - 0.77 0.90 0.00 19.00 
Directors on 4 or More Boards - 0.14 0.13 0.00 1.00 
CEO Ownership - 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.55 
Institutional Ownership - 0.67 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Sales - 8.84 1.17 4.62 12.70 
Tobin’s Q - 1.43 1.40 0.02 12.45 
Shareholder Return - 6.89 20.02 -73.17 106.32 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Investigations 1        
2. Class Action Lawsuits 
0.16** 1       
3. Shareholder Resolutions 
0.26** 0.07** 1      
4. Size of Board 
0.05* 0.05** 0.11** 1     
5. 
Percentage of Outside 
Directors 0.10** 0.06** 0.14** 0.16** 1    
6. CEO is Chairman 0.04 0.03 0.13** 0.00 0.22** 1   
7. CEO Tenure -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09** 0.16** 1  
8. Directors on 4 or More Boards 0.13** 0.01 0.18** 0.07** 0.20** 0.09** -0.07** 1 
9. CEO Ownership -0.03 0.04* -0.06** -0.05* -0.23** -0.01 0.21** -0.07** 
10. Institutional Ownership 0.00 -0.05* -0.01 -0.14** 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 
11. Sales 0.20** 0.13** 0.36* 0.42** 0.19** 0.10** -0.02 0.27** 
12. Tobins Q -0.07 -0.08** -0.12* -0.28** -0.22** -0.14** 0.01 -0.08** 
13. Shareholder Return -0.03 -0.19** 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.07** 
          
  9. 10. 11. 12. 13.    
9. CEO Ownership 1        
10. Institutional Ownership -0.08** 1       
11. Sales -0.05** -0.05* 1      
12. Tobins Q 0.05* 0.09** -0.27** 1     
13. Shareholder Return -0.06** 0.09** 0.01 0.17** 1    
*significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
Table 3 presents the results from a series of fixed-effects regression models predicting 
changes in the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted to all top 5 executives in 
the S&P 500 from 2001 to 2005. Model 1 includes only the control variables; model 2 
includes the external threats from the institutional environment along with the 
controls; model 3 includes the variables measuring CEO power, independent director 
power, corporate ownership structure, and the controls; and model 4 is the fully 
specified model. 
 The results do not support hypothesis one that companies in which CEOs have 
more power had higher option values. In the fully specified model, none of the four 
measures of CEO power (board size, CEO is chairman, CEO tenure, and percent of 
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Table 3: Results from Fixed Effects Regression Models, 
Value of Executive Stock Options of Five Highest Paid Executives, S&P 500,  
2001 -2005 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
 -0.705  -0.558 
Investigations 
 (0.115)**  (0.115)** 
 0.039  0.037 
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits 
 (0.080)  (0.080) 
 -0.129  -0.106 
Shareholder Resolutions 
 (0.026)**  (0.026)** 
  0.039 0.032 
Size of Board 
  (0.017)* (0.016) 
  -1.267 -1.134 
Percentage of Outside Directors 
  (0.276)** (0.272)** 
  -0.126 -0.074 
CEO is Chairman  
  (0.052)* (0.051) 
  0.062 0.051 
CEO Tenure 
  (0.035) (0.034) 
  -0.955 -0.771 
Directors on 4 or more Boards  
  (0.214)** (0.212)** 
  0.005 0.004 
CEO Ownership 
  (0.001)** (0.001)** 
  -0.038 -0.012 
Institutional Ownership 
  (0.086) (0.085) 
-0.249 -0.248 -0.007 -0.043 
Sales (log) 
(0.095)** (0.093)** (0.098) (0.097) 
0.174 0.143 0.121 0.106 
Tobin's Q 
(0.042)** (0.041)** (0.042)** (0.041)** 
-0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
Total Shareholder Return 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
11.026 11.153 9.724 10.043 
Constant 
(0.854)** (0.832)** (0.872)** (0.860)** 
Observations 1732 1732 1694 1694 
Number of Companies 379 379 379 379 
R-squared 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.12 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
directors serving on multiple boards) had a statistically significant and positive effect 
on the value of executive stock options. Interestingly, companies with higher 
percentages of directors on four or more corporate boards actually had lower values of  
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tock options during this period. The managerial power theory predicts that these 
directors would be less able to monitor executive compensation and that boards with  
more directors on multiple boards would lead to higher stock option values. The 
negative impact that these boards appear to have on stock option values suggests that 
these types of directors may actually be more able to function as effective monitors, 
either through experience or because they were more connected to the larger business 
community and more aware of the pressures from the institutional environment. 
Overall, the findings regarding CEO power reveals that in the wake of the scandals, 
CEOs had limited ability to increase the value of their stock option compensation. 
 In contrast, the results provide strong support for hypothesis two regarding the 
power of independent directors. As predicted, companies in which independent 
directors made up a larger percentage of the board had lower executive stock option 
values. In fact, the coefficient for this variable is the largest for any of those analyzed. 
This suggests that independent directors exerted substantial influence over executive 
compensation after the scandals and responded to institutional pressures challenging 
the use of stock options by providing executives with less valuable stock option 
grants. The results do not provide support for hypothesis three, which predicted that 
companies in which CEOs owned more stock would reduce stock options. In fact, the 
coefficient is in the opposite direction, although it is small. Hence, contrary to the 
assumptions of agency theory, CEO ownership does not appear to have aligned the 
interests of CEOs with shareholders, who were calling for reductions in and changes 
to executive stock options. Finally, higher levels of ownership by institutional 
investors did not have any effect on the value of executive stock options, thus 
providing no support for hypothesis four. Institutional ownership may not have 
functioned as a constraint on boards of directors’ decisions regarding executive stock 
options.  
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 Turning to the variables measuring the institutional pressures, the results 
provide support  for hypothesis five. Companies under investigation by a federal 
agency for corporate fraud had lower executive stock option values. Similarly, the 
results support hypothesis seven that companies that were the targets of more 
shareholder resolutions would have lower stock options values. Hence, as predicted by 
institutional theory, these two pressures likely motivated boards of directors to not 
only scrutinize executive compensation practices, but to make reductions in the value 
of stock options granted to executives, the compensation mechanism that had come 
under the heaviest criticism during this period. However, the results show that class 
action lawsuits had no statistically significant effect on stock option values suggesting 
that these lawsuits were not perceived as pressures by boards of directors.  
 As discussed in previous sections of this paper, although stock options came 
under the most scrutiny and criticism after the scandals, they do not represent the only 
form of executive compensation. To complement the findings regarding changes to 
executive stock options, I also examined the influence of the same institutional 
pressures, corporate governance structures, and ownership patterns on changes to 
other forms of compensation: salary, restricted stock units, and bonuses. Did board 
structures influence the value of these forms of executive compensation in the same 
way? Did institutional pressures lead boards to make changes to these other forms? Do 
the results provide support for the claim that corporate boards were offsetting 
reductions in stock options with increases in other forms of compensation?  
 Table 4 presents results from the fully specified models predicting changes to  
three other forms of executive compensation. The second column first  presents the 
results for total compensation, which is the sum of salary, value of stock options, value 
of restricted stock, bonuses, all other forms of cash payments received by executives, 
and payouts from long-term incentive plans. For total compensation, only 
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Table 4: Results from Fixed Effects Regression Models, 
Value of Executive Compensation of Five Highest Paid Executives, S&P 500, 
2001 -2005 
  
Total 
Compensation 
Salary 
Value of 
Restricted 
Stock Units 
Bonus 
-0.189 -0.033 0.853 0.554 
Investigations 
(0.070)** (0.022) (0.485) (0.116)** 
0.040 -0.015 0.254 -0.147 
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits 
(0.048) (0.015) (0.330) (0.080) 
-0.023 -0.010 0.203 -0.007 
Shareholder Resolutions 
(0.016) (0.005)* (0.108) (0.026) 
0.020 0.016 0.148 0.001 
Size of Board 
(0.010) (0.003)** (0.070)* (0.017) 
-0.324 -0.122 2.944 0.778 
Percentage of Outside Directors 
(0.170) (0.054)* (1.170)* (0.291)** 
-0.006 0.004 0.124 0.041 
CEO is Chairman  
(0.032) (0.010) (0.220) (0.053) 
0.008 0.034 -0.643 -0.030 
CEO Tenure 
(0.021) (0.007)** (0.149)** (0.036) 
-0.115 -0.132 1.445 -0.286 
Directors on 4 or more Boards  
(0.129) (0.041)** (0.890) (0.213) 
0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
CEO Ownership 
(0.001) (0.000)** (0.005) (0.001) 
0.058 0.023 0.691 -0.064 
Institutional Ownership 
(0.046) (0.015) (0.319)* (0.075) 
0.229 0.011 1.880 0.581 
Sales (log) 
(0.058)** (0.018) (0.399)** (0.096)** 
0.096 0.011 0.196 0.006 
Tobin's Q 
(0.026)** (0.008) (0.177) (0.043) 
0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.006 
Total Shareholder Return 
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.005) (0.001)** 
7.787 7.992 -16.673 2.283 
Constant 
(0.514)** (0.165)** (3.558)** (0.863)** 
Observations 1845 1861 1861 1767 
Number of Companies 384 384 384 381 
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.10 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
investigations have a statistically significant effect: companies facing investigations 
had lower total compensation. This suggests that investigations motivated boards of 
directors to scrutinize and reduce overall compensation after the scandals. However, 
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since the results for total compensation offer few significant findings, disaggregating 
total compensation into its component parts is likely a better approach for 
understanding the influence of the independent variables on executive compensation 
during this period.  
 Turning to the separate components, for CEO power, the results provide a 
slightly different picture than that of stock options. Although CEO power did not lead 
to higher option values, companies with more powerful CEOs (as measured by larger 
boards and longer CEO tenures) had higher salaries. The findings for restricted stock 
regarding CEO power, however, are ambiguous. While companies with larger boards 
had higher restricted stock values for executives, companies with longer CEO tenure 
had lower restricted stock values. This highlights the possibility that CEO power may 
not have been relevant for this form of compensation or that these two measures do 
not both capture CEO power. Similar to the findings regarding stock options, however, 
the dual role of CEO-chairman had no statistically significant impact on any form of 
executive compensation, and boards with more directors on four or more boards had 
lower salaries. Hence, these findings suggest that in the postscandal environment, 
executives with more power over directors were most able to exert their influence by 
increasing their salaries, but not any other forms of compensation. This provides 
further evidence that the scandals placed real constraints on the ability of executives to 
extract rents through their compensation arrangements.  
 The results for the power of independent directors also presents a more 
complicated picture, particularly regarding the possible connections between changes 
in executive stock options and other forms of compensation. Companies in which 
directors had more power, as measured by the percentage of independent directors on 
the board, had lower salaries, but higher values for both restricted stock and bonuses. 
When combined with the negative results for stock option values, this suggests that 
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independent directors responded to pressures challenging the use of stock options by 
reducing the number of stock options granted to executives and reducing salaries. It 
also suggests that in place of stock options and salary, corporate boards may have 
offset these reductions through increases in restricted stock and bonuses. Overall, the 
evidence provides strong support for the claim that independent directors took an 
active role in making changes to executive compensation, as the decrease in stock 
options and scandals, and increases in restricted stock and bonuses was a marked shift 
from the prescandal era. Companies with higher levels of institutional ownership had 
higher values of restricted stock, providing further evidence that shareholders were 
feeling pressure to move away from options and towards restricted stock during this 
period.  
 A similar process of replacement is also suggested by the findings for 
investigations in Table 4. The results show that companies under investigation had 
higher values of bonuses, but the two other forms of compensation were unaffected. 
Since companies under investigation also had lower stock option values, boards of 
directors may have offset these reductions with increases in bonuses. Similar to the 
findings for stock options, class action lawsuits had no statistically significant effects 
on the value of any of these three types of executive compensation. Finally, the results 
reveal that companies that were the targets of more shareholder resolutions regarding 
corporate governance had lower salary values, but the other forms of compensation 
were unaffected. This provides evidence that boards of directors facing institutional 
pressure from shareholders reduced salary levels in addition to stock options, but did 
not increase any other form of compensation.  
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Discussion 
The results of the analysis presented in this paper provide a number of insights into the 
forces shaping changes to executive compensation after the scandals. First, the 
findings indicate that institutional pressures that emerged with the scandals led 
corporate boards to reduce executive stock option values and salaries, but boost the 
value of executive bonuses. The results also support the claim that in the postscandal 
environment, powerful CEOs faced new constraints in using their power to continue 
receiving valuable stock option grants, but were able to increase their salary levels. In 
addition, independent directors exerted their power in shaping executive compensation 
practices after the scandals, and they used their positions to reduce stock option values 
and salary, and increase the value of restricted stock and bonuses. The results 
regarding the role of independent directors challenges existing work that has shown 
that independent directors have little power to influence or reduce executive 
compensation (Core et al 1999, Cyert at al. 2002, Westphal and Zajac 1994). Since 
these studies analyzed these dynamics prior to the scandals, my findings support the 
contention that the scandals altered the power of independent directors.  
 The limited ability of powerful CEOs and the apparent power of independent 
directors to influence executive compensation after the scandals could be interpreted 
as a partial refutation of the managerial power perspective advanced by Bebchuk and 
Fried (2004). More specifically, the results do not support the view that powerful 
CEOs were able to extract rents through their compensation arrangements. However, 
when these same CEOs and independent directors are placed within the broader 
postscandal environment in which corporations, executives, and boards of directors 
were facing intensive scrutiny and criticism of existing compensation arrangements, 
these findings make more sense and lead to a more complex view of the influence of 
organizational environments on executive compensation practices. This turbulent 
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environment generally made it difficult for executives to exert their power to influence 
compensation arrangements in their favor at the same time that it gave independent 
directors more incentive and power to monitor and alter executive compensation 
arrangements.  
 The findings also reveal, however, that the turbulence in the institutional 
environment after the scandals did not merely create constraints on executive 
influence over compensation setting processes. The scandals and subsequent 
challenges to the legitimacy of executive compensation and stock options also led to 
concrete actions, i.e., shareholder activism and investigations, by extraorganizational 
actors that targeted the existing executive compensation practices and deviant 
executive behavior within specific organizations. The results provide strong evidence 
that in the face of these pressures, boards of directors reacted by reducing the value of 
executive stock options. The finding that institutional pressures had an important 
influence on the structure of executive compensation after Enron is in line with a vast 
body of literature that has demonstrated the importance of institutional environments 
for the diffusion of a number of organizational practices. More specifically, two 
streams of research by Westphal and Zajac (Westphal and Zajac 1994, Zajac and 
Westphal 1995, Westphal and Zajac 2001) and Wade, Porac, and Pollock (Wade et al. 
1998, Porac et al. 1999, Pollock et al. 2001) have shown how institutional 
environments influenced the symbolic management of executive compensation in the 
1990s. Here, I extend this research by showing how institutional environments 
influence the actual substantive structure of executive compensation.  
 In addition, the influence of shareholder activism on executive compensation is 
in line with existing studies by Bizjak and Marquette (1998), Rao and Sivakumar 
(1998), Wade et al (1997) and Porac et al (1999), who have all found that shareholder 
resolutions can influence the diffusion of corporate governance practices and the 
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symbolic management of executive compensation. Although studies by Johnson and 
Shackell (1997) and Thomas and Martin (1999) did not find a similar effect of 
shareholder proposals on the levels of executive compensation, both examined the role 
of activism in the prescandal period. My findings about the role of shareholder 
activism in the postscandal period expands upon this work and more recent work that 
has forged deeper connections between institutional theory and the literature on social 
movements (Davis et al. 2006, King and Soule 2007). One of the primary insights of 
the second stream of literature is that groups of actors outside corporations can engage 
in collective action to effect change in organizational practices. The case of 
shareholder activism demonstrates the applicability of social movement theory for 
studying changes to organizational practices that influence social inequality. In this 
case, shareholders, and in particular union pension funds and individual activist 
investors, were able to take advantage of the political opportunity presented by the 
scandals to mobilize resources to submit shareholder resolutions to effect change in 
executive compensation (McAdam and Scott 2006).  
 The key unresolved question that this analysis leaves open, however, relates to 
the long-term consequences of this shareholder activism and the broader challenges to 
the legitimacy of executive compensation and stock options that emerged after the 
scandals. In this paper, I have demonstrated that these challenges placed pressure on 
boards to decrease the level of certain forms of executive pay and alter the mix of 
executive compensation away from stock options. However, as the broad trend data 
revealed, the sharp decline in the levels of executive compensation that began after 
2000 had leveled off by 2003, and, with the apparent replacement of stock options 
with restricted stock and bonuses, these levels have recently started to climb again. 
Hence, the postscandal constraints on executive power and empowerment of 
independent directors may have been short-lived. Since the scandals did not produce 
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any new substantive regulation of executive compensation by the state, it is likely that 
the social and political environment of boards of directors, which  provide executives 
with distinct power over setting their compensation, have remained mostly unchanged. 
Those challenging the legitimacy of executive compensation practices appear to have 
been able to effect short-term changes in response to institutional pressures, but were 
not able to fundamentally alter the underlying organizational level, corporate 
governance processes through which boards, executives, and corporate human 
resources departments design, implement, and alter executive compensation. It 
appears that the overall system has retained its legitimacy in the face of these 
challenges.  
 This study has obvious limitations. One of the most important limitations 
concerns accurately disentangling the effects of the scandals and the effects of the 
stock market decline that began prior to the scandals in 2000. The drop in stock option 
values, for example, may have been driven by the overall drop in the stock market 
values of most companies during this time, rather than due to the forces uncovered in 
my analysis. A related question is that of executive preferences. Given the drop in the 
stock market, executives may have preferred to receive less of their compensation in 
stock options, contrary to what I have argued in the section motivating my hypotheses. 
This is an important unanswered question. Executives saw dramatic increases in their 
wealth due to the appreciation of the stock market in the 1990s. This may have made 
them continue to want to receive stock options, as I have argued. This contention is 
further supported by the fact that the most advantageous time to receive stock options 
is when stock prices are low because if the stock price increases, the spread between 
the grant price and market price will be higher. Future research would benefit greatly, 
therefore, by controlling more directly for decreases in company stock prices during 
this period, more precise attention to the issue of the timing of changes during this 
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period, and engaging with the large literature on executive preferences for types of 
compensation. Such expansions would help to more precisely measure the impacts of 
the scandals on changes in executive compensation.  
 In addition, I only analyzed changes to the levels of different forms of 
executive compensation, which was not the only the target of criticism. Shareholders 
were also very concerned about the lack of connection between executive pay and 
performance. Did the challenges to executive compensation lead to the 
implementation of such links? Gaining insight into these possible changes would 
provide a richer view of the possible transformation or retrenchment of executive 
compensation after the scandals. Second, the variation in the findings for different 
measures of CEO power raises questions regarding whether these commonly used 
operationalizations of CEO power are measuring the same mechanisms. For example, 
the finding regarding directors on multiple boards suggests that when the legitimacy of 
market institutions is challenged by actors outside the corporation, directors with 
larger networks are more likely to be influenced by these environmental forces. Future 
research would benefit from attending more closely to the specific mechanisms that 
these individual measures isolate. With respect to shareholder activism, my counts of 
shareholder resolutions is a relatively coarse measure of shareholder pressure. Were 
different types of resolutions more or less effective? Did the affiliation of the sponsor 
(e.g., union pension fund, individual activist, social justice organization, public 
pension fund) determine the effectiveness of the activism? Were resolutions that 
received majority votes more influential? It would clearly be useful to dig deeper into 
the conditions under which shareholder resolutions make a difference for executive 
compensation and corporate governance more generally. Along the same lines, were 
different types of regulative pressures more salient than others? Did serious attention 
by the SEC to a particular industry influence levels of executive compensation?  
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 Finally, the analysis only focuses on the S&P 500, which are the largest firms 
in terms of market capitalization. It is reasonable to expect that these companies were 
the most likely to receive scrutiny and most vulnerable to institutional pressures for 
change. Smaller companies may have been less susceptible to such pressures and may 
not have altered their executive stock options programs in the same ways as it appears 
the S&P 500 did. Finally, my focus on the postscandal period limits my comparative 
abilities. What type of influence did CEOs and independent directors have over 
executive compensation before the scandals? What about institutional pressures? 
Extending the quantitative analysis to the earlier period would permit a stronger 
assessment of the extent to which the scandals altered the landscape.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite these limitations, this paper has demonstrated the usefulness of combining the 
managerial power approach with institutional theory in examining changes to 
executive compensation practices. The broad diffusion of executive stock options in 
the 1990s was a key development in the expansion of economic inequality over the 
last two decades. The scandals that emerged at Enron and other companies during 
2000 and 2001 challenged, among other market institutions, the legitimacy of existing 
executive compensation practices, and in particular, the widespread and heavy use of 
stock options. The findings of this paper reveal that these challenges led at least to 
short-term reductions in executive compensation and a decrease in the use of stock 
options. They also suggest that these challenges were possibly not successful at 
altering the organizational level processes through which executive compensation is 
structured.  
 This paper also highlights the potential benefits of making deeper connections 
between institutional theory, the sociology of markets, and the social stratification 
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literature. For example, Fligstein (2001) has argued in his political-cultural approach 
to markets that market institutions, even those that with strong legitimacy, can come 
under challenge during periods of destabilization. The scandals represented such a 
period as some of the core pillars of the institutional architecture of American 
capitalism, such as executive compensation, came under challenge. Fligstein (2001) 
has theorized that during such moments of contestation, market incumbents who 
benefit from existing institutional arrangements possess a great deal of power against 
challengers. Although the analysis presented here reveals that the power of 
incumbents (in this case, executives who benefit from existing compensation-setting 
practices) was constrained in the immediate wake of the scandals, these challenges 
may not have been successful at fundamentally altering the system of corporate 
governance that determines executive compensation. This retention of broad 
institutional legitimacy is not surprising. Although institutions that govern markets are 
subject to periodic crises and challenges, large-scale transformations of market 
institutions are relatively rare (Fligstein 2001). In the case of executive compensation, 
the shift away from the tainted stock option, the increase in the use of restricted stock 
and bonuses, and reductions in the overall level of executive compensation that my 
analysis has revealed may have functioned as symbolic changes that effectively 
derailed more substantial changes. 
 This paper has demonstrated that executive compensation practices, which are 
key mechanisms through which the wealth generated by corporations is distributed 
among different stakeholders, become institutionalized over long periods of time, but 
can become open to contestation during certain periods. However, actors challenging 
the legitimacy of executive compensation practices may face distinct limits in altering 
the social and political processes that ultimately determine the structure of these 
practices. The persistence of the organizational level arrangements through which 
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executive compensation practices are structured will likely translate into continued 
growth in executive pay levels and, without a corresponding increase in compensation 
levels of nonexecutive employees, a continuation of current patterns of income and 
wealth inequality.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF CONVERGENCE IN THE GLOBAL 
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EMPLOYEE 
STOCK OPTION PROGRAMS IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
Introduction 
For the last two decades, organizational and economic sociologists have greatly 
expanded our understanding of the forces shaping cross-national variation in a number 
of different types of economic activity, demonstrating a notable lack of convergence 
between national settings (Guillen 1999, 2001). One stream of literature has focused 
on how national level institutions, such as the state, organized labor, elite networks, 
management ideologies, and culture shape variation in patterns of economic 
development (Evans 1995), the emergence and structure of entire industries (Biggart 
and Guillen 1999), the transfer of organizational forms (Guillen 2001, Westney 1987), 
and the development of management ideologies (Guillen 1994). A second stream of 
literature has analyzed how economic and institutional forces at both the national and 
organizational field levels have shaped the diffusion of specific, legally codified 
organizational practices such as ISO (Guler et al. 2002) and hostile takeovers 
(Schnepper and Guillen 2004); the diffusion of native conceptions of control 
developed in one setting within a new setting (Fiss and Zajac 2004); and variation in 
the contours of less well-defined organizational practices like small group activities 
(Cole 1985) and strategic human resource management (Gooderham et al. 1999). This 
second body of research has both broadened the scope of institutional organizational 
theory, which has mostly examined the diffusion of practices within the US, and 
demonstrated the continued relevance of institutional environments, which are 
particularly visible in comparative societal research. 
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 In terms of research strategy, recent studies of the cross-national diffusion of 
organizational practices have focused primarily on examining the effects of variables 
that capture key elements of national institutional environments. However, like most 
institutional research,  the literature on the cross-national diffusion of compensation 
practices has lacked grounded analyses of how organizational practices are translated 
by organizational and field-level actors who have key roles in implementing, 
structuring, and constructing the meaning of new practices imported from other 
settings. To address this substantial gap in institutional organizational theory, 
Campbell (2005: 54-55) suggested that: 
 
“What is required is a specification of the mechanisms whereby models of 
organization and action that diffuse through a field are translated into practice 
on a case-by-base basis. By translation, I mean the process by which practices 
that travel from one site to another are modified and implemented by adopters 
in different ways so that they will blend into and fit the local social and 
institutional context.” 
 
Explicating the forces shaping translation processes will, therefore, permit a deeper 
view of the malleability of organizational practices and the role of agency in diffusion 
processes. Such a view is important not only for understanding how practices move 
across national borders, but also for understanding how practices diffuse between 
organizations within the same field and between different fields in the same national 
setting. This paper takes a step towards developing a better understanding of the 
processes of translation by examining the institutionalization of employee stock option 
programs (ESOs) within software and information technology (IT) companies in India, 
using the comparative case of the US. Since there are no legal requirements in either 
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country for how these programs can be structured, it is an ideal setting for examining 
variation in the institutionalization of the same organizational practice.  
 More specifically, through data collected in interviews with managers and 
consultants in India, this paper accesses the views and constraints of organizational 
actors who have played key roles in interpreting and implementing ESOs in India. The 
qualitative data indicate that the practice took on a different meaning and structure in 
the Indian context. In the US, technology companies have used stock options since the 
1950s, and the practice diffused rapidly with successive waves of high-tech sectoral 
development in the 1980s and 1990s (Blasi et al. 2003). Furthermore, within the US, 
technology companies have granted stock options very broadly among their 
employees, especially in the 1990s (Blasi et al. 2003). In contrast, ESOs diffused 
among Indian technology companies only beginning in mid 1990s, and Indian 
software and IT firms did not grant stock options as deeply within their organizational 
hierarchies as did technology companies in the United States. The data I collected in 
my interviews reveal that forces at the individual, organizational, organizational field, 
and broader macroeconomic and sociocultural levels influenced how actors in the 
Indian context translated the practice of ESOs. More specifically, my informants 
illuminated how labor market conditions, cultural beliefs about stock ownership and 
investing, organizational constraints on managers and a lack of field level actors and 
conduits of information to promote the creation and transfer of knowledge about the 
practice all had important influences on how organizational actors translated the 
meaning of the practice and adapted it to the Indian context. 
 In addition to emphasizing the roles of institutional change agents in the global 
diffusion of management practices and illuminating how broader organizational, 
institutional, cultural, and economic environments shape the interpretive activity and 
actions of these agents, this paper also aims to make new connections between 
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institutional organizational theory and the vast literature on social stratification by 
examining the institutionalization of a compensation practice that can have a 
substantial impact on income and wealth inequality (Blasi at al. 2003, Morgan and 
Cha 2006). Although scholars of inequality have acknowledged the role of 
organizational level processes and structures in shaping patterns of various 
stratification outcomes (Baron 1984, Baron and Bielby 1980, Sorensen and Kalleberg 
2001), this literature has largely ignored how these organizational level forces are 
themselves shaped by processes and structures at the organizational field and more 
macro levels. Gaining such insight will help us understand the multilevel forces 
shaping variation in the institutionalization of compensation practices in different 
settings and illuminate specific foundations of global inequality that have remained 
mostly obscured in the social stratification research. Finally, this paper expands upon 
the literature on the cross-national transfer of management practices by analyzing 
diffusion within the knowledge sector. Existing work has focused primarily on the 
diffusion of practices within manufacturing industries. Despite the rapid acceleration 
in the globalization of knowledge work and technology production in the last two 
decades, our understanding of its causes, characteristics, and consequences remain 
thin.  
 Gaining insight into the global diffusion of compensation practices within 
knowledge industries is particularly important in light of the fact that technology 
companies in the United States, particularly in the software and internet industries, 
have historically embraced organizational innovations that promote a more equitable 
distribution of profits and power, relative to practices in companies in more traditional 
manufacturing and service industries. These innovations include the widespread 
granting of stock options to most or all employees and the decentralization of 
decision-making authority (Blasi et al. 2003, Saxenian 1998). Anecdotal evidence 
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from media reports in the late 1990s suggested that firms within similar industries in 
India were also adopting similar types of organizational practices. If these practices 
are in fact diffusing widely across borders, the globalization of technology work may 
have different characteristics than what has occurred in manufacturing industries: the 
large scale transference of production and jobs from the advanced capitalist countries 
of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to less developed economies in the 
Third World, and concomitant downward pressures on global wages, employee 
benefits, and working conditions. Although the transference of knowledge work from 
more developed economies to less developed economies has accelerated recently, the 
potential diffusion of organizational practices that broaden ownership and authority 
within the knowledge sector could mean that the globalization of knowledge work is 
not characterized by a similar deterioration of wages and working conditions that has 
occurred in many global manufacturing industries.  
 Despite the importance of these issues, there have been few empirical 
examinations of how compensation practices within the knowledge sector are 
transferring across borders. The case of India is a rich one for examining the 
offshoring of white collar technological work. Since the 1980s, India has become a 
formidable competitor in a number of technology markets, most prominently software 
and information technology (IT). In the last decade, a number of Indian companies 
have emerged as global industry leaders in the creation of increasingly sophisticated 
and customized software and IT products. In addition, dramatic technological 
advances in the last decade have accelerated the ability and capacity of multinational 
technology companies to shift increasingly more of their production activities to 
cheaper labor markets. India has been the recipient of a growing number of these jobs 
because of its highly educated, highly skilled, English-speaking supply of engineers, 
scientists, and other highly skilled workers. This trend of offshoring has been the 
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subject of an increasing amount of media attention and policy debate in the US, but a 
singular focus on the effects of globalization on workers in the US hinders more in-
depth analyses of the deeper causes, complex characteristics, and wide-ranging 
consequences of the globalization of knowledge work.  
 This paper begins with a presentation of the case of the institutionalization of 
ESOs in the US, followed by a brief discussion of the emergence and development of 
the technology sector in India. This sets up the broader context for the analysis of the 
diffusion and institutionalization of ESOs in Indian software and IT firms.  
 
Stock Options and Knowledge Work: The Case of the United States 
An employee stock option is a form of stock-based compensation that gives an 
employee the right to purchase a fixed number of shares at a fixed price for a fixed 
period of time. In both the US and India there are few regulatory requirements 
regarding how companies distribute stock options. Therefore, companies have a great 
deal of freedom in deciding who gets options, how many, how often, and under what 
conditions. For example, companies can grant stock options to only their CEOs, to all 
upper managers, to all middle managers and above, to all employees, or to any 
possible permutation in the number and types of employees. Decisions regarding the 
allocation of stock options among employees remain mostly with corporate 
management, but certain types of grants must be approved by boards of directors and 
shareholders. The lack of specific requirements for how companies structure ESOs 
creates the opportunity for organizations to structure these plans in different ways, and 
for the practice to take on different meanings and become institutionalized in different 
ways in different national environments and organizational fields. This paper focuses 
specifically on how grants to nonmanagement employees became institutionalized in 
India. To better understand the Indian case, it is worthwhile to compare it to how the 
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practice became institutionalized in the US, which has been capably analyzed by Blasi 
et al (2003) and Saxenian (1997).  
 The emergence of ESOs in the US technology sector can be traced to the first 
semiconductor companies in the Silicon Valley of California. In their detailed history, 
Blasi et al. (2003) identify the initial emergence of the practice of granting stock 
options broadly to the experience of Fairchild Semiconductor. Fairchild was founded 
by employees of Shockley Semiconductor, which was an early pioneer of 
semiconductor technology. In 1957, a group of engineers at Shockley became 
disillusioned with the way that the company was managed and left to start their own 
company. From the beginning, the founders wanted Fairchild to be run in a way that 
granted engineers more autonomy and that was more egalitarian in its culture. The 
company also provided most of its engineers and other knowledge workers with an 
equity stake through the mechanism of a stock option, which US corporations had 
been using for decades, but only for top executives.  
 For the founders of Fairchild, giving employees who represented the 
company’s intellectual capital both an equity stake in the business and autonomy in 
their work just seemed to make sense, and this concept became a core part of the 
Silicon Valley model described by Saxenian (1997). A number of Fairchild employees 
went on to found the next generation of semiconductor startups, such as current 
stalwarts like Intel, National Semiconductor, and Advanced Micro Devices. These 
employees brought to their new companies the more egalitarian management 
philosophies originally implemented at Fairchild. The early semiconductor 
manufacturers were typically structured around a core group of engineers who had a 
great deal of autonomy in their jobs and received a financial stake in the organization 
through stock options (Blasi et al 2003). However progressive such policies were for 
these employees, these early high-tech organizations were essentially manufacturing 
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companies and also employed large groups of blue collar workers, who usually did not 
receive stock options. By the mid-1980s, many of these blue collar jobs were moving 
to cheaper labor markets in the same way as blue collar jobs in more traditional 
manufacturing industries (Blasi et al., 2003). However, the early semiconductor 
companies established the initial legitimacy of broad-based stock option programs by 
giving stock options beyond top managers. This practice would take on a new 
meaning for subsequent types of technology companies in Silicon Valley.  
 With the development and diffusion of personal computers (PCs) in the 1980s, 
for example, a new generation of computer manufacturers emerged. In addition, the 
rise of PCs meant that software production, which was traditionally handled within 
hardware manufacturers, became a distinct enterprise, around which whole companies 
could be formed. These new software firms epitomized the notion of a knowledge 
company because their capital and products were not physical, but intellectual (Blasi 
et al. 2003). Due to the primacy of this intellectual capital, tight labor markets for 
knowledge workers, and the need to preserve start up cash, software companies began 
granting stock options to a much broader groups of employees than the earlier 
generation of Silicon Valley semiconductor companies (Blasi et al, 2003). In the late 
1980s, the highly publicized public offerings of many of these companies, particularly 
Microsoft, turned a number of lower level employees into millionaires and 
dramatically reinforced the legitimacy of granting stock options to broad groups of 
employees. As the Internet boom began in mid-1990s, a number of new industries 
sprang up to provide the hardware and the software for this new technology. Facing 
similar needs for knowledge workers, tight labor markets, and startup cash as the 
previous generation of software startups, companies in these industries turned en mass 
to the practice of granting stock option to most or all employees, which the software 
industry had institutionalized as the accepted way to address these issues. With the 
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widespread adoption of this practice within the new generation of startups, ESOs 
became firmly institutionalized within Silicon Valley and began to spread to both 
other technology regions in the US such as Boston, Seattle, and Washington DC. The 
practice even began to spread to nontechnology companies during the stock market 
boom of the late 1990s.  
 In the 1990s in the United States, therefore, the practice of granting stock 
options broadly to most or all employees became standard within most high-tech 
industries as a way attract, retain, and motivate knowledge workers. The forces 
shaping the institutionalization of this practice were complex and can mostly be traced 
to the population of startup firms in Silicon Valley. First, the practice had strong 
cultural resonance within the Silicon Valley startup environment characterized by 
strong norms of innovation and nontraditional organizational structures. Second, the 
practice served a very practical function as a way for startup companies to preserve 
cash, and still hire and retain the intellectual capital on which success was determined. 
Third, in the extremely tight knowledge labor markets of Silicon Valley, employees 
demanded stock options because they were knowledgeable about the potential payoffs 
that could occur under the standard business model of startup firms going public. This 
positive evaluation of stock-based compensation was also influenced by the broader 
phenomenon of more widespread participation in stock market investing within the US 
during the 1990s. At the organizational field level, the practice diffused quickly and 
easily within the dense networks of highly mobile employees, managers, and 
executives that has defined Silicon Valley since its emergence in the 1950s (Saxenian 
1998). Finally, a community of field-level actors also helped legitimate the practice, 
such as the venture capital industry, which required startup firms to have ESOs; 
compensation consulting firms that specialized in the design and management of 
ESOs; and technology industry associations and nonprofit organizations specializing 
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in equity compensation practices, such as the National Association of Stock Plan 
Professionals (NASPP), which were crucial in disseminating information and building 
inter-company networks of professionals responsible for designing, implementing, and 
managing these programs.   
 The bursting of the Internet-driven stock market bubble in 2000 and 
subsequent corporate scandals, however, challenged the legitimacy of the practice 
(Carberry 2007). Although privately-held startups still grant stock options broadly, 
their use among larger publicly traded technology companies has diminished in the 
last four years (NCEO 2007). In addition, the globalization of technology production, 
which began to accelerate in the late 1990s, has had important implications for the 
legitimacy and use of the practice within the knowledge sector.  
  
The Emergence of the Global Technology Sector and the Case of India 
In the last ten years, dramatic advances in information technology have accelerated the 
ability and capacity of US companies to offshore a wide range of white collar and 
high-tech jobs to cheaper labor markets. India has been a recipient of a number of 
these jobs because of its highly educated, English-speaking workforce. As India’s 
economy opened up to global investment with the implementation of reforms backed 
by the International Monetary Fund in 1991, the focus of the high-tech sector, centered 
primarily around software development, began to shift from production for internal 
markets to production for external markets (Evans 1995, Patibandla & Petersen 2002). 
However, prior to the mid-1990s, software firms in India were primarily low cost 
exporters of routine functions and faced serious institutional barriers to harnessing the 
high-tech industry as an engine of economic development, such as a lack of 
entrepreneurial initiatives, complex bureaucratic oversight, a very underdeveloped 
infrastructure, and the loss of talent to the United States (Parthasarathy 2004a, 2004b; 
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Saxenian forthcoming, 2002, 2000). However, subsequent policy initiatives created 
new opportunities and a diversification of products and of the industry generally, 
paving the way for the emergence of a population of software and IT services 
companies that competed in the most advanced global markets (Parthasarathy 2004a, 
2004b).  
 Despite its extensive analysis of the historical development of the Indian 
software sector, the existing literature has not examined in similar detail the structure 
of compensation in the Indian software industry. Indian software companies such as 
Wipro and Infosys have received significant media attention in the United States for 
generating enormous wealth for their employees and creating organizations that 
resemble software firms in the US through employee stock options, decentralized 
organizational structures, and unconventional corporate cultures (e.g., Karp 1999). 
However, we still lack a detailed view of compensation and organizational practices in 
the software industry in India, particularly practices that provide employees with an 
equity stake in the company through stock options. The initial motivation of the 
research discussed in the remainder of this paper was to address this gap.  
 
Methodology: Accessing the Views of Organizational and Field Level Actors 
Most studies of practice diffusion take advantage of longitudinal data on adoption 
events. However, for many organizational practices, adoption events are neither 
visible nor measurable. In this study, I employed an alternative strategy for analyzing 
diffusion by accessing the views of actors who were either involved in practice 
adoption (corporate managers) or who occupied positions that provided in-depth 
knowledge of adoption events (compensation consultants). While this strategy does 
not serve as a replacement for standardized, longitudinal data on practice adoption 
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within a representative sample of organizations, it does represent an underused 
approach for gaining insight into broad diffusion trends.  
 To examine the incidence and processes shaping the institutionalization of 
ESOs in India, I conducted a series of interviews in Pune, Hyderabad, and Bangalore 
in February and March of 2005. I interviewed a total of 19 people, which included 18 
Indians and one Americans. Thirteen of the informants worked for eight different 
companies: six were employed in three Indian-based firms, while the other seven 
worked for five different multinationals, all but one of which was based in the United 
States. These companies were all involved in creating high-end, customized software 
and information technology products for a range of global clients. Of the 13 company 
representatives, one was an executive, ten worked as high-level human resource or 
compensation and benefits managers, one was a middle manager, and one was a client 
services manager. I also interviewed four Indian consultants (two at one Indian firm 
and two who worked for one American firm) and two Indian academics. Interviews 
were open-ended, based on a set of standard questions, and lasted between one and 
two hours each. I inquired about how their own companies (or clients) were using 
stock options, and probed their broader views about the use of employee stock options 
and equity compensation in India more generally, as well as the development of the 
technology sector in India. More detailed information on the interviews can be found 
in the Appendix of this dissertation.  
 This sample of informants is not representative of the population of Indian 
technology firms, MNCs based in India, or consulting firms in India. The analysis and 
conclusions I draw from the data should, therefore, be viewed with some caution 
regarding their generalizability. However, most of my informants who were working 
within technology companies occupied high-level positions, such as director of 
compensation or vice-president of human resources. They were in primary decision-
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making roles regarding the implementation and design of ESOs within their 
companies, and therefore, represent actors involved in the process of translation. In 
terms of broader views of practice diffusion, the roles and experiences of this sample 
of informants represent a broad perspective on the use of stock options and other 
compensation practices within their own companies and within the technology sector 
more generally. Informants working in consulting or academic positions possessed 
similarly broad industry experience and perspectives on the connections between 
economy and society in India. My sample, therefore, included informants who all have 
an expansive perspective of stock option practices and extensive professional and 
industry networks, and were therefore well-qualified to assess current practices, the 
history of stock option practices, and broader trends. 
 Hence, beyond offering a novel way to gain insight into the diffusion of ESOs 
in India, this research strategy also represents a fruitful approach for examining 
processes of translation. What types of individual, organizational, field, and societal 
level forces drive decisions about how an organizational practice from one setting is 
understood, interpreted, and actually implemented by actors in a different setting? My 
interviews with key actors in the Indian technology sector provided unique insight into 
this question because I was able to probe the views of organizational actors who 
played key roles in interpreting and implementing ESOs in the Indian setting. What 
follows in the rest of the paper is a descriptive summary and analysis of the views and 
perspective of my informants on the growth of the IT sector in India, the use of ESOs 
in this sector, and the forces shaping the institutionalization of ESOs. I have removed 
any direct references to individuals or companies to protect the confidentiality of my 
informants.  
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A Brief History of Employee Stock Options in India 
The diffusion of ESOs in India closely parallels the history of the software and IT 
industry. My informants painted a broad picture of the development of this industry 
that reflects existing analyses (Parthasarathy 2004a, 2004b; Saxenian forthcoming, 
2002, 2000). The industry developed from providing primarily low-cost, routine 
coding in the 1980s to one that, by the mid-1990s, produced increasingly complex and 
customized systems for a range of global clients. By the late 1990s, India had emerged 
as a global center of software development and related IT products due to the 
increasing sophistication of its technological knowledge base and high levels of 
productivity. In addition, electronic communication and file transfer capabilities 
expanded dramatically in the late 1990s, and this both allowed Indian companies to 
serve a growing base of global clients and motivated multinational companies to 
outsource more significant components of their production processes to India. The 
country has been the recipient of a growing number of these jobs because of its highly 
educated, highly skilled, English-speaking supply of engineers, scientists, and other IT 
workers who are paid at substantially lower wages relative to the United States and 
Western Europe. The dramatic growth continued until the downturn in the US stock 
markets in 2001. Indian software and IT companies, however, recovered relatively 
quickly and have continued to expand into new services, products, and markets.  
 My interviews clearly revealed that Indian executives and managers want India 
to become a global center of technological innovation within the next decade, one to 
rival Silicon Valley. As a senior vice-president of human resources at a large Indian 
software firm explained: 
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 “The time has come that the best practices can be created anywhere in the 
 world. It is no  longer restricted to the Western world. India is just speeding 
 ahead in terms of growth, creativity, and innovation.”  
 
As many informants indicated, however, India faces serious challenges to realizing 
this vision, challenges that some scholars have argued must be addressed at both the 
industry and societal levels, and for which the state will have to take on a new role to 
address effectively (Saxenian forthcoming, Parthasarathy 2004a). Similarly, the same 
senior VP of human resources observed that:  
 
 “The big problems for India and China will be the lopsided development 
 between urban and rural development. There is social imbalance. I saw this in 
 China. Poverty and  prosperity coexisting. That is the only danger and risk 
 these companies face. Otherwise these countries have enormous potential and 
 power to surge ahead…And,  there will be externalities on the rural sector. I 
 still think there will be a drag on both India and China even after 20 years.” 
 
 As the technology sector expanded in India, so did the use of employee stock 
option programs. Although there is little empirical data on the historical or current 
incidence and structure of ESOs in Indian companies, my interviews, while not 
providing a set of quantitative data in a representative sample of companies, generated 
a rich set of qualitative observations about the structure of ESOs in India (who 
receives stock options, how many, how often, and how these decisions are made) and 
about broader historical trends. Overall, my interviews revealed that Indian technology 
companies have used stock as a form of compensation since the sector’s inception in 
the 1980s, but ESOs for nonmanagers only emerged as a compensation mechanism in 
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the mid-1990s. Prior to this, companies used other forms of stock-based 
compensation, such as direct stock grants. Some of the pioneering Indian IT 
companies provided these grants to broad groups of employees because of the 
ideological commitments of their founders to egalitarian approaches to management.  
 The general history of stock option use in indigenous Indian technology 
companies is reflected in the histories of stock option use within individual 
organizations. The individual histories that informants recounted in their own and 
other companies had similar characteristics. Many companies began granting stock 
options to nonmanagers some time in the mid-to-late 90s, usually around 1997, 
although some companies were making such grants a few years earlier. As one of my 
informants, a CEO of an Indian software firm, noted:  
 
 “I have worked for three IT companies in India. Similar philosophies. 
 Typically the option plans started in 1996 and 1997.”  
 
 According to my informants, the initial diffusion of ESOs was fueled by the 
rapid growth of the Indian IT sector in the mid-1990s. As the sector expanded, the 
demand for skilled labor intensified. In addition to offering high levels of cash 
compensation and more generous benefits, these companies also imported the practice 
of granting stock options from the US. Indian executives and managers initially 
gravitated towards ESOs out of familiarity: many Indian managers and technical 
workers had either spent at least some time working in the United States or were 
embedded within dense cross-national networks of colleagues. Furthermore, during 
the mid-1990s, high-tech MNCs from the United States began to aggressively set up 
operations in India and hire within local labor markets. Many of the US-based MNCs 
initially granted stock options very broadly to employees, and in order to compete for 
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technical labor, Indian companies had to follow suit and grant stock options.  
 Despite the broadness of the grant practices of US MNCs, however, all of my 
informants agree that Indian companies used stock options more selectively, and this 
is the primary difference between how the practice became institutionalized in India 
vs. the US. The most common structure of ESOs in India has been one that grants 
stock options to all top management and a selective group of middle level managers 
and technical workers. For example, one company in my interview sample granted to 
employees at all levels of their technical staff, but not necessarily to all employees 
within these levels. Another company granted to all technical employees down to a 
certain level. Another company only granted to top managers and the highest level 
technical workers. These grants seldom, if ever, went to nontechnical employees, such 
as those in traditional administrative functions, in contrast to stock option practices in 
US technology companies (Weeden et al. 2001). In India, stock options also have been 
used primarily as a way for companies to retain employees, rather than as a hiring 
incentive. This also contrasts to the experience of the US, in which grants were used as 
both a hiring incentive and a retention device (Weeden et al. 2001).  
 As the Indian IT sector entered a state of rapid expansion at the end of the late 
1990s and early 2000s, more US-based multinational companies came to India, labor 
shortages tightened further, and ESOs spread to more Indian IT companies. 
Companies that had never granted options before began to do so at this time, and those 
with plans broadened the number of employees receiving them. As a compensation 
manager for a US-based firm indicated:  
 
 “In 1999 when I joined, that was really the hot time, one of the first few peaks 
 in the industry. A lot of companies, Indian companies, a lot of the 
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 multinationals were losing people to these companies. Stock options were a 
 rage at the time. It was one of the leading market practices.” 
 
Some companies even extended stock options to all employees, including nontechnical 
workers. As an assistant VP of human resources for a large India-based software and 
IT firm explained:  
 
 “So that’s what I was talking about in 2001 when we actually increased it to 
 the rest of the organization. The rest of the organization were really the 
 software engineers. Entry level to two years. Everyone else had pretty much 
 been covered. It was really the software engineers and the systems analyst with 
 0-3 years experience who were covered to a much less percentage. And this is 
 where we really opened up and said, we should really give the opportunity to 
 these employees as well. Because these are really the knowledge generation.” 
 
Just as the practice was reaching a more advanced stage of institutionalization, 
however, the value of US technology stocks experienced a dramatic downturn. 
According to the same assistant VP:  
 
 “There was a time around 2001 – 2002 when [broad-based stock option grants] 
 became almost a market practice and most of the big players in the industry 
 were giving stock options. But over 2001 – 2002 and after that, a lot of 
 organizations stopped.”  
 
 Why did the diffusion of the practice stop at this point? Since many Indian 
companies were traded on the US stock market and/or did a large percentage of their 
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business with US-based clients, there was a substantial negative impact on the value of 
Indian technology companies. In turn, the potential value of the stock options that had 
been granted to IT employees diminished substantially or evaporated completely, 
leading to substantial criticism of ESOs as a mechanism of wealth generation and a 
reassessment of a common view among Indian employees that stock options had no 
downside. As most of my informants indicated, the criticism and reassessment hurt the 
fragile legitimacy of ESOs in India, and IT companies began to scale back the 
broadness of their stock option grants or eliminate of stock option grants altogether. 
The drop in potential stock option value and challenges to the legitimacy of ESOs also 
occurred in the US, but the practice had achieved a more advanced level of 
institutionalization in the latter and thus has retained its core legitimacy in the face of 
these challenges.  
 The history of ESOs described by my informants reveals that other than the 
period from 1999-2001, when labor market shortages were most acute and companies 
began granting stock options to broader groups of employees, Indian companies have 
not granted and do not currently grant stock options as broadly as US companies. In 
India, stock options have primarily been used as a retention tool for more selective 
groups of employees. In addition, ESOs have also had limited spread to non-
knowledge based industries in India, with the exception of executive and management 
grants. Furthermore, my interviews revealed that multinational companies based in 
India appear to simply extend to Indian employees the grant practices they have in 
place for US employees to their Indian counterparts. Most of these companies will, 
however, adjust the number of options granted to reflect local currency values. Hence, 
US based companies that grant stock options to all employees in the US tend to offer 
stock options to all employees in India, and those US companies that have more 
selective grants in the US have more selective grants in India. 
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 The picture that emerged from my interviews regarding the spread of ESOs in 
India is not a simple one of a compensation practice moving effortlessly across 
borders, with Indian companies simply imitating their American counterparts. 
Although information about the practice easily transferred across borders and Indian 
lawmakers imitated the basic regulatory framework of the US, the meaning and 
structure of the practice in the two countries differed in significant ways. Most 
notably, broad-based stock option grants did not diffuse as widely in India, and the 
general practice of ESOs did not become deeply institutionalized in India. What 
accounts for this variation in the patterns of incidence and the structure of ESOs in 
India? To answer this question, it is essential to examine the views of  institutional 
change agents within organizations and the broader organizational field within which 
software and IT companies are embedded and to explore how and why these agents 
translated the practice into one that made more sense in the Indian context. The next 
section examines the forces shaping the processes of translation.  
 
Forces Shaping the Translation and Institutionalization of ESOS in India 
My interviews revealed that the translation of ESOs and the different pattern of ESO 
diffusion within the Indian IT sector has been shaped by broader labor market 
conditions, cultural beliefs about stock ownership generally and stock options 
specifically, strategic human resource management considerations at the 
organizational level, and the apparent absence of certain field level conditions that 
function as drivers of diffusion within organizational fields. My informants provided 
detailed observations about how these different forces shaped the institutionalization 
of ESOs in India. In this section, I take a more detailed look at these forces in the 
context of both indigenous Indian firms and MNCs with operations in India.  
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Labor Market Conditions and Cultural Beliefs about Stock Ownership 
Organizations adopt and structure compensation practices as a way to attract, retain, 
and motivate employees. Although much research has focused on wages and salaries, 
in the last two decades, equity has emerged as a complementary component of 
employee compensation in a number of labor market settings. A core factor shaping 
the structure of any form of compensation are local labor market conditions. In 
addition, in order to be effective, these practices have to be perceived in a positive way 
by employees. In the case of cash compensation, the levels have to be considered as 
fair. In contrast to cash-based compensation, equity-based compensation is a relatively 
new form of compensation. Since few employees beyond the executive ranks have 
extensive experience with stock ownership, organizations face the additional barrier 
that employees have little familiarity with the mechanism. In the case of knowledge 
labor, hiring and retention are key, and compensation managers have to be especially 
sensitive to designing these programs effectively.  
 In terms of local labor market conditions, although India creates a large 
number of highly trained technology workers every year, the dramatic expansion of 
the technology sector has meant that severe labor shortages have been a relative 
constant. This shortage was particularly acute in the late 1990s, receded during the end 
of 2001 and 2002, but has become a very serious issue once again. As a senior 
compensation manager for a US-based software firmed explained:  
 
 “It was crazy in the late 1990s. Absolutely mad. Worse than it is now. People 
 were…could go around and shop, go out in the morning and come back with 
 four offers. That is how it was. Then, I think, 2000, it came down. Now it has 
 gone back up.” 
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A compensation manager at another US-based firm agreed that knowledge workers 
were in a position of power within technology labor markets: 
 
 “India is a hot sellers market. They will end up going to ten companies, get the 
 offers,  then go to the 11th company and try to get the best offer.”  
 
 All of my informants noted that attracting and retaining employees was one of 
the most significant challenges facing both Indian IT firms and MNCs with operations 
in India. This labor shortage gave employees significant leverage to shop around for 
multiple job offers and negotiate aggressively for their compensation. Interestingly, 
employees appear to only negotiate aggressively for cash compensation. Practically 
every one of my informants emphasized that “cash is king” for technology employees 
in India. This was the single most common and emphatic theme raised in my 
interviews. Employees welcome other benefits above and beyond their base cash 
compensation, such as stock options or variable pay, but do not value these as highly 
as cash. As the CEO of a consulting firm specializing in equity compensation plans 
explained:  
 
 “People at the low level of the organization would rather see cash which is 
 certain.  Rather than have something that is …I mean…they do not have a 
 clue. They say ‘I have been coming to the office everyday, I have been 
 working everyday, why should I not get this money.’ They do not 
 understand…they do not correlate their performance with the stock market 
 performance. They would rather get cash than something that is variable.”  
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Similarly, a compensation and benefits director for a US-based hardware manufacturer 
with extensive operations in India noted:  
 
 “When we are selling employees our total value proposition to potential 
 employees, they are just focused towards the base. The moment you show 
 them the variable component, they think that is still contingent on X, Y, and 
 Z…The moment you tell them about variable pay, mentally, they cut out the 
 program. They will just focus on their base pay.” 
 
Another compensation and benefits director for a US based software firm noted: 
 
 “Today we have a significant population who are very young in the IT 
 industry. When they look at compensation, all they look at is cash. They are 
 only concerned about cash allowances. They don’t care about benefits. They 
 don’t care about the soft benefits that we try and give them. They don’t think 
 about the long-term, so all they are concerned about is why is that number that 
 hits my bank account. That’s all that matters.” 
 
This desire for cash emanates from a number of forces. First, employees want 
immediate cash to take care of and provide financial security for themselves and their 
extended families. Also, there is only a small social safety net in India. If employees 
lose their jobs, most are on their own for healthcare and other necessities. If the IT 
sector goes into a downturn, employees who have saved up cash from previous 
employment will be much better prepared to deal with loss of employment. A 
compensation manager for a US-based software firm commented:  
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“Here an employee looks at making money fast and making money fast in 
terms of cash. His daily earnings is more important than the long term 
earnings. Because tomorrow if he loses his job, he does not have a state to take 
care of him. It’s as simple as that. So, even if you are in an MNC or one of the 
big companies, none of us have a guarantee of a job. If the business does not 
do well, we are out. If we are out, the state doesn’t take care of us. So this guy 
is looking at all these….I am going to look at the next few months or years and 
how I can make the maximum money. That is all he is concerned about.” 
 
This person continued to note that:  
 
 “If I have a family, I have to feed to two children and tomorrow I meet with an 
 accident, my family is doomed. If I am the only earning member in the family, 
 the family is doomed. So I have this concern all the while that I need to keep. I 
 need to save. I need to leave behind.”  
 
In addition, the technology sector has created a new middle class, however small in 
proportion to the rest of the population, and members of this new class want to 
purchase homes, cars, and consumer goods. As one compensation manager noted:  
 
 “Cash is immediate. I get to see and I get to utilize it for my big purchases. 
 And that impacts what I take home, what kind of purchases I make.”  
 
Moreover, levels of cash compensation have escalated rapidly among 
technology workers because of high labor mobility. The human resource managers 
and consultants I interviewed emphasized that the most common career ladders for 
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technology workers are not those within a single organization. Instead, employees in 
the Indian technology sector advance in their careers by moving from company to 
company every couple of years. These moves are usually significant promotions and 
come with a significant increase in base salary. A compensation manager for a US-
based firm observed that:  
 
“In India, you can get a college graduate at a salary, but typically in a design 
 environment, four years experience, the market average tends to double. So in 
 five years, you have to figure out a way to double this person’s salary. 
 Different in the US. As people enter different phases…each job shift is also 
 seen as one of the ways to significantly increase compensation. When I shift 
 my job, I expect a 30% increase.” 
 
In addition, the MNCs that entered in earnest in the late 1990s were able to pay high 
cash compensation, which drove levels up even further.  
 Just as employees view cash compensation very positively, they view stock 
options negatively. The devaluation of stock options can be traced to a number of 
sources. First, many informants indicated that in general, Indians do not view the stock 
market as a place to make money or even a place to put their assets. A compensation 
and benefits manager for a US-based firm explained: 
  
 “Culturally, India hasn’t seen like…how many of them have really seen the 
 magic of shares giving you big benefits…If you look at Indians, they are very 
 risk averse. For sure. We don’t believe…the trend is definitely changing…but 
 still, on average, risk averse people.” 
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Similarly a senior VP of human resources at an Indian-based firm noted that: 
 
 “You also need to look at the social cost of people in India. If you look at the 
 way investments are done. For us, until recently, investments of retirements 
 funds were not allowed. Individuals in India, traditionally, they have invested 
 in something like gold. Which is really fixed, not large return, but an assured 
 return. But this is changing…if you want to look at risk and return, more 
 people will go for low risk and low return. There are very few of the 
 population who are investing in the stock market and expecting high 
 returns.” 
 
This is in sharp contrast to attitudes about the stock market in the United States. 
Indians are more risk averse, and the state has only recently put stronger controls in 
place within India’s stock markets. Hence, the legitimacy of the stock market itself 
remains unstable in India. Moreover, few employees have realized significant gains 
from their stock options in India, and the widespread use of stock options among 
broad strata of the technological workforce only began to occur just before the crash 
of the US stock markets in 2001. Hence, few employees made significant amounts of 
money from stock options. As a middle manager at an Israel-based software firm 
noted: 
  
 “Stock options came into play in India to a large extent post the dotcom bust. 
 Lower level folks thinking about the negative aspects and not getting 
 benefited. This is one of the reasons why [stock options] have not gone down 
 to the lower levels.” 
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 Furthermore, the startup sector in India is only in its infancy. In the US, the 
large number of startup ventures granted options to virtually all employees, and 
created the situations in which employees enjoyed astronomical windfalls from 
exercising their stock options once these companies went public in a bubble market. 
The generation of wealth through stock options received extensive media coverage in 
the US, and helped solidify the legitimacy of the practice. An experienced, Indian, 
equity compensation consultant noted that:  
  
 “In India, very few companies go public. It is very difficult for people to see 
 cash. Even in terms of getting acquired. It is very rare. Still considered a 
 stigma if you sell your business.” 
 
 In India, in contrast, the startup sector remains in a nascent stage with large, 
established, public Indian software companies and multinationals dominating most 
markets. Hence, there were far fewer situations in which nonmanagement employees 
made large amounts of money off their stock options, although this did occur for 
employees in some of the pioneering Indian IT companies, such as Wipro 
Technologies.  
 Most informants also traced the devaluation of stock options among Indian 
knowledge workers to a lack of knowledge and awareness of the mechanism. Stock 
options are complicated forms of compensation that require employees to understand 
new tax rules, avoid securities regulations, and engage in long-term financial planning. 
This type of knowledge often accumulates gradually through corporate educational 
programs and other information channels, such as media reports. One informant, an 
experienced consultant on equity compensation, noted that Indian companies are doing 
very little in terms of educating employees about stock options:  
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 “But in India, companies are doing very little or no communication at all other 
 than what is required statutorily. If employees are actually told about the value 
 of those shares that they are holding, both present value and future value, there 
 will be tendency to hold onto  the shares. But in absence of that, its been looked 
 upon as a short term incentive. People are waiting for the price to go up.” 
 
 However, some informants indicated that employees at different levels have 
different attitudes, and part of this may relate to knowledge and awareness. For 
example, managers and executives tend to value options more because it is more 
common for them to receive stock options and when they do, they often receive a 
significant number of them. Managers and executives also have more experience with 
investing and the stock market. Lower level, nonmanagement employees have had 
limited access to generous stock option awards, so have tended to value them less. 
However, this also means that they have little experience with, awareness of, and 
knowledge about stock options, which contributes to employees’ negative perceptions. 
This leads to an interesting point. Most of my informants emphasized emphatically 
that tech labor markets are very tight and that as a result, employees are negotiating 
aggressively for cash. If skilled labor is in such short supply, employees should be 
able negotiate for both cash and stock options, as well as other benefits. Although part 
of the reason they do not has been because they do not value options all that highly, 
another factor may be that employees do not have a broad enough knowledge about 
stock options, how they work, how they can benefit from having them in the long 
term, and how to negotiate for them, even though the labor market conditions are 
fertile for employees to obtain them above and beyond their cash compensation.  
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. This section has reviewed the perspectives and incentives of Indian knowledge 
workers regarding compensation and benefits. These views and overall labor market 
conditions were key considerations for corporate managers designing and 
implementing ESOs. Indian technology workers have been most interested in 
receiving cash over stock options because they do not view the stock market as a place 
to make money, have not witnessed stock options generating significant wealth, and 
remain relatively unknowledgeable about stock options and how they work. Since 
stock options are not highly valued by Indian employees, there is little incentive for 
companies to invest resources into designing and implementing plans. This is not to 
say that India tech workers only value cash. Most informants noted that employees 
also value good working conditions, respect and autonomy in their jobs, opportunities 
to work on interesting projects, opportunities to learn, and opportunities to work for 
high status organizations.  
 
Organizational Level Constraints 
In addition to labor market conditions, managers face organizational level constraints 
when designing compensation and human resource programs. Such constraints include 
how staffing and retention fit in with overall corporate strategy, as well as the financial 
resources available for wages and salaries. In the case of stock-based compensation, 
managers must also taken into account the total amount of employer stock available to 
make available for employees to purchase or acquire. Beyond these practical 
considerations, decisions about how to structure employee compensation are driven by 
what Guillen (1994) has identified as models of management, or institutionalized 
ideas, concepts, and strategies available to managers for how to manage organizations. 
With respect to compensation and human resource practices, Baron et al. (2001: 961) 
have highlighted the importance of “culturally accepted logics or blueprints for 
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organizing, including a model of how employment relations should be structured.” My 
interviews illuminated how both practical considerations and more tacit logics of 
compensation shaped the translation and adoption of ESOs among Indian software and 
IT firms.  
 In terms of an employment relations model, corporate decision-makers in India 
view stock options as primarily a way to retain key employees, rather than a benefit 
that is worthwhile providing to most or all of their employees. The institutionalization 
of the structure and meaning of ESOs in India as selective grants is clearly different 
from the way stock options became institutionalized in Silicon Valley. One of the 
primary components of the Silicon Valley organizational model was an egalitarian 
emphasis on the liberal and broad use of stock options as a way to attract, retain, and 
motivate knowledge workers and drive innovation at all levels of an organization. 
Hence, although options have always been more feasible in Silicon Valley in 
comparison to India because of the large number of startup companies, the advanced 
institutionalization of the practice in the US has also been the result of the broader 
institutionalization of the Silicon Valley model (Saxenian 1994) and with it, the 
diffusion of a particular employment model that emphasized broad-based stock 
compensation. 
 The common logic regarding stock option grants among Indian managers 
appears to be different that the US, namely that the primary use of stock option grants 
is to retain the employees they view as essential to the success of the organization. In 
other words, it is a model that emphasizes the importance of key employees in driving 
innovation and corporate performance. For example, the CEO of an Israel-based 
software firm observed: 
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 “[Options are] not so much of an attraction mechanism, but a retention 
 mechanism in  India. Because of the vesting period are longer. You can not 
 attract people with this. Maybe at the senior level but not at the junior level. 
 Once they are in and performing, it might be a good mechanism for retention. 
 Typically vesting 3-4 years.” 
 
In addition, Indian managers believe that the grants employees receive need to be 
significant enough so that they will make a difference. As one informant noted, it is 
better to provide something of value to the people who really drive the value of the 
company, rather than give out “peanuts to everyone.” This informant, an experienced 
equity compensation consultant, continued:  
  
 “I do not suggest people go the whole hog. [Options] should go to people who 
 are capable of appreciating the wealth. If it is given to someone who does not 
 understand, it does not work that well. What you are doing is diluting the 
 shares of the other people. It  will not have the impact on the bottom line. You 
 should give it to the people who are in the position to make a difference. Who 
 are probably the leaders and not the followers. Down the line, you do not 
 expect them to understand the instrument in that complexity.” 
 
A CEO of a software firm echoed this approach:  
 
“If you look at the average age of employee, it is 26-29. At that age, people are 
not staying for a long time. Options are only good for long term. Only staying 
2-3 years. If you spread it out too thin, there will be no value. If you cover all 
employees, you need to have the options available. But just giving for the sake 
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of giving say a token amount, it does not mean much. It is difficult to retain 
people with a small amount. The approach is to target the key people and have 
it mean something.” 
 Another important force shaping the more selective use of ESOs within Indian 
companies is that these companies tend to have fewer shares available to grant than 
their American counterparts and are thus constrained in how many shares they can 
give out. In addition, Indian managers have been cautious in distributing stock options 
broadly because these plans remain new and their long-term effects appear uncertain. 
Moreover, one informant noted that once granted, even if employees do not value 
stock options, it is difficult to take away the benefit, and this contributes to 
management’s caution of in distributing stock options:  
  
 “It is not broad-based. Why don’t these programs percolate to all people at all 
 organizations? People are cautious about the new programs that we introduce. 
 Same cautiousness applies to other organizations. Once introduced, it is very 
 difficult to take away.” 
 
 Providing stock options to most or all employees as simply a way of doing 
things, therefore, never became institutionalized as a widely held belief among 
corporate managers in India. Although my informants indicated that the broad-based 
concept began to spread in the late 1990s, its diffusion was halted with the bursting of 
the technology bubble in the US in 2000 and the subsequent corporate scandals at 
Enron and other companies. These events hurt the fragile legitimacy of a more US-
style translation of ESOs by revealing the downside of stock options for employees, 
i.e., when stock prices plummeted, stock options were worthless. Something that was 
never valued highly by employees became valued even less.  
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 Moreover, the scandals set in motion reform efforts that placed new constraints 
on how companies used stock options. Historically, companies traded on US stock 
markets have not had to recognize the value of ESOs as a compensation expense. 
However, the corporate scandals in the United States in 2001 and 2002 created an 
opportunity for accounting regulators, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), to implement regulations in 2004 that required companies to recognize an 
expense for stock options granted to employees. Since many Indian technology 
companies are traded on the American NASDAQ, this change was a significant one 
for them. A real threat of a new expensing requirement first emerged at the end of 
2002. As my informants indicated, the threat and implementation of expensing meant 
that Indian companies had to start thinking more carefully about whether the value 
they were receiving from granting stock options was equal to the expense. As an 
Indian equity compensation consultant who has worked with many different 
companies noted:  
  
 “Maybe [expensing] will make them a little more vigilant. Instead of just 
 doling it out. When you are taking a charge, there will be more thinking about 
 whether it will achieve its value.”  
 
 This accounting change coincided with the crash in the stock markets and the 
concomitant blow to the legitimacy of stock options in the minds of Indian tech 
workers. 
 Most of the representatives of Indian companies whom I interviewed indicated 
that they scaled back or stopped their option grants after the stock market downturn of 
2001 because they decided that, at least at that point with expensing looming, the cost 
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of granting stock options could not be justified, and many began to cut back or stop 
granting stock options. As one of my informants explained: 
  
 “There was also the expensing thing came up. Also, we were giving to all 
 employees. We were giving right from the entry level at the time of joining, 
 and then performance  based stock options. We also found that in many 
 geographies, stock options were not  in…and we had various taxation issues. 
 The whole effectiveness of that. Our core belief behind stock options was 
 about long-term motivation, long-term retention. The whole effectiveness was 
 coming down. So, we have suspended the stock option scheme.” 
 
Another compensation executive of an India-based firm noted: 
 
“The people who got options in 1999, 2000, and 2001. They did not see their 
value. Options lost their attractiveness. That is one. The other thing was that as 
you go down a level, people were not getting enough. This also made it so that 
people did not see a lot of money. So, it was no longer acting as a retention 
tool. Clearly, options had lost their luster.” 
  
It is difficult to say whether Indian companies would have reacted in the same way 
had expensing not occurred, since the devaluation of stock options by employees was 
a powerful force. It seems plausible, however, that expensing entered into the calculus 
of corporate decision-makers to scale back their stock option programs.  
 This section has examined the organizational level constraints faced by Indian 
compensation and other managers who were involved in the design and 
implementation of ESOs. With fewer shares available for grants than US companies 
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and an employee population that did not value stock options, the US style model of 
broad-based ESOs never caught on among compensation professional and corporate 
executive in India. Instead, the model that developed was one that centered on more 
selective grants to key employees. What also emerged from my interviews was that 
the tentative foray that Indian companies made into more broad-based grants in the 
late 1990s and their quick retreat from the concept reflected a collective level of 
professional knowledge about stock option plan design and strategy that is only 
beginning to become more sophisticated. This has made Indian managers cautious in 
granting options. In part, this was a result of the newness of the practice. However, my 
interviews also revealed that this caution may have also stemmed from the absence of 
certain informational channels through which ideas about business practices diffuse, 
rather than any lack of sophistication in the approach of Indian managers to 
compensation and strategic human resource management.  
 
Organizational Field Level Forces 
ESOs became a widely known concept among Indian technology companies during 
the mid-to-late 1990s, but due to employee attitudes about compensation, tight labor 
markets, and organizational level constraints faced by corporate managers, stock 
options were granted much more selectively within Indian companies. This section 
discusses other forces that may have shaped the differences in the way that ESOs 
became institutionalized in India, as compared to the United States. Arias and Guillen 
(1997) argue that existing studies on the cross-border transfer of organizational 
practices have ignored the role of forces within organizational fields in shaping the 
cross border diffusion of information and ideas about organizational practices: cross 
border networks, multinational corporations, professional groups, international 
consulting firms, international NGOs, and the congruence between business elite 
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mentalities in different countries. How might have these forces shaped the translation 
of ESOs from the US to India and the institutionalization of the practice in India? 
Some of my informants were able to provide insight on this question. 
 There are some strong channels of information flow between India and the 
United States. For example, many Indian managers and engineers in the technology 
sector have spent time training and/or working in the United States, particularly 
Silicon Valley (Saxenian 2002). This is a key source of exposure to American 
management practices, such as ESOs. In addition, the heavy volume of US 
multinationals setting up operations in India was another key source of ideas and 
information about employee stock options. However, certain cross-border information 
channels are missing or in early stages of development and the absence of these forces 
may have contributed to the more selective use of employee stock options in India. For 
example, the professions are an important conduit of knowledge about organizational 
practices (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). A profession that plays a central role in defining 
and building legitimacy for compensation practices such as ESOs is the human 
resources profession, which encompasses those working in human resource (or 
compensation and benefits) roles within companies, as well as consultants that advise 
companies on these issues. My interviews revealed that in India, the HR profession is 
still in an early stage of professionalization, which is in contrast to the more advanced 
stage of institutionalization of the HR profession in the United States. Few, if any, 
consulting firms in India have people strictly dedicated to compensation and benefits. 
Moreover, there are hardly any consulting firms that specialize in employee stock 
compensation. The low level of institutionalization of the human resources profession 
may have limited the amount of information available to corporate decision-makers 
about using employee stock options and different approaches to plan design, and 
contributed to the cautious approach to ESOs taken by Indian managers.  
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 In addition, although human resource professionals within Indian companies 
demonstrate a very high level of sophistication regarding strategic human resource 
management and there are some strong informal networks between human resource 
professionals in different organizations, some informants indicated that they wished 
there were more formal opportunities to share ideas and information. One senior 
human resource executive noted that: 
 
“I think the industry needs to be a little more mature. We need to get into what 
some of the older industries have done in the past. Like the manufacturing 
industry. They always had forums where they met up and they standardized 
things. I think that standardization is something that is very much required 
even in terms of wages and benefits for that matter. I don’t think that the 
industry is looking at that at all. We talk to each other, but we really don’t 
work with each other. That’s how it is. We talk to each other and talk about the 
companies…we do talk often, but we don’t work with each other. And that’s 
very important for any industry to survive. Otherwise,  its going to be a 
cutthroat competition.” 
 
This person was discussing the problems stemming from a lack of standardization of 
compensation and benefits among technology companies. This lack of standardization 
has contributed to the rapid escalation of cash compensation and enhanced the 
attraction of cash for employees. Since HR managers at different companies are not 
part of more cohesive professional networks, they have few opportunities to discuss 
and take collective action, such as trying to constrain the cutthroat competition for 
employees, which has let cash compensation “spiral out of control.” This lack of 
cohesion has also contributed to a lack of knowledge transfer about ESOs.     
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 In addition to the professions, the state, international NGOs, and the media can 
also play a significant role in the diffusion of management practices and information 
about them (Arias and Guillen 1997). In India, as in the US, there are no laws 
requiring companies to adopt ESOs or design them in certain ways, so the state had 
little impact on diffusion of the practice. In addition, there are few Indian trade 
associations that act as conduits of information about these practices, with the 
exception of the National Association of Software and Service Companies 
(NASSCOM), which is a broad industry trade group not specifically focused on 
compensation or stock options. There are also no nonprofit organizations or NGOs 
dedicated to providing information and advocacy about employee stock options and 
related forms of equity compensation, in contrast to the US. In terms of the media, 
although there was high profile coverage of ESOs in India, some informants indicated 
that this coverage, particularly before the crash, tended to present an unrealistic and 
sensationalist image of stock options, such as portraying stock options as having no 
downside. The problem with this coverage, according to some of my informants, was 
that it created unrealistic expectations about stock options, which fueled the more 
widespread disillusionment with them once the markets crashed and the reality of the 
downside of stock options was exposed.  
 Finally, the absence of a vibrant startup sector in India may have also 
constrained the flow of knowledge about and the diffusion of ESOs. In the United 
States, startup technology companies have always been common and in fact have been 
the primary organizational form driving technological innovation. As discussed 
earlier, the low number of startups has restricted the number of large option payouts 
and constrained the legitimacy of the practice. The strong startup sector in Silicon 
Valley created strong cross-organizational networks, which acted as a key conduit in 
the broad diffusion of the Silicon Valley model generally and the broad diffusion of 
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ESOs in Silicon Valley more specifically. The lack of a similar startup culture in India 
has most likely constrained the flow of information about management practices. One 
informant noted that Indian companies are focused outward towards global markets, 
rather than towards internal markets. Parthasarthy (2004) has described this as a low 
level of embeddedness within local markets, and it has most likely been a barrier to 
the transfer of knowledge about stock options and to the broader diffusion of the 
practice.  
 Hence, the lack of specific field-level conduits through which ideas and 
information about organizational practices move across and within borders most likely 
influenced the way in which ESOs diffused in a more limited way in India and the 
institutionalization of the practice as one that provided grants to a much more limited 
group of employees than in the US. The cross-national networks of Indian managers 
and the presence of MNCs helped information about the practice transfer easily, while 
the state, the professions, and the media played minimal roles in driving the 
institutionalization of ESOs in India. As one compensation consultant noted, “India is 
just getting over the learning curve with stock options.” 
 
Summary and Conclusion: Translation and The Limits of Convergence  
This paper has provided qualitative evidence that the cross-border diffusion of 
compensation practices is not a simple one in which organizations in different 
countries converge around similar models, even in the presence of strong cross-
national networks. The results, therefore, represent strong support for theoretical 
claims regarding the divergent outcomes of globalization (Guillen 2001). Among US 
software companies, ESOs spread rapidly during the 1990s, and the structure of these 
plans granted options to most or all employees. This diffusion was shaped by the high 
value attached to options by employees, the vibrant startup culture of Silicon Valley 
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for which options were a perfect compensation mechanism, and dense networks and 
supportive field level institutions that legitimized the practice and created rich 
channels of information exchange for diffusion. In India, the practice diffused much 
more gradually, with companies designing plans to make grants much more 
selectively.  
 The translation of ESOs to the Indian context was driven by a number of 
factors. The evidence from my interviews reveal that one of the primary factors was 
that stock options were not viewed as valuable by employees due to the lack of 
significant wealth created by stock options, the allure of cash for employees in tight 
labor markets, and general attitudes about the stock market and investing among both 
managers and employees. The translation of the practice to India was also shaped by 
significant changes in the accounting treatment of stock options, a lack of investment 
in stock option education by technology companies, and a cautionary approach to 
stock option plan design among Indian companies, in part due to the youth of the 
industry and the practice, but also potentially due to the weakness of certain field-level 
actors and informational channels that previous research has shown can have an 
important influence on the diffusion and institutionalization of management practices.  
 The transfer of ESOs from the US to India has not, therefore, been one of 
simple imitation or rejection, but rather a transfer of ideas and information about 
ESOs, which were then translated by organizational decision-makers and adapted to 
local conditions. These actors were influenced by myriad forces within the economic, 
institutional, political, and cultural environment of Indian software and IT firms. The 
analysis in this paper has focused on how these actors interpreted this environment and 
how it influenced their decisions regarding the translation and implementation of 
ESOs. Accessing the perspectives of such institutional change agents provides a more 
complex picture of the diffusion of organizational practices from one setting to 
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another and emphasizes that practices are not necessarily blindly adopted in their 
original form. Key actors within organizations and organizational fields interpret and 
modify these practices in relation to their own complex environments. This 
interpretive work and modification is at the core of what Campbell (2005) has 
described as translation. This paper has provided a grounded view of the translation of 
one practice from one environment to another, revealing how a complex set of factors 
and constraints can influence organizational actors who make decisions regarding the 
design and adoption of compensation practices. Although this same set of factors and 
constraints may not be generalizable to the translation of other types of organizational 
practices, future research on translation would benefit by paying close attention to the 
complex environments in which organizational decision-makers are embedded.  
 In addition to shedding new light on the role of translation in the cross-border 
diffusion of organizational practices, supporting recent work on the contingent nature 
of globalization, and revealing the complex forces shaping the offshoring of white-
collar work, this paper also creates a link between the literature on the global spread of 
management practices and the literature on social stratification by examining the 
institutionalization of practice that can have important implications for inequality in 
two different national contexts. The findings reveal a complex set of reasons why, in 
contrast to the US, the majority of employees working in the technology sector in 
India have never had access to stock options and the wealth that can be generated by 
them. Although US companies in the technology sector also granted options whose 
number and value were unequally distributed among employees, the widespread use of 
stock options within the technology sector meant that many nonmanagement 
employees had access to wealth generated through returns to capital, a phenomenon 
not replicated in any other set of US industries or in the Indian technology sector. 
Hence, gaining a better understanding of why this practice did not become 
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institutionalized in a similar way in India permits a deeper view of some of the forces 
that are likely shaping patterns of income and wealth inequality in the global 
technology sector.  
 However, my interviews also revealed that Indian companies are using other 
organizational practices that broaden the distribution of the wealth and authority as 
compared to traditional industries, such as high levels of cash compensation, generous 
benefits, cash-based bonuses, and flatter organizational hierarchies. Hence, the 
fundamental conditions under which knowledge work is executed in India appear to be 
similar to these conditions within the United States, i.e., conditions that represent a 
more equitable distribution of profits and power than more traditional types of work.  
This raises the interesting question of whether knowledge work requires such 
conditions or if management practices developed within Silicon Valley in the United 
States have simply become a template for knowledge work that is adapted to local 
conditions.  
 The recent acceleration in the globalization of technology production 
represents a predictable extension of advanced capitalism, with potentially profound 
implications for economic productivity and development, the organization of work, 
and the inequality of income and wealth in the developed and developing world. 
Gaining a better understanding of the long-term causes, characteristics, and 
consequences of the globalization of technology production will require more 
extensive research based on detailed, cross-national data sets and an expansive 
theoretical view of globalization occurring within and between capitalist organizations 
situated within local, regional, and national economies, and broader social, political, 
and cultural environments.  
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CHAPTER 4 
WHO BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY?  
THE SOCIAL STRATIFICATION OF WEALTH IN COMPANIES WITH 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
 
Introduction 
Although the history of employee ownership in the United States dates back to the late 
nineteenth century with the establishment of worker-owned cooperatives by the 
Knights of Labor, employee ownership as a trend within mainstream business 
organizations is a relatively new phenomenon (Blasi and Kruse 1991). The current era 
began in the early 1970s with the passage of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), which established the legal structure of employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs). This structure provided a tax-effective way for business 
owners to sell large blocks of stock to employees. The number of public and private 
companies using these plans expanded sharply in the 1970s and 1980s to 
approximately 10,000 today (NCEO 2008). In addition, the growth of the high-tech 
industry in the 1980s and 1990s led to the rapid diffusion of another form of employee 
ownership, broad-based stock options (BBSOPs), which provide an effective way for 
organizations to preserve startup cash, attract and retain key knowledge workers, and 
maintain ideological commitments to fairness and innovation. Alongside the spread of 
these two forms of employee ownership has been the more gradual spread of other 
organizational practices that allow employees to acquire stock of their employers, such 
as 401(k) plans and employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs). According to the 
National Center for Employee Ownership, approximately 32.7 million employees in 
over 17,000 corporations now own stock of their employers (NCEO 2008).  
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 The long-term goals of employee ownership, whether promoted by actors on 
the left or right side of the political spectrum, have always been to both boost 
economic productivity and democratize capital ownership. Employee ownership 
therefore possesses the virtuous potential of improving American competitiveness 
while mitigating some of the severe inequalities produced by modern capitalism. Most 
of the existing research has focused on the impact of employee ownership on 
corporate performance (for a review, see NCEO 2006). However, the spread of 
various forms of employee ownership in the last three decades raises a number of 
interesting questions relating to the persistence of broader patterns of inequality in the 
United States. Since employee ownership programs broaden corporate ownership and 
how financial returns of this ownership are distributed, as more employees gain access 
to these programs, what happens to existing patterns of stratification? Does employee 
ownership mitigate or exacerbate existing patterns of income and wealth inequality? 
How do women and nonwhites, groups that traditionally experience these inequalities 
most powerfully, fare with respect to employee ownership? 
 Despite the importance of these and related questions for our understanding of 
social inequality in the 21st century economy, few studies have made connections 
between the vast literature on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of 
employee ownership and the large body of sociological research that has examined the 
impact of gender, race, and ethnicity on such outcomes as income, wealth, and power 
in the workplace. Such questions also have practical implications for corporate 
managers in companies with employee ownership and companies considering these 
plans. If certain groups of employees experience inequities in terms of participating in 
these plans and the financial value they receive from these plans, these realities may 
detract from the potential that these plans offer for aligning employee behaviors with 
long-term corporate strategy and for creating organizational cultures of fairness. This 
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paper represents a modest first step towards better understanding the connections 
between employee ownership and social stratification.  
 More specifically, this paper will examine how access to employee ownership 
and returns from employee ownership programs are stratified by gender, race, 
ethnicity, and disability. The analysis is based on an extensive dataset of over 40,000 
employees in 14 U.S. companies with at least one of the following types of employee 
ownership programs: ESOPs, BBSOPs, ESPPs, and two forms of performance-based 
pay, profitsharing and gainsharing. The data were collected by a team of researchers 
(of which the author was one) through the Shared Capitalism Research Project of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research between 2001 and 2006. This dataset provides 
rich individual level information on participation in different employee ownership 
programs, financial returns and assets held in employee ownership programs, and 
access to and perceptions of various types of power and authority.  
 Our knowledge of how different groups do with respect to these outcomes is 
severely limited, as existing research on employee ownership has largely ignored these 
issues. Gaining a better understanding of these outcomes will provide a richer 
perspective on how the returns of employee ownership are distributed and the 
potential effects of this distribution on both broader patterns of inequality and the 
effectiveness of employee ownership. Beyond understanding the impact of employee 
ownership on inequality, this paper also aims to take seriously the effect of social 
inequality on employee outcomes, and the possibility that social inequality can 
mitigate the relationship between employee ownership and employee perceptions of 
these plans. This paper will not examine the causes of stratification within the sample 
companies, nor will it provide an in-depth analysis of the consequences of employee 
ownership programs for long-term trends in inequality. Rather, the analysis will 
examine the concrete outcomes for different demographic groups and thus provide a 
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detailed picture of the contours of stratification within employee ownership 
companies. Ultimately, another goal of this paper is to open a research and theoretical 
space on which future studies of stratification and employee ownership can build, both 
to better understand the long-term impacts of employee ownership on broader patterns 
of social inequality and to expand the existing theoretical frameworks on social 
stratification to incorporate new forms of compensation and wealth generation in the 
21st century economy. After reviewing the existing literature on income inequality 
generally and discussing general trends in the growth of employee ownership, this 
paper will turn to the empirical analysis, which will first examine whether women and 
different minority groups face barriers to accessing employee ownership programs. 
Next, the analysis will examine the effect of gender, race, ethnicity, and disability on 
the value of assets that employees acquire through employee ownership programs.
 Overall, the results reveal substantial disparities between the outcomes of 
women and men, nonwhite and whites, and employees with and without disabilities in 
terms of access to employee ownership and the financial value provided by this 
participation. Although many of these effects appear to stem from existing 
mechanisms of occupational segregation and patterns of income inequality, the results 
also show that the ways in which corporate managers make decisions regarding 
participation for some plans, in particular profitsharing plans, may be systematically 
excluding certain type of employees. Overall there are more disparities in the financial 
values that different groups receive through these plans, and women and African 
Americans experience more disparities with respect to plan values than other groups, 
even accounting for differences in education, occupation, and salary. This suggests 
that the structure and operation of certain forms of employee ownership generates 
disparities beyond those created by extant mechanisms of stratification.  
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The Persisting Significance of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity 
Analyzing gaps in the economic and organizational outcomes for groups with different 
ascriptive statuses has been a central focus of a vast literature on social stratification in 
the last three decades (Morris and Western 1999). These analyses have focused 
primarily on gaps in earnings, but also on gaps in wealth, socioeconomic status, and 
power and authority within organizations. A common story emerges from this 
literature: in the U.S., the postwar prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s reduced or held 
constant inequality levels within all demographic groups. Since the early 1970s, 
however, median earnings have declined for most groups, and in the 1980s, inequality 
accelerated rapidly, with the trend continuing through today (Morris and Western 
1999). The lone exception is that since 1973, the real value of wages for women has 
increased across all income levels, while the real value of wages for most men has 
declined or remained constant. Women, however, continue to earn less than men. A 
recent analysis from the Economic Policy Institute (2006) indicates that college-
educated women earn 24% less than college-educated men, that women are 
disproportionately represented in minimum wage jobs, and that women are less likely 
to earn high wages (10.1% of women vs. 17.6% of men earn at least three times the 
poverty level wage).  
 Similarly, although African Americans experienced increases in the real value 
of their wages in the postwar period, this trend for the most part stopped in the mid-
1970s, and earnings inequality has increased among African Americans in the last two 
decades (Morris and Western 1999). In addition, the median income for African 
Americans is only 55.6% that of whites, and 29.4% of African American households, 
as compared to 13% of white households, have zero or negative net worth (Economic 
Policy Institute 2006). Other racial and ethnic groups have not been the subject of as 
much attention as women and African Americans, but the overall trends reflect 
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similarly negative outcomes. In their analysis of census data from 1970, 1980, and 
1990, Hirschman and Snipp (1999) found similarly negative effects of race/ethnicity 
on the socioeconomic status (a measure of occupational attainment) among African 
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. However, the outcomes for Asian 
Americans were equal to or greater than that of whites. In terms of earnings, all racial 
and ethnic groups, except for Japanese Americans, earned less than whites, and the 
gaps were the largest for African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.  
 Explaining the differential outcomes of men and women, and of whites and 
nonwhites, has been the topic of a large body of literature on social stratification. 
Reviewing this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, but the evidence provides 
strong empirical support for the explanation that inequality is the result of women and 
minorities being consistently segregated into different labor markets than men and 
whites, and that these labor markets consist of  primarily different (and lower-paying) 
occupations (Grusky 2001). The literature has also revealed that occupational 
segregation itself has been driven primarily by mechanisms of social closure that 
emanate from social conflict for jobs and access to jobs, differential access to 
educational opportunities that are crucial for occupational attainment, and cultural 
views that devalue female and nonwhite labor (Grusky 2001). In addition, women and 
African Americans have each faced their own unique set of barriers. For the former, 
the legacy of slavery, geographic segregation, and the decimation of the domestic 
manufacturing sector have cut many African-Americans off from educational 
opportunities, social networks, and formal labor markets (Massey and Denton 1993, 
Wilson 1980). Although women have recently faced fewer barriers to education, they 
have been uniquely affected by the devaluation of their paid labor market skills and 
abilities and relegated to a primary role as unpaid, domestic labor (Grusky 2001).   
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 Morris and Western (1999) have argued that despite the importance of these 
specific forces shaping access to economic opportunities for different groups, all 
groups have been significantly and similarly affected by some common recent trends. 
In the last two decades demographic forces, such as the rise of the baby boomers, the 
increase in the number of women entering the workforce, and an increase in the 
number of unskilled immigrants, have all increased the supply of available workers. 
These demographic changes have coincided with deindustrialization, globalization, the 
decline of unions, the rise of market-based employment relations (e.g., contract work, 
subcontracting, temporary employment), and the expansion of the service sector, 
which provide lower paying jobs with fewer benefits for unskilled workers than the 
manufacturing jobs that they replaced. All of these trends have led to the stagnation of 
wages for workers at the bottom of the income distribution.  
 The empirical evidence on inequality in the U.S., therefore, presents a sobering 
account of the reality of equal access to economic opportunity. The persistence of 
inequality produces a range of negative economic and social consequences for all 
demographic groups, but serious solutions remain politically anathema at this stage. In 
the absence of new legislation to both mitigate these outcomes and address root 
causes, as well as large scale cultural shifts in attitudes about the legitimacy and 
function of inequality, these patterns are likely to continue. In the last three decades, 
however, the diffusion of employee ownership programs has opened up new avenues 
of economic opportunity since these programs provide a way for employees to access 
a source of income and wealth beyond their fixed pay, i.e., through the ownership of 
stock and direct sharing of profits of their employing companies. Broadening capital 
ownership and profit sharing to groups earning less in the labor market may, therefore, 
help reduce income and wealth inequality. However, since access to these plans and 
the value that employees receive are often a direct function of income and occupation, 
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employee ownership may also exacerbate existing patterns of income inequality even 
as it increases the wealth of lower paid employees. Although the employee ownership 
data analyzed in the paper do not allow us to test these claims directly, it does allow us 
to gain a better understanding of inequality relating to participation in, and the value 
generated by, employee ownership. I now turn to the evidence presented by the NBER 
dataset of companies with employee ownership.  
 
The Shared Capitalism Dataset 
The data analyzed in this paper were collected by a team of researchers between 2001 
and 2006 in association with the Shared Capitalism Project of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. The team conducted employee surveys in 14 U.S. companies 
with any of the following forms of employee ownership: employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOPs), broad-based stock option plans (BBSOPs), employee stock purchase 
plans (ESPPs), and 401(k) plans. Each of these plans provides a mechanism through 
which employees can acquire stock, and each works a little differently. In ESOPs and 
401(k) plans, employees receive employer stock in their retirement accounts. BBSOPs 
give employees the right to purchase a fixed amount of shares at a fixed price for a 
fixed period of time. Employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) allow employees to 
defer part of their salary in order to buy discounted stock on specific purchase dates. 
The sample also included data on profitsharing and gainsharing plans, which do not 
provide employees with a way to acquire stock, but instead provide employees with 
cash bonus payments based on corporate profits, in the former, and group based 
performance, in the latter. Some companies in the sample had one type of plan, while 
others had multiple plans. The response rates from employees averaged 53% across 
the 14 companies, and a total of 41,206 respondents provided useable surveys. The 
Appendix of this dissertation provides more detailed information on the companies 
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surveyed and the survey instrument. This dataset provides rich individual level 
information on participation in different employee ownership programs, financial 
returns and assets held in employee ownership programs, and access to and 
perceptions of various types of power and authority. The dataset also provides the 
ability to analyze how these outcomes differ by gender, race, and ethnicity. Finally, 
this dataset is unusual because it allows us to measure these outcomes for employees 
with a disability, a group that remains understudied in the literature on stratification.  
 
Methodology 
The focus of the statistical analyses is on examining the effect of being in one of six 
demographic categories (female, African American, Hispanic, Asian American, 
Native American, and having a disability) on participation in three different forms of 
employee ownership (ESOPs, BBSOPs, and ESPPs), profitsharing, and gainsharing, 
as well as the financial value of participation in these plans.3 The analyses compare 
outcomes of women to men, each nonwhite group to whites, and employees with 
disabilities to those without disabilities. For example, when compared to men, are 
women more or less likely to participate in employee ownership? Statistically, such 
comparisons are accomplished through the use of general linear regression models, 
and more specifically, logit models. In terms of reporting, the results for the logit 
report coefficients rather than odds ratios. The analysis that examines financial values 
of assets in these plans uses ordinary least squares regression.  
 I include a number of variables to control for other possible explanations for 
disparities in outcomes between these groups. Of particular interest is modeling the 
effects of occupation. A large body of sociological research has demonstrated that an 
                                                 
3 Although the survey collected data on 401(k) plans with employer stock, I did not include similar 
analyses of these plans because a substantial amount of data regarding participation and financial value 
with respect to these plans was missing in the sample. 
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important driver of income inequality is the consistent segregation of women and 
racial and ethnic minorities into different labor markets than men and whites, labor 
markets that consist of primarily different (and lower-paying) occupations (Grusky 
2001). Such segregation may be important for employee ownership outcomes if 
women and nonwhites are more likely to be in occupations that are less likely to 
participate in employee ownership. For example, if the results indicate that women are 
less likely to participate in employee ownership, but the models do not control for 
occupation, this effect may be due to the fact that women could be segregated into 
occupations that have restricted access to employee ownership, rather than due to 
something unique about how organizations structure employee ownership plans.  
 In fact, confirming the evidence from past research, there is strong evidence of 
occupational segregation by gender, race, ethnicity, and disability status among 
employees in the sample. Table 5 shows results from logit models predicting the effect 
of demographic characteristics on the likelihood of being in different occupations, 
controlling for firm level differences, among employees in the sample. All groups are 
less likely to be in management positions, which have better access to employee 
ownership and workplace power. The same is true for professional/technical positions, 
with the exception of Asian-Americans. Therefore, controlling for occupation will 
permit a more nuanced understanding of the potential sources of disparities between 
different groups, i.e., do disparities stem from occupational segregation and/or the 
specific ways in which employee ownership plans are structured? In considering the 
results that account for occupational segregation, however, it is important to recognize 
that the occupational categories are broad. Although more fine grained occupational 
categories would have permitted a more detailed analysis of the role of occupational 
segregation, the survey did not collect data on more detailed occupational categories. 
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The discussion of the results, to which this paper now turns, is intended to illuminate 
overall trends and patterns and not discuss every finding in detail.  
 
 
Table 5: Results from Logit Models Predicting the Effect  
of Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Disability 
on the Likelihood of Being in Particular Occupations 
 
 MANAGEMENT 
PROFESSIONAL/ 
TECHNICAL 
SALES 
ADMINI-
STRATIVE  
PRODUCTION 
CUSTOMER 
SERVICE 
Women -0.717 -0.283 -0.673 2.165 -0.021 1.153 
 (0.042)** (0.030)** (0.061)** (0.059)** (0.028) (0.072)** 
African American -0.848 -0.705 -0.474 -0.293 1.080 -0.319 
 (0.118)** (0.079)** (0.157)** (0.112)** (0.068)** (0.178)* 
Hispanic -0.363 -0.410 -0.156 -0.155 0.507 0.337 
 (0.074)** (0.057)** (0.104) (0.101) (0.049)** (0.109)** 
Asian -0.508 0.624 -0.653 -0.780 -0.106 0.188 
 (0.068)** (0.046)** (0.092)** (0.138)** (0.054)* (0.137) 
Native American -0.719 -0.765 -0.112 -0.113 0.897 -0.002 
 (0.209)** (0.156)** (0.253) (0.246) (0.122)** (0.312) 
Disability -0.730 -0.465 -0.577 -0.006 0.810 -0.167 
 (0.098)** (0.065)** (0.142)** (0.103) (0.058)** (0.156) 
Constant -1.796 -1.243 -2.917 -4.029 0.102 -3.697 
 (0.025)** (0.020)** (0.038)** (0.056)** (0.018)** (0.056)** 
Observations 33913 33913 32720 33913 33571 21275 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Before exploring the influence of gender, race, ethnicity, and disability on access to 
and returns from employee ownership, Table 1 provides summary information about 
the demographic characteristics of the sample, including participation rates in 
employee ownership plans, values of employee ownership assets, salary, and wealth.4  
 On all outcomes, men do better than women. Men have a higher rate of 
participation in employee ownership, profit-sharing, and gainsharing, as well as higher 
average values for employee ownership assets, salary, and wealth. In terms of race and 
                                                 
4 Wealth is defined as total assets minus debts. More specifically, respondents were asked to report their 
wealth by including the “value of their house minus the mortgage, plus their vehicles, stocks and mutual 
funds, cash, checking accounts, retirement accounts including 401(k) and pension assets, and so forth.”  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Shared Capitalism Dataset 
 
GROUP 
NUMBER OF  
RESPONDENTS 
PERCENT 
PARTICIPATING 
IN ANY FORM 
OF EMPLOYEE 
OWNERSHIP 
 
MEAN 
VALUE OF 
STOCK  
HELD IN 
ALL 
EMPLOYEE 
OWNERSHIP 
PLANS 
 
%  
ELIGIBLE 
FOR 
PROFIT-
SHARING 
%  
ELIGIBLE 
FOR 
GAIN-
SHARING 
MEAN 
SALARY 
MEAN 
WEALTH 
Women 11,942 62% $40,957 69% 16% $45,895 $229,794 
Men 26,383 67% $69,834 72% 24% $62,805 $318,327 
White 28,698 71% $62,006 77% 21% $60,251 $322,965 
African 
Americans 
1,739 58% $20,735 55% 13% $41,462 $118,580 
Hispanics 2,745 39% $32,647 56% 17% $37,983 $139,319 
Asian 
Americans 
2,989 61% $85,137 66% 30% $63,634 $310,826 
Native 
Americans 
460 58% $41,784 56% 13% $42,251 $197,618 
Employees 
with 
Disabilities 
2,256 60% $54,820 66% 17% $46,258 $220,727 
 
ethnicity, whites have the best outcomes on most measures, with the exception of 
Asian Americans, who have the highest average values for employee ownership assets 
and salary, and the highest participation rates in gainsharing plans. African Americans 
have the lowest value of employee ownership assets and wealth, while Hispanics have 
the lowest average participation in employee ownership and lowest average salaries. 
To gain a better understanding of the significance and magnitude of these differences, 
this paper now turns to a deeper analysis of employee ownership outcomes for various 
demographic groups.  
 In the discussion that follows, I focus on those results that are statistically 
significant. However, it is important to note that the number of employees within each 
demographic group may influence the statistical significance of some of the findings. 
For example, there are only 460 Native Americans in the sample, compared to almost 
12,000 women. These sample sizes mean that the standard errors for women are 
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lower, and this makes it easy to establish statistical significance. This also means that 
there will be little discussion of the outcomes of Native Americans. This does not 
necessarily mean that Native Americans do not experience disparities in various 
outcomes, but that statistically, it is difficult to establish relationships between being 
Native American and the outcomes of primary interest. Also, the sample sizes for 
African-Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and employees with disabilities are 
similar, so making comparisons of significant differences among these groups is 
relatively easy. Making comparisons between these groups and women, however, 
should be made with some caution.   
 
Access to Employee Ownership Programs 
Do rates of participation in employee ownership programs vary between different 
demographic groups? If rates do vary, to what extent and what accounts for these 
differences? Tables 7 - 11 present the results of logit regression models that predict the 
effect of gender, race, ethnicity, and disability status on participation in the three 
primary types of employee ownership programs, profitsharing plans, and gainsharing 
plans that were the focus of the NBER survey,. For all outcomes, I report results for 
seven models. The first includes only the demographic variables of interest. Models 2 
through 6 add the effects of different control variables, respectively: fixed pay, tenure, 
individual firms, occupation, and education. Model 7 is the fully specified model. The 
models examined participation rates only among those employees who were eligible 
for specific plans, not for the entire sample. For example, the models that examine 
participation rates for broad-based stock option plans only include employees in 
companies that had such plans, rather than for the entire sample. Interpreting the logit 
coefficients requires a mathematical transformation known as exponentiation. This 
transformation yields a new number known as an odds ratio, which compares the odds 
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that a woman will participate in an ESOP to the odds that a man will participate in an 
ESOP. For example, the coefficient for African Americans participating in ESOPs 
(without controls) is -.373, which when transformed yields an odds ratio of .68. 
Hence, African Americans are, on average, 32% less likely to participate in ESOPs 
when compared whites.  
 When examining the results for plan participation, it is essential to keep in 
mind the rules governing different forms of employee ownership. ESOPs are governed 
by federal legislation that requires that most employees participate. For other types of 
employee ownership plans, such as broad-based employee stock option plans 
(BBSOPs), profit-sharing, and gainsharing, management decides who will participate 
among employees who are eligible, and there are no legal rules constraining these 
decisions. For still other forms of employee ownership, such as employee stock 
purchase plans (ESPPs), the law requires that most employees are eligible, but 
employees ultimately have the choice of whether or not they will participate. 
Ultimately, variation in patterns of access to employee ownership plans may differ 
according to how decisions about decisions about access are made and by whom.  
 Table 7 examines the results for ESOP participation. Model 1, which presents 
the effects of gender, race, and disability without any controls, indicates that African 
Americans, Hispanics, and employees with disabilities are less likely to participate in 
ESOPs. However, the effects become statistically insignificant in the fully specified 
Model 7, except for employees with disabilities. It is somewhat surprising to find any 
significant results once the controls are added because ESOPs legally require broad 
participation by most employees. However, companies can exclude part-time 
employees and employees with less than one year of employment. Model 3 includes 
controls for tenure, but none of the models control for part-time work. The lower 
likelihood of participation by employees with disabilities may stem from them being  
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Table 7: Results from Logit Models Predicting Participation in ESOPs 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female 0.043 0.351 0.174 -0.183 0.021 0.032 -0.049 
 (0.092) (0.097)** (0.097)* (0.097)* (0.099) (0.093) (0.119) 
African American -0.373 -0.199 -0.150 -0.614 -0.277 -0.306 -0.279 
 (0.177)* (0.181) (0.185) (0.187)** (0.188) (0.181)* (0.217) 
Hispanic -0.695 -0.588 -0.509 -0.714 -0.492 -0.578 -0.162 
 (0.225)** (0.234)** (0.237)* (0.243)** (0.251)* (0.233)** (0.302) 
Asian American 0.996 1.071 1.297 0.594 0.967 0.939 0.671 
 (0.603)* (0.614)* (0.609)* (0.627) (0.606) (0.608) (0.641) 
Native American -0.347 -0.276 -0.231 -0.270 -0.341 -0.160 -0.104 
 (0.468) (0.477) (0.497) (0.482) (0.474) (0.471) (0.533) 
Disability -0.406 -0.307 -0.731 -0.386 -0.329 -0.342 -0.541 
 (0.172)** (0.178)* (0.189)** (0.180)* (0.179)* (0.175)* (0.214)** 
Fixed Pay  1.518     0.895 
  (0.120)**     (0.155)** 
Tenure   0.200    0.193 
   (0.014)**    (0.015)** 
Firm 1    -0.959   -1.167 
    (0.230)**   (0.273)** 
Firm 2    1.004   1.464 
    (0.273)**   (0.321)** 
Firm 6    -0.565   -0.132 
    (0.219)**   (0.285) 
Firm 7    -1.505   -1.195 
    (0.231)**   (0.286)** 
Firm 8    -1.310   -1.331 
    (0.276)**   (0.344)** 
Production     -1.225  -0.254 
     (0.213)**  (0.271) 
Administrative     -0.818  0.192 
     (0.270)**  (0.319) 
Professional/Technical     -1.018  -0.180 
     (0.224)**  (0.262) 
Sales     -0.626  0.594 
     (0.321)*  (0.377) 
No High School      -1.270 -0.603 
      (0.317)** (0.401) 
High School      -0.901 -0.289 
      (0.281)** (0.347) 
Some College      -0.897 -0.131 
      (0.284)** (0.342) 
Associates Degree      -0.415 0.103 
      (0.312) (0.365) 
Bachelors Degree      -0.099 0.246 
      (0.310) (0.348) 
Constant 1.552 -14.338 0.466 2.245 2.578 2.291 -8.083 
 (0.062)** (1.244)** (0.087)** (0.211)** (0.206)** (0.274)** (1.768)** 
Observations 3304 3304 3260 3304 3212 3284 3157 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
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Table 8: Results from Logit Models Predicting Participation in BBSOPs 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.548 0.288 -0.660 -0.183 -0.245 -0.427 0.235 
 (0.095)** (0.107)** (0.096)** (0.115) (0.107)* (0.098)** (0.146) 
African American -0.228 0.014 -0.024 -0.643 -0.347 -0.209 -0.304 
 (0.262) (0.273) (0.265) (0.315)* (0.267) (0.265) (0.347) 
Hispanic -0.095 -0.024 0.075 -0.656 -0.042 -0.063 0.001 
 (0.238) (0.250) (0.240) (0.306)* (0.247) (0.239) (0.346) 
Asian American 1.032 1.163 1.138 -0.034 1.162 0.902 0.228 
 (0.193)** (0.202)** (0.193)** (0.232) (0.215)** (0.195)** (0.306) 
Native American -0.607 -0.194 -0.712 0.253 -0.774 -0.361 -0.023 
 (0.481) (0.515) (0.488) (0.543) (0.495) (0.488) (0.602) 
Disability -0.279 0.267 -0.216 -0.365 0.038 -0.151 0.134 
 (0.228) (0.241) (0.231) (0.272) (0.235) (0.231) (0.305) 
Fixed Pay  1.827     1.622 
  (0.083)**     (0.181)** 
Tenure   0.183    0.235 
   (0.016)**    (0.020)** 
Firm 4    -0.901   -2.629 
    (0.143)**   (0.275)** 
Firm 5    5.221   3.799 
    (0.342)**   (0.399)** 
Firm 9    0.767   -- 
    (0.289)**   -- 
Firm 12    1.843   1.090 
    (0.180)**   (0.231)** 
Production     -2.473  -1.301 
     (0.240)**  (0.352)** 
Administrative     -1.946  -0.924 
     (0.254)**  (0.340)** 
Professional/Technical     -1.277  -0.876 
     (0.216)**  (0.267)** 
Sales     -0.462  -0.907 
     (0.280)*  (0.361)** 
No High School      -1.120 0.297 
      (0.452)** (0.637) 
High School      -0.770 0.526 
      (0.185)** (0.305)* 
Some College      -0.582 -0.198 
      (0.154)** (0.251) 
Associates Degree      -0.679 -0.395 
      (0.182)** (0.285) 
Bachelors Degree      -0.217 -0.311 
      (0.127)* (0.192) 
Constant 2.970 -17.404 2.281 1.329 4.127 3.234 -15.369 
 (0.065)** (0.912)** (0.079)** (0.133)** (0.209)** (0.109)** (1.995)** 
Observations 8943 8943 8853 8943 8771 8925 8667 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   
 
 
 
 138 
Table 9: Results from Logit Models Predicting Participation in Profitsharing 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.169 0.025 -0.150 -0.010 -0.107 -0.172 0.140 
 (0.025)** (0.026) (0.025)** (0.027) (0.027)** (0.028)** (0.034)** 
African American -0.978 -0.803 -0.930 -0.928 -0.883 -0.968 -0.833 
 (0.054)** (0.055)** (0.055)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.057)** (0.064)** 
Hispanic -0.904 -0.305 -0.813 -0.937 -0.857 -0.357 -0.333 
 (0.043)** (0.048)** (0.044)** (0.044)** (0.045)** (0.062)** (0.069)** 
Asian American -0.484 -0.271 -0.334 -0.794 -0.620 -0.229 -0.454 
 (0.040)** (0.044)** (0.041)** (0.044)** (0.043)** (0.054)** (0.064)** 
Native American -0.775 -0.540 -0.772 -0.632 -0.712 -0.492 -0.315 
 (0.100)** (0.103)** (0.102)** (0.105)** (0.102)** (0.115)** (0.131)** 
Disability -0.236 -0.097 -0.304 -0.176 -0.158 -0.120 -0.125 
 (0.050)** (0.051)* (0.051)** (0.051)** (0.051)** (0.056)* (0.063)* 
Fixed Pay  0.736     0.600 
  (0.018)**     (0.043)** 
Tenure   0.032    0.034 
   (0.001)**    (0.002)** 
Firm 1    -2.276   -2.220 
    (0.179)**   (0.187)** 
Firm 2    0.478   1.098 
    (0.176)**   (0.186)** 
Firm 3    0.386   0.135 
    (0.174)*   (0.182) 
Firm 4    -0.775   -1.040 
    (0.165)**   (0.171)** 
Firm 5    0.800   0.807 
    (0.151)**   (0.159)** 
Firm 6    -0.210   0.435 
    (0.158)   (0.169)** 
Firm 7    -1.309   -0.549 
    (0.178)**   (0.190)** 
Firm 8    0.530   1.079 
    (0.262)*   (0.287)** 
Firm 9    -1.262   -- 
    (0.223)**   -- 
Firm 11    -0.385   0.020 
    (0.147)**   (0.155) 
Firm 12     -2.057   -2.044 
    (0.159)**   (0.166)** 
Production     -0.859  -0.371 
     (0.043)**  (0.064)** 
Administrative     -0.971  -0.251 
     (0.063)**  (0.085)** 
Professional/Technical     -0.261  -0.152 
     (0.045)**  (0.058)** 
Sales     -1.862  -2.162 
     (0.060)**  (0.075)** 
Customer Service     -0.751  -0.267 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
No High School      -1.306 -0.963 
      (0.077)** (0.094)** 
High School      -0.791 -0.268 
      (0.049)** (0.068)** 
Some College      -0.692 -0.166 
      (0.049)** (0.064)** 
Associates Degree      -0.649 -0.079 
      (0.058)** (0.071) 
Bachelors Degree      -0.376 -0.022 
      (0.048)** (0.055) 
Constant 0.897 -7.059 0.590 1.161 1.554 1.566 -5.334 
 (0.016)** (0.192)** (0.021)** (0.147)** (0.039)** (0.042)** (0.504)** 
Observations 34215 34212 33699 34215 33600 29049 28204 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level, --dropped to collinearity  
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Table 10: Results from Logit Models Predicting Participation in Gainsharing 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.473 -0.172 -0.490 -0.442 -0.319 -0.338 -0.262 
 (0.032)** (0.033)** (0.032)** (0.035)** (0.034)** (0.034)** (0.040)** 
African American -0.511 -0.212 -0.553 -0.154 -0.255 -0.240 -0.017 
 (0.079)** (0.081)** (0.079)** (0.084)* (0.084)** (0.084)** (0.093) 
Hispanic -0.462 0.205 -0.534 -0.090 -0.238 -0.054 0.068 
 (0.061)** (0.065)** (0.062)** (0.066) (0.064)** (0.080) (0.088) 
Asian American 0.396 0.501 0.279 -0.101 0.276 0.245 -0.017 
 (0.045)** (0.048)** (0.046)** (0.051)* (0.047)** (0.052)** (0.059) 
Native American -0.164 0.134 -0.146 0.278 0.105 0.351 0.494 
 (0.128) (0.134) (0.129) (0.134)* (0.134) (0.142)** (0.153)** 
Disability -0.273 -0.041 -0.229 -0.039 0.054 -0.011 0.098 
 (0.065)** (0.067) (0.066)** (0.070) (0.068) (0.073) (0.080) 
Fixed Pay  1.065     0.373 
  (0.025)**     (0.045)** 
Tenure   -0.027    0.003 
   (0.002)**    (0.002) 
Firm 1    -1.124   -0.896 
    (0.156)**   (0.160)** 
Firm 2    -0.899   -0.636 
    (0.136)**   (0.139)** 
Firm 3    1.083   1.259 
    (0.098)**   (0.104)** 
Firm 4    -0.071   -0.175 
    (0.108)   (0.112) 
Firm 5    1.134   0.862 
    (0.070)**   (0.077)** 
Firm 6    -0.462   0.119 
    (0.096)**   (0.105) 
Firm 7    -0.416   -0.196 
    (0.145)**   (0.152) 
Firm 9    0.120   -- 
    (0.191)   -- 
Firm 11    -1.146   -0.927 
    (0.069)**   (0.075)** 
Production     -1.442  -0.753 
     (0.044)**  (0.066)** 
Administrative     -0.945  -0.562 
     (0.078)**  (0.096)** 
Professional/Technical     -0.228  -0.407 
     (0.040)**  (0.049)** 
Sales     0.338  0.224 
     (0.056)**  (0.068)** 
Customer Service     -1.445  -0.500 
     (0.124)**  (0.164)** 
No High School      -1.641 -0.142 
      (0.111)** (0.127) 
High School      -1.613 -0.110 
      (0.052)** (0.073) 
Some College      -1.328 -0.173 
      (0.049)** (0.062)** 
Associates Degree      -1.142 -0.176 
      (0.062)** (0.072)** 
Bachelors Degree      -0.261 0.019 
      (0.041)** (0.046) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Constant -1.193 -12.879 -0.935 -0.883 -0.646 -0.358 -4.669 
 (0.017)** (0.272)** (0.023)** (0.068)** (0.034)** (0.035)** (0.518)** 
Observations 33826 33823 33318 33826 33223 28664 27837 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level, --dropped to collinearity  
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Table 11: Results from Logit Models Predicting Participation in ESPPs 
 
 
 145 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.670 -0.046 -0.713 -0.134 -0.415 -0.448 0.102 
 (0.057)** (0.065) (0.058)** (0.067)* (0.065)** (0.061)** (0.077) 
African American -1.417 -1.307 -1.344 -1.280 -1.542 -1.510 -1.191 
 (0.146)** (0.154)** (0.148)** (0.164)** (0.151)** (0.148)** (0.173)** 
Hispanic 0.075 0.156 0.163 -0.221 0.110 0.072 0.075 
 (0.155) (0.164) (0.157) (0.170) (0.165) (0.160) (0.183) 
Asian American 0.723 0.780 0.774 0.447 0.697 0.497 0.521 
 (0.096)** (0.102)** (0.097)** (0.107)** (0.107)** (0.099)** (0.117)** 
Native American -2.164 -2.136 -2.215 -1.602 -2.216 -1.805 -1.625 
 (0.281)** (0.297)** (0.282)** (0.318)** (0.288)** (0.292)** (0.334)** 
Disability -0.662 -0.356 -0.631 -0.568 -0.478 -0.357 -0.180 
 (0.134)** (0.147)** (0.135)** (0.147)** (0.143)** (0.142)** (0.173) 
Fixed Pay  1.529     0.785 
  (0.055)**     (0.083)** 
Tenure   0.051    0.080 
   (0.006)**    (0.007)** 
Firm 4    0.290   -0.680 
    (0.127)*   (0.161)** 
Firm 5    2.348   1.334 
    (0.113)**   (0.151)** 
Firm 9    -0.532   -- 
    (0.198)**   -- 
Firm 12    0.442   -0.204 
    (0.118)**   (0.139) 
Production     -1.600  -0.231 
     (0.120)**  (0.157) 
Administrative     -1.184  -0.067 
     (0.124)**  (0.155) 
Professional/Technical     -0.030  0.197 
     (0.087)  (0.099)* 
Sales     0.125  0.381 
     (0.118)  (0.135)** 
No High School      -1.317 -0.553 
      (0.310)** (0.403) 
High School      -1.943 -0.496 
      (0.112)** (0.147)** 
Some College      -0.607 0.075 
      (0.095)** (0.119) 
Associates Degree      -0.664 0.191 
      (0.115)** (0.143) 
Bachelors Degree      -0.173 0.084 
      (0.075)* (0.086) 
Constant 1.732 -15.461 1.484 0.139 1.940 2.051 -8.396 
 (0.039)** (0.620)** (0.048)** (0.106) (0.079)** (0.065)** (0.934)** 
Observations 8941 8941 8851 8941 8768 8924 8665 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level, --dropped to collinearity  
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more likely to work part-time. The data do not allow me to test this claim. If it did and 
there was still a negative effect, this would provide evidence that the ESOP companies 
in the sample could be restricting access to these employees.  
 For African Americans, the negative effect in Model 1 becomes statistically 
insignificant in Models 2, 3, and 5, which control for fixed pay, tenure, and 
occupation, respectively. Hence, African-Americans are less likely to participate not 
because of any exclusionary processes through which ESOP stock is allocated, but 
because they are paid less, stay with the company for shorter periods of time, and are 
more likely to be in occupations that are less likely to participate when compared to 
managers: production, administrative, and professional/technical. Although the 
negative effect for Hispanics participating in ESOPs becomes statistically insignificant 
in the full specified model, the effects remain for all other models, so it is difficult to 
distinguish what accounts for the negative effect in Model 1. In addition to the effects 
for different groups, Model 7 reveals that employees who receive higher fixed pay and 
companies with longer tenures are more likely to participate in the ESOP. This makes 
sense because it is unlikely that employees receiving high salaries and who have been 
with the company longer would meet any of the conditions that would allow 
companies could exclude them from participation. Finally, Model 5 shows that all 
nonmanagerial occupations are less likely to participate, but these effects disappear in 
the fully specified model 7. Overall, the results for ESOPs are not surprising. They 
reveal few barriers to participation, which is expected because these plans legally 
require participation by most employees.  
 Turning to plans in which management decides who will participate, BBSOPs, 
profitsharing and gainsharing, the results paint a different picture. In BBSOPs, 
management has a great deal of flexibility in deciding who receives stock options. 
There are no legal requirements for how stock options can be distributed. The only 
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real constraint is imposed by the number of future shares that companies need to have 
available when employees exercise their options and purchase the shares. Typically, 
employees receive options when they join the company and/or on an ongoing basis, 
but there is wide variation in plan design (Weeden et al. 2001). Some employees will 
receive options every year; others will receive shares more sporadically. There is also 
wide variation in terms of who makes decisions about which employees receive stock 
options. In some companies, an employee’s immediate supervisor will make the 
decision, while in others, the human resources or compensation department will make 
the decision (NCEO 2001). Hence, if an employee participates in an option plan, this 
could mean that they only received a small number of options at one time or that they 
receive options every year. The dataset did not provide detailed information on plan 
design, but the results for participation can still offer important insights into how stock 
option participation varies by gender, race, and disability status.  
 Table 8 presents the results for BBSOPs. Model 1, without controls, shows that 
women are less likely to receive stock options and Asian Americans are more likely. 
Both of these results become statistically insignificant in the fully specified Model 7. 
In examining Models 2 – 6, the negative effect for women disappears with controls for 
fixed pay and individual firms. This suggests that because women receive less pay, 
this may be a factor in determining whether or not they receive stock options. For firm 
level effects, all employees in Firm 4 are less likely to receive stock options relative to 
the other firms with these plans in the sample. Women may be overrepresented in this 
company. For Asian Americans, the positive effect of Model 1 disappears with the 
firm level controls of Model 4, suggesting that Asian Americans may be 
overrepresented in the firms that are more likely to grant stock options to employees. 
Similar to the results for ESOPs, employees with higher pay and longer tenures are 
more likely to participate in these plans. Unlike the ESOP results, however, employees 
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in all nonmanagerial positions are less likely to receive stock options, and these effects 
remain in the fully specified Model 7. Since there are no rules requiring participation 
by broad groups of employees, these results reveal that even in companies that are 
granting options to nonmanagers, managers are still more likely to receive options. 
The overall results for stock option participation show that none of the demographic 
groups of interest are less likely to receive stock options and that barriers to 
participation are mostly shaped by pay levels, tenure, and occupation, rather than 
through any systematic mechanisms of exclusion in how stock options are granted.  
 Table 9 presents the results for participation in profitsharing plans, another 
program in which management decides who participates. Model 1 reveals that all 
demographic groups of interest are less likely to participate in these plans, and all of 
these effects remain in the fully specified Model 7. The one exception is the case of 
women, who are less likely to participate in Model 1, but more likely to participate in 
Model 7. The effect seems to stem from firm level effects, as Model 4 reveals. Hence, 
women may be overrepresented in firms that provide broader access, or 
underrepresented in firm that provide more narrow access. The results do not allow a 
more detailed examination of the firm level effects. Again, higher pay and longer 
tenure are associated with participation. Similar to stock options, all nonmanagerial 
employees are less likely to participate in profitsharing plans. The results reveal very 
strong barriers to participation for all nonwhite groups and employees with 
disabilities. Since these effects remain even when controls for fixed pay, tenure, and 
occupation are included, the ways in which companies provide access for different 
groups may be exclusionary in a systematic way.  
 Table 10 presents the results for the other plan in which managers decide 
participate, gainsharing plans. Model 1 shows that women, African Americans, 
Hispanics, and employees with disabilities are less likely to participate in gainsharing, 
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while Asian Americans are more likely to participate. Model 7, however, reveals that 
these effects only remain for women and Asian Americans once controls are added. 
Models 2 – 6 do not provide an easy explanation for why the effect for African 
Americans disappears, but shows that firm level effects and lower education appears 
to account for the negative effect for Hispanics. For employees with disabilities, the 
negative effect disappears with controls for fixed pay, firm level effects, occupation, 
and education. Finally, although Native Americans appear to be more likely to 
participate in these plans, this finding is most likely due to the small number of Native 
Americans in the sample. In terms of other variables, employees with higher fixed 
pay, but not those with longer tenures, are more likely to participate. Also, all 
nonmanagerial employees are less likely to participate, with the exception of sales 
employees, suggesting that these plans may be partly targeted towards these 
employees. The results for gainsharing are similar to those of stock options in that the 
barriers that most groups face appear to be the effect of income, firm level factors, or 
occupation. The results are clear that women are less likely to participate in these 
plans, suggesting that companies may be obstructing access to women through plan 
design.  
 Table 11 examines the outcomes for the one type of plan in which employees 
decide whether or not they will participate, employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs).  
In an ESPP, employees defer part of their pretax compensation that is used to purchase 
stock at discount on specific purchase days. The law requires that most employees be 
eligible to participate (part-time employees, for example, can be excluded). However, 
the employee chooses whether or not to participate. Model 1 in Table 9 shows that 
women, African Americans, Native Americans, and employees with disabilities are all 
less likely to participate in ESPPs. In the fully specified Model 7, the effects remain 
for African Americans and Native Americans. Model 2 shows that the negative effect 
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of women disappears when fixed pay is included in the model, suggesting that the 
negative effect for women stems from them receiving lower pay than men. Not 
surprisingly, higher paid employees are more likely to participate in this plan, which 
most probably reflects the ability of these employees to defer part of their current 
compensation for future investment opportunities. The results show that African 
Americans and Native Americans are more likely to choose not to participate in these 
plans, while Asian Americans are more likely to participate in these plans, even 
controlling for many other factors. This could reflect variation in attitudes towards 
investing or saving, the need for current cash, the level of understanding of ESPPs, or 
financial literacy. These results could also reflect how managers promote and 
communicate ESPPs to different groups of employees to encourage participation.  
 In assessing the overall picture of participation in employee ownership plans, 
the results suggest that most of the barriers to access for women, nonwhites, and 
employees with disabilities operate through existing mechanisms that place women 
and minorities into income and occupational groups for which access to employee 
ownership is restricted, rather than through specific exclusionary ways in which 
companies design these plans. In ESOPs, this is no surprise because the law requires 
broad participation. In plans where management decides, the evidence for 
exclusionary plan design is only strong for profitsharing. All groups except women 
face barriers to accessing these plans, even when the analysis controlled for other 
possible influences. Since the survey did not collect data on how managers are 
designing these plans, it is difficult to assess the underlying explanation, but the data 
analyzed here raises this as a very important area for future research. For other plans 
in which management decides, stock option plans and gainsharing, only one group 
faces restricted access that is unexplained by the controls: women accessing 
gainsharing plans. Again, the data do not permit an explanation, but suggests possible 
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exclusionary plan design. Finally, the lower likelihood of certain groups voluntarily 
deciding to participate in ESPPs suggests a different set of mechanisms relating to the 
choices that individuals make regarding investing and saving. Overall, the evidence 
reviewed in this section provides a strong case that stratification in access to employee 
ownership programs is primarily related to existing mechanisms that place women and 
minorities in different and lower-paying occupations than men and whites. The results 
also suggest substantial organizational level variation in access to non-ESOP plans. 
To the extent that participation is related to an employee’s place in the organizational 
structure and pay scale, these results make a great deal of sense. With the exception of 
profit-sharing plans, managers do not appear to be designing these plans in 
exclusionary ways in terms of participation, nor are they using these plans to try to 
balance out existing patterns of inequality by opening up participation, which is also 
unsurprising. 
 
Financial Value of Employee Ownership 
Of those employees who participate in employee ownership programs, what is the 
relationship between gender, race, and disability status to the financial value of assets 
employees require through these programs?  To answer this question, I examined the 
effect of being in different demographic groups on the value of assets acquired 
through employee ownership. Tables 12 -16 show the results of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) models that predict the natural logarithm of plan assets. For these analyses, I 
only included those employees who participated in these plans. To the extent that 
certain groups are less likely to participate in certain plans, therefore, the effects for all 
employees within these groups who work in these companies is likely understated. For 
example, African Americans are less likely to participate in profit-sharing plans. If 
those who participate in these plans have significantly negative values for 
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profitsharing, the overall difference in the value of profitsharing between all whites 
and all African Americans—combining lower participation and lower values for those 
who do participate—would be larger. Similar to the results for plan participation, the 
tables report results from seven models for each of the five plans. The first includes 
only the demographic variables of interest. Models 2 through 6 add in the effects of 
different control variables, respectively: fixed pay, tenure, individual firms, 
occupation, and education. Model 7 is the fully specified model. 
 The models regress the independent variables on the natural logarithm of the 
financial value held or received from the various forms of employee ownership. I used 
log transformations to control for the effects of outliers. The specific dependent 
variables for which I used the logged transformation include:  
 
• ESOP:  approximate total value of company stock that employees hold in their 
ESOPs.  
• BBSOP:  total stock option value, or, the sum of the money an employee 
would receive if they exercised all vested and unvested stock options at the 
time of the survey (net of purchase price) plus the value of the stock currently 
held by employees from exercising any stock options plus the amount of 
money an employee has made from exercising any stock options from the 
company in the past and selling the shares.  
• ESPPs: total value of company stock an employee owns from purchases of 
stock made through an ESPP. 
• Profit-sharing: value of payments an employee received in the previous year 
from a profit-sharing plan.  
• Gainsharing: value of payments an employee received in the previous year 
based on workgroup or department performance. 
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The value of stock acquired in most employee ownership plans is linked directly to 
salary, so the results should show that stratification in these values reflects existing 
patterns of income stratification shown in Table 6.  
 Table 12 presents the results for ESOPs. Distributions of stock through an 
ESOP are required to be made on some existing relative basis such as salary. In the 
case of ESOPs, employees who make higher salaries, for example, will usually receive 
more shares of stock. Model 1 only shows a statistically significant effect for 
employees with disabilities, who receive higher plan values. In the fully specified 
Model 7, this effect remains, and women receive lower values than men, even with 
controls for other possible influences. Both findings defy an easy explanation since 
any differences should be mediated by pay, tenure, or occupation. Not surprisingly, 
higher paid employees and employees with longer tenure receive higher values of 
assets. In addition, production workers receive lower value of assets, suggesting that 
the specific ways in which companies allocate stock through ESOPs may be 
disadvantageous for production workers. 
 Table 13 presents the results for financial value from stock options. Unlike 
ESOPs, companies have a great deal of flexibility deciding who should receive stock 
options and how many employees receive. Typically, companies establish ranges for 
the number of shares that they grant to different types of employees, based on 
occupation, salary, or seniority. The final number of stock options employees receive 
depends on a number of factors. Broad-based plans often provide employees with a 
grant of options upon hire and annual grants every year based on individual or group 
performance. In most companies, the human resources or compensation department 
will make the final decision about the number of options to grant to individual
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Table 12: Results from OLS Models Predicting Financial Value of ESOP Assets 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.040 0.237 0.124 -0.365 0.049 -0.039 -0.166 
 (0.085) (0.084)** (0.080) (0.076)** (0.090) (0.085) (0.068)* 
African American -0.030 0.243 0.230 -0.592 0.072 -0.016 -0.116 
 (0.196) (0.190) (0.185) (0.169)** (0.204) (0.201) (0.148) 
Hispanic -0.172 -0.014 0.033 -0.349 -0.199 -0.129 -0.084 
 (0.298) (0.286) (0.276) (0.255) (0.301) (0.300) (0.212) 
Asian American 0.027 -0.015 0.353 -0.469 -0.049 -0.004 -0.282 
 (0.366) (0.351) (0.340) (0.315) (0.368) (0.367) (0.259) 
Native American -0.664 -0.393 -0.514 -0.485 -0.548 -0.617 -0.148 
 (0.486) (0.468) (0.451) (0.416) (0.480) (0.488) (0.336) 
Disability 0.365 0.510 0.183 0.328 0.415 0.395 0.287 
 (0.180)* (0.173)** (0.167) (0.154)* (0.180)* (0.181)* (0.126)* 
Fixed Pay  1.176     1.024 
  (0.093)**     (0.089)** 
Tenure   0.101    0.113 
   (0.006)**    (0.005)** 
Firm 1    0.478   0.063 
    (0.162)**   (0.146) 
Firm 2    1.860   2.458 
    (0.147)**   (0.130)** 
Firm 6    0.556   0.843 
    (0.141)**   (0.137)** 
Firm 7    -1.220   -0.812 
    (0.161)**   (0.142)** 
Firm 8    -0.823   -0.973 
    (0.299)**   (0.250)** 
Production     -1.000  -0.536 
     (0.125)**  (0.114)** 
Administrative     -0.835  -0.057 
     (0.183)**  (0.139) 
Professional/Technical     -0.836  -0.193 
     (0.136)**  (0.101) 
Sales     -1.181  0.073 
     (0.202)**  (0.153) 
Customer Service     0.000  0.000 
     (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
No High School      -0.398 -0.028 
      (0.280) (0.221) 
High School      -0.275 0.060 
      (0.187) (0.158) 
Some College      -0.264 0.157 
      (0.190) (0.153) 
Associates Degree      -0.272 -0.032 
      (0.210) (0.161) 
Bachelors Degree      -0.140 -0.084 
      (0.198) (0.142) 
Constant 9.659 -2.870 8.723 9.232 10.417 9.889 -2.648 
 (0.056)** (0.997)** (0.075)** (0.131)** (0.111)** (0.174)** (1.018)** 
Observations 1895 1895 1879 1895 1860 1891 1842 
R-Squared 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.04 0.01 0.54 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 13: Results from OLS Models Predicting Financial Value of BBSOP Assets 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.685 0.003 -0.682 -0.468 -0.397 -0.505 -0.067 
 (0.040)** (0.036) (0.040)** (0.036)** (0.041)** (0.040)** (0.031)* 
African American -0.539 -0.207 -0.558 -0.510 -0.483 -0.491 -0.352 
 (0.135)** (0.117) (0.137)** (0.115)** (0.132)** (0.134)** (0.097)** 
Hispanic -0.088 0.042 -0.128 -0.342 -0.052 -0.085 -0.138 
 (0.100) (0.086) (0.101) (0.085)** (0.098) (0.099) (0.071) 
Asian American -0.002 0.090 -0.037 -0.384 0.010 -0.130 -0.182 
 (0.050) (0.043)* (0.050) (0.043)** (0.050) (0.050)** (0.037)** 
Native American -1.350 -1.127 -1.343 -0.619 -1.573 -1.078 -0.913 
 (0.216)** (0.186)** (0.216)** (0.183)** (0.211)** (0.214)** (0.154)** 
Disability -0.131 -0.028 -0.117 -0.074 -0.072 -0.071 0.028 
 (0.107) (0.092) (0.108) (0.090) (0.104) (0.105) (0.076) 
Fixed Pay  1.669     1.312 
  (0.031)**     (0.032)** 
Tenure   -0.017    0.046 
   (0.003)**    (0.002)** 
Firm 4    -1.540   -1.256 
    (0.091)**   (0.078)** 
Firm 5    1.937   2.406 
    (0.051)**   (0.052)** 
Firm 9    0.553   0.000 
    (0.152)**   (0.000)** 
Firm 12    0.683   1.642 
    (0.065)**   (0.058)** 
Production     -1.218  -0.019 
     (0.095)**  (0.075) 
Administrative     -1.640  -0.600 
     (0.088)**  (0.072)** 
Professional/Technical     -0.450  -0.496 
     (0.044)**  (0.035)** 
Sales     -0.492  -0.489 
     (0.062)**  (0.048)** 
Customer Service     0.000  0.000 
     (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
No High School      -0.713 -0.118 
      (0.236)** (0.172) 
High School      -1.500 0.116 
      (0.090)** (0.072) 
Some College      -0.491 0.006 
      (0.061)** (0.046) 
Associates Degree      -0.684 0.007 
      (0.075)** (0.057) 
Bachelors Degree      -0.222 -0.021 
      (0.040)** (0.030) 
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Table 13 (Continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 11.765 -7.301 11.881 10.336 12.144 12.004 -5.027 
 (0.023)** (0.351)** (0.029)** (0.047)** (0.038)** (0.034)** (0.372)** 
Observations 8435 8435 8344 8435 8325 8401 8202 
R-squared 0.04 0.29 0.05 0.32 0.09 0.08 0.53 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 14: Results from OLS Models Predicting Financial Value of Profitsharing 
Assets 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.634 -0.087 -0.653 -0.540 -0.322 -0.402 -0.092 
 (0.026)** (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.016)** 
African American -0.837 -0.216 -0.856 -0.560 -0.289 -0.434 -0.166 
 (0.071)** (0.050)** (0.071)** (0.053)** (0.058)** (0.058)** (0.039)** 
Hispanic -0.810 0.476 -0.851 -0.674 -0.489 -0.011 0.028 
 (0.055)** (0.040)** (0.055)** (0.041)** (0.044)** (0.052) (0.035) 
Asian American 0.856 0.651 0.757 -0.291 0.439 0.338 -0.002 
 (0.045)** (0.032)** (0.046)** (0.035)** (0.037)** (0.039)** (0.027) 
Native American -0.925 -0.278 -0.907 -0.545 -0.183 -0.258 -0.054 
 (0.130)** (0.092)** (0.130)** (0.097)** (0.106) (0.108)* (0.072) 
Disability -0.582 -0.167 -0.543 -0.294 -0.119 -0.194 -0.035 
 (0.056)** (0.039)** (0.056)** (0.042)** (0.045)** (0.046)** (0.031) 
Fixed Pay  1.896     1.300 
  (0.013)**     (0.019)** 
Tenure   -0.021    0.014 
   (0.001)**    (0.001)** 
Firm 1    0.437   0.942 
    (0.163)**   (0.113)** 
Firm 2    1.456   2.164 
    (0.114)**   (0.079)** 
Firm 3    0.689   0.731 
    (0.113)**   (0.079)** 
Firm 4    1.915   1.311 
    (0.120)**   (0.083)** 
Firm 5    3.462   2.738 
    (0.100)**   (0.070)** 
Firm 6    -0.004   1.226 
    (0.110)   (0.078)** 
Firm 7    0.184   0.805 
    (0.138)   (0.096)** 
Firm 8    0.132   1.009 
    (0.169)   (0.120)** 
Firm 9    2.465   0.000 
    (0.197)**   (0.000)** 
Firm 11    0.819   1.500 
    (0.099)**   (0.070)** 
Firm 12     2.372   2.036 
    (0.120)**   (0.083)** 
Production     -2.413  -0.815 
     (0.029)**  (0.026)** 
Administrative     -1.864  -0.473 
     (0.051)**  (0.038)** 
Professional/Technical     -0.391  -0.359 
     (0.029)**  (0.021)** 
Sales     0.057  0.172 
     (0.056)  (0.038)** 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Customer Service     -2.204  -0.741 
     (0.068)**  (0.051)** 
No High School      -2.594 -0.519 
      (0.071)** (0.051)** 
High School      -2.627 -0.447 
      (0.033)** (0.029)** 
Some College      -2.081 -0.378 
      (0.032)** (0.026)** 
Associates Degree      -1.820 -0.360 
      (0.040)** (0.030)** 
Bachelors Degree      -0.591 -0.119 
      (0.030)** (0.020)** 
Constant 8.186 -12.632 8.410 6.703 9.244 9.643 -7.305 
 (0.015)** (0.145)** (0.021)** (0.099)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.231)** 
Observations 20778 20777 20522 20778 20572 18845 18441 
R-squared 0.07 0.54 0.08 0.48 0.40 0.40 0.73 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
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Table 15: Results from OLS Models Predicting Financial Value of Gainsharing 
Assets 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.890 -0.273 -0.915 -0.622 -0.330 -0.567 -0.088 
 (0.054)** (0.039)** (0.053)** (0.041)** (0.043)** (0.043)** (0.030)** 
African American -1.089 -0.518 -1.122 -0.701 -0.611 -0.584 -0.292 
 (0.147)** (0.104)** (0.146)** (0.111)** (0.114)** (0.117)** (0.078)** 
Hispanic -1.068 0.203 -1.125 -0.793 -0.457 -0.233 -0.130 
 (0.106)** (0.077)** (0.105)** (0.080)** (0.082)** (0.096)* (0.062)* 
Asian American 0.283 0.401 0.142 -0.470 -0.046 -0.040 -0.097 
 (0.070)** (0.049)** (0.070)* (0.053)** (0.055) (0.057) (0.038)* 
Native American -0.324 -0.370 -0.281 0.271 -0.373 0.355 -0.001 
 (0.231) (0.164)* (0.228) (0.176) (0.177)* (0.186) (0.122) 
Disability -0.889 -0.365 -0.816 -0.446 -0.169 -0.364 -0.055 
 (0.111)** (0.079)** (0.111)** (0.083)** (0.085)* (0.090)** (0.059) 
Fixed Pay  1.900     1.180 
  (0.023)**     (0.030)** 
Tenure   -0.042    0.014 
   (0.003)**    (0.002)** 
Firm 1    -1.623   -1.052 
    (0.204)**   (0.135)** 
Firm 2    -0.188   0.180 
    (0.174)   (0.115) 
Firm 3    -1.669   -1.145 
    (0.107)**   (0.076)** 
Firm 4    -0.093   -0.572 
    (0.136)   (0.090)** 
Firm 5    1.351   0.920 
    (0.082)**   (0.058)** 
Firm 6    -1.958   -0.634 
    (0.123)**   (0.086)** 
Firm 7    -1.052   -0.611 
    (0.176)**   (0.118)** 
Firm 8    0.000   0.000 
    (0.000)**   (0.000)** 
Firm 9    0.646   0.000 
    (0.229)**   (0.000)** 
Firm 11    -1.063   -0.260 
    (0.084)**   (0.060)** 
Production     -3.088  -1.205 
     (0.055)**  (0.052)** 
Administrative     -2.312  -0.757 
     (0.101)**  (0.075)** 
Professional/Technical     -0.274  -0.463 
     (0.046)**  (0.033)** 
Sales     0.182  0.177 
     (0.061)**  (0.043)** 
Customer Service     -2.885  -1.137 
     (0.169)**  (0.139)** 
 
 
 164 
Table 15 (Continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
No High School      -2.142 -0.328 
      (0.145)** (0.098)** 
High School      -2.892 -0.413 
      (0.066)** (0.054)** 
Some College      -1.749 -0.354 
      (0.059)** (0.042)** 
Associates Degree      -1.380 -0.354 
      (0.075)** (0.050)** 
Bachelors Degree      -0.421 -0.169 
      (0.044)** (0.029)** 
Constant 9.113 -12.200 9.463 8.905 9.748 10.055 -3.955 
 (0.028)** (0.264)** (0.036)** (0.081)** (0.038)** (0.037)** (0.353)** 
Observations 6566 6566 6490 6566 6486 6094 5959 
R-squared 0.08 0.54 0.11 0.49 0.47 0.36 0.74 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
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Table 16: Results from OLS Models Predicting Financial Value of ESPP Assets 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Female -0.821 -0.349 -0.768 -0.344 -0.605 -0.623 -0.092 
 (0.036)** (0.033)** (0.036)** (0.031)** (0.036)** (0.035)** (0.029)** 
African American -0.421 -0.132 -0.451 -0.335 -0.357 -0.369 -0.102 
 (0.138)** (0.120) (0.137)** (0.112)** (0.131)** (0.132)** (0.102) 
Hispanic 0.019 0.146 -0.056 -0.189 0.036 0.036 -0.054 
 (0.089) (0.077) (0.088) (0.073)** (0.085) (0.085) (0.066) 
Asian American 0.089 0.169 0.052 -0.114 0.140 -0.088 0.024 
 (0.043)* (0.037)** (0.043) (0.035)** (0.042)** (0.042)* (0.034) 
Native American 0.096 0.228 0.082 0.227 0.267 0.153 0.341 
 (0.309) (0.269) (0.306) (0.252) (0.294) (0.294) (0.227) 
Disability -0.114 -0.043 -0.136 -0.135 -0.036 -0.044 -0.006 
 (0.097) (0.084) (0.097) (0.079) (0.092) (0.092) (0.073) 
Fixed Pay  1.425     0.854 
  (0.030)**     (0.031)** 
Tenure   -0.042    0.013 
   (0.003)**    (0.003)** 
Firm 4    0.131   -0.601 
    (0.097)   (0.094)** 
Firm 5    2.122   1.156 
    (0.081)**   (0.081)** 
Firm 9    0.159   0.000 
    (0.193)   (0.000)** 
Firm 12    0.067   -0.416 
    (0.089)   (0.083)** 
Production     -1.876  -0.442 
     (0.088)**  (0.076)** 
Administrative     -1.219  -0.058 
     (0.090)**  (0.075) 
Professional/Technical     -0.411  -0.236 
     (0.041)**  (0.034)** 
Sales     0.038  0.246 
     (0.056)  (0.045)** 
Customer Service     0.000  0.000 
     (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
No High School      -0.563 -0.366 
      (0.231)* (0.186)* 
High School      -1.938 -0.674 
      (0.092)** (0.077)** 
Some College      -0.959 -0.377 
      (0.054)** (0.045)** 
Associates Degree      -0.768 -0.244 
      (0.068)** (0.055)** 
Bachelors Degree      -0.133 0.005 
      (0.035)** (0.028) 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 10.106 -6.191 10.323 8.289 10.407 10.356 -0.467 
 (0.021)** (0.342)** (0.027)** (0.080)** (0.037)** (0.030)** (0.362) 
Observations 7071 7071 6997 7071 7014 7056 6928 
R-squared 0.07 0.30 0.10 0.38 0.15 0.16 0.50 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
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employees. Due to this flexibility, it is likely that BBSOPs generate the most 
individual level variation in terms of both participation and the amount of assets 
employees receive. Model 1 in Table 13 shows that women, African-Americans, and 
Native Americans all have less valuable stock option grants. For all three of these 
groups, these effects remain when the controls are included in the models. In addition, 
Asian Americans also receive less valuable stock option grants in the fully specified 
model. Hence, employees in these groups who receive stock options receive fewer 
options than their comparison groups. Since many of these effects remain with 
controls, Table 13 provides persuasive evidence that the decisions corporate managers 
make regarding the number of options granted to employees may treat women and 
nonwhites unequally. This contrasts sharply with the results for stock option 
participation, which showed no barriers to access by gender and race. Less 
surprisingly, higher paid employees and those with longer tenures receive more 
valuable grants as well. Administrative, professional/technical, and sales employees 
also receive less valuable grants.  
 Tables 14 and 15 examines values from profit-sharing plans and gainsharing 
plans, respectively, two other plans in which management determines the financial 
value of assets. In contrast to stock option plans, which have a high degree of 
customization in terms of how many options individuals receive, both of these plans 
have a more standardized structure in which larger groups of employees receive 
similar allocations of financial assets. In the case of both of these plans, employees 
receive a cash payout as a bonus based on corporate profits (profitsharing) or groups 
of employees hitting performance targets (gainsharing). Table 14 presents the results 
for the financial value of profitsharing payouts. Model 1 shows that all demographic 
groups, with the exception of Asian Americans, receive less valuable payouts. In the 
fully specified Model 7, these effects remain for women and African Americans. For 
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Hispanics, the negative effect disappears when controls for education are included, 
indicating that this effect is more a function of Hispanics being more likely to have 
lower levels of education and that less educated employees receive less valuable 
assets. For employees with disabilities, no such clear distinction is discernible 
regarding why the negative effect disappears in Model 7. Similar to most other 
outcomes, Model 7 shows that higher paid employees and those with longer tenure 
receive higher payouts and that all nonmanagement employees, except for sales 
employees, receive less valuable assets. Hence, the ways in which profit-sharing 
allocation decisions are made appears to be treating women and African Americans 
unequally when compared to men and white employees. 
 Turning to gainsharing, Table 15 shows more negative outcomes than the 
results for profitsharing. All groups except Native Americans and employees with 
disabilities receive lower payouts, even when all controls are added. Similar to the 
results for profit-sharing, higher paid and longer tenured employees have more 
valuable payouts, while all nonmanagment groups except for sales employees have 
lower payouts. Finally, for both types of plans, employees with educational attainment 
below a Bachelor’s degree receive less valuable payouts. These results provide strong 
evidence that companies are designing gainsharing plans in ways that appear to 
provide unequal payouts to women and nonwhite employees, relative to men and 
white employees.  
 Table 16 presents the results for the value of assets for the final type of plan, 
employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs). In ESPPs, employees defer part of their 
compensation to purchase discounted stock on specific dates. Employee can defer up 
to a certain percentage of their compensation, and they decide on this percentage. 
Hence, unlike other plans, employees make the decision regarding how much stock 
they will purchase. The results for Model 1 in Table 15 show that women and African 
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Americans have lower stock values in their ESPP holdings. In the fully specified 
model, only the effect for women remains, suggesting that women are less able or 
willing to defer compensation, even when controlling for other factors. For African 
Americans, the negative effect of Model 1 is associated primarily with lower levels of 
fixed pay, as demonstrated in Model 2. Again, higher paid employees and those with 
longer tenures receive higher values. Model 7 also shows that production and 
professional/technical employees have less valuable ESPP holdings than managers, 
and all non-college educated employees have lower values. This suggests that these 
employees may be less willing and able to defer compensation. It also suggests a 
potential lack of knowledge about the investment process among these groups.  
 Looking at all the outcomes for the financial value of assets acquired through 
the three forms of employee ownership, profitsharing, and gainsharing, it is clear that 
since the distribution of most of these plans is a function of existing forms of 
compensation, higher paid employees receive more valuable assets through all of these 
plans, regardless of how decisions regarding participation are made. However, the 
results also provide evidence that companies are allocating stock and payouts from 
profitsharing and gainsharing to certain groups unequally, based on gender and race. 
For example, in two of the three types of plans in which management decides, stock 
options and gainsharing, women and most nonwhite employees have statistically 
significant lower values than their comparison groups, even when controls for pay, 
tenure, firm effects, and occupation are included. For all three of these plans, women 
and African-Americans have lower values than men and whites, respectively. This is 
strong evidence that the way in which managers make decisions about how many 
stock options to allocate to different groups and the value of payouts relating to 
profitsharing and gainsharing provided to different groups, unequally favors men and 
whites above and beyond the advantages provided to men and whites from higher pay, 
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longer tenures, higher educational attainment, and increased representation in 
management. Finally, for these three plans in which management decides on the value, 
employees in most nonmanagement occupations also receive less value. In ESOPs, 
which require that allocations are based on pay or some other existing relative 
measure, and ESPPs, in which employees choose the value of their plan assets, women 
have lower values, even accounting for other factors. Hence, similar to the results for 
plan participation, disparities in financial value that are related to the specific ways in 
which employee ownership plans are structured are most prevalent in plans in which 
management makes the decisions.  
 
Putting the Pieces Together 
The results from these two sets of analyses provide a more detailed picture of 
disparities in how different demographic groups access and benefit financially from 
employee ownership and related plans. Although many of these disparities emanate 
from existing mechanisms of stratification, the evidence also suggests that the specific 
structure of these programs may be benefiting certain groups over others. Overall, the 
evidence for such potential discriminatory mechanisms is stronger for how companies 
allocate stock and financial benefits of these plans than for how companies provide 
access to participation. For example, for plans in which management decides both 
participation and financial value, the findings suggest that, with respect to stock 
options and gainsharing, the decisions managers make with respect to the allocation of 
financial value lead to more unequal outcomes for specific groups than the decisions 
regarding participation. The opposite is true for profitsharing, in which more groups 
face barriers to access, even with controls, than experience lower financial values. A 
priority for future research should be to uncover the ways in which decisions about 
participation and allocation for these plans are actually made by corporate managers. 
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In contrast, the results show that for ESOPs, in which broad participation is legally 
required and allocation structures are legally defined, there are few barriers to access 
and disparities in financial value beyond existing mechanisms of stratification. Finally, 
for plans in which employees decide, two groups, women and African-Americans, 
appear to opt out and to invest less money in these plans. For ESPPs, women and 
African-Americans choose to defer less of their salary then men and whites. In 
contrast to the disparities evident in the plans in which management makes the 
decisions, for ESPPs, these disparities likely reflect different mechanisms regarding 
preferences for investing.  
 What is the overall picture for specific groups? Table 17 summarizes the 
results for the outcomes regarding access to employee ownership and the financial 
value of assets for different demographic groups. The percentages in each cell 
represent the percentages of statistically significant negative coefficients for all 
outcomes within each of the two sets of variables discussed above: access to employee 
ownership and the value of assets in employee ownership. Negative coefficients 
represent disparities in outcomes between specific demographic groups and their 
comparison groups (men for women, whites for each nonwhite group, and employees 
without disabilities for employees with disabilities). The qualitative assessment is 
based on the following broad categories: few disparities (0 - 33% negative outcomes), 
some disparities (34% - 66%), and many disparities (67% to 100%). The table shows 
the overall patterns for all outcomes both with and without controls for occupation, 
education, and tenure. 
 This table provides a concise way to assess overall outcomes for women, racial 
and ethnic minorities, and employees with disabilities. For participation in employee 
ownership plans, although most groups experience at least some disparities in 
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Table 17: Summary of Disparities in Access to and Financial Value of Employee 
Ownership Assets 
 
  
DISPARITIES IN 
PARTICIPATION IN 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
 
DISPARITIES IN 
FINANCIAL VALUE OF 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
SUMMARY: 
PERCENTAGE OF ALL 
OUTCOMES WITH 
DISPARITIES 
 
WITHOUT 
CONTROLS 
WITH 
CONTROLS 
WITHOUT 
CONTROLS 
WITH 
CONTROLS 
WITH 
CONTROLS 
WITHOUT 
CONTROLS 
 
Women 
 
Many   
(80%) 
Few 
(20%) 
Some 
(60%) 
Many 
(100%) 
Many 
(70%) 
Some 
 (60%) 
 
African 
Americans 
 
Many  
(80%) 
Some 
(40%) 
Some  
(60%) 
Many 
(80%) 
Many 
 (70%) 
Some 
 (60%) 
 
Hispanics 
 
Some  
(60%) 
Few  
(20%) 
Some 
 (40%) 
Few 
(20%) 
Some 
 (50%) 
Few 
 (20%) 
 
Asian 
Americans 
 
Few  
(20%) 
Few  
(20%) 
None 
Few 
(20%) 
Few 
(10%) 
Few 
 (20%) 
 
Native 
Americans 
 
Many  
(60%) 
Some  
(40%) 
Some 
(60%) 
None 
Some 
 (60%) 
Few 
 (20%) 
 
Employees 
With 
Disability 
 
Many  
(80%) 
Some 
 (60%) 
Some 
(40%) 
None 
Some 
 (60%) 
Few 
 (30%) 
Coding scheme: few (0 – 33%), some (33% - 66%), many (66% to 100%)  
 
participation rates, all of these attenuate in the models that include controls for fixed 
pay, tenure, individual firm effects, education, occupation,. However, all groups still 
face barriers to accessing these plans, even with controls. Employees with disabilities 
and African Americans have the highest percentage of disparities both with and 
without controls. For women, the effects of pay and occupation appear to be the 
strongest, as their outcomes for models with and without controls shift the most. 
In terms of the financial value held in employee ownership plans, most groups 
experience some disparities in outcomes, but there are fewer overall disparities than in 
terms of access, and all effects attenuate with controls, with the exception of women 
and African Americans. These two groups have lower plan values for all plans (except 
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for ESOPs for African Americans). Hence the disparities in access and financial 
values are the strongest for these two groups, both with respect to existing 
mechanisms of stratification and the unique features of employee ownership plans.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this paper provides strong evidence that patterns of 
inequality in access to employee ownership and the value of assets held in these plans 
are very similar to existing patterns of inequality. To the extent that the value of assets 
provided by employee ownership is linked to existing compensation systems, which 
themselves are stratified by gender, race, ethnicity, and disability, this is not 
surprising. However, the unequal access to these plans and the lower value of the 
assets held in these plans by women and African Americans serves as a reminder that 
these groups still face strong barriers to accessing economic opportunities in ways 
similar to men and whites. It appears, therefore, that the barriers to this access are the 
result of deeply entrenched mechanisms that generate occupational segregation, such 
as certain groups being underrepresented in occupational groups that are more likely 
to receive access to employee ownership. In addition, the ways in which companies 
structure certain types of plans leads to additional disparities for thee two groups, and 
this is particularly the case for plans in which managers make decisions regarding 
which employees participate and how much employees receive through these plans: 
stock options, profitsharing, and gainsharing.  
 On the whole, the results suggest that employee ownership plans may not be 
altering existing patterns of income and wealth stratification and could be exacerbating 
these gaps, since those employees with higher salaries are more likely to participate 
and receive more financial value through employee ownership, and employees facing 
existing barriers to economic opportunity face similar barriers to accessing and 
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benefiting from employee ownership. Testing the long-term impact of employee 
ownership on existing patterns of income and wealth stratification more completely, 
however, will require comparing outcomes within a group of similar employees in 
similar organizations without employee ownership, which is beyond the more modest 
scope of this paper. However, this paper has opened up a new research stream for 
better understanding how the outcomes of employee ownership are stratified by 
gender, race, and disability status. In addition to uncovering the concrete effects for 
different demographic groups, this paper suggests that the potential mechanisms 
shaping these outcomes are closely related to how decisions regarding participation 
and allocation are made and by whom. Identifying these mechanisms needs to be a 
priority for future research. Not only will this type of research expand existing 
perspectives about the possibilities represented by employee ownership for influencing 
existing patterns of income and wealth inequality, but renewed attention to the 
organizational level processes through which compensation decisions are made would 
likely enrich the broader literature on social stratification, which continues to 
undertheorize such mechanisms.  
 Although these results should be very interesting to social scientists, they also 
have important implications for managers. First, since the value of assets acquired 
through employee ownership is usually directly related to pay, managers should be 
careful in assuming that implementing employee ownership creates instant equity and 
fairness. The reality is that the implementation and operation of these plans occurs 
within broader structures of stratification, and this reality may have negative 
consequences for the effectiveness of these plans if employees perceive their 
implementation and operation as unfair. Substantial disparities may be particularly 
important if certain demographic groups are concentrated in crucial occupational roles 
and experience disparities in access to and the benefits of employee ownership. Ittner 
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et al. (2003), for example, found that the performance effects of employee stock 
option grants were influenced by larger grants to certain key employees, such as 
technical employees, managers, and individual contributors who were non-exempt.  
 Furthermore, the results show that, beyond the traditional mechanisms of 
stratification, the ways in which certain types of employee ownership are designed and 
operated can create further disparities in access and financial value for different 
groups. Hence, to the extent that the structures of specific forms of employee 
ownership are flexible in terms of who gets access and the value of the financial 
benefits that flow from these plans, management has the leverage to design plans to 
address the disparities uncovered in this analysis. The bottom line is that these 
disparities most likely produce outcomes that individuals in diverse categories would 
experience as unfortunate. This suggests that companies with diverse employee 
populations can benefit from paying attention to traditional inequalities, and how 
employee ownership is shaped by and, in turn, influences these inequalities. This type 
of inequality, if left unaddressed can siphon off the potential positive effects of 
employee ownership for individual employees and for the firm. 
 Finally, the evidence suggests policy innovations that might improve access to 
employee ownership. Females and minority groups face no barriers to participating in 
ESOPs, which are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), which has strong requirements for broad participation in retirement plans. 
None of the other forms of employee ownership analyzed in this paper have similar 
requirements, and the evidence is clear that certain groups, especially women and 
African-Americans, face barriers to participation. Participation in such plans as 
BBSOPs and the various forms of performance based pay is controlled by managers, 
while participation in ESPPs and 401(k) plans is controlled primarily by employees. 
To the extent that existing patterns of occupational segregation and income inequality 
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restrict access to management controlled plans, broad participation requirements could 
help alleviate existing barriers to participation.  
 Obviously, ESOP-like legislation that has broad participation requirements that 
also provides tax benefits for companies implementing these plans is a way to 
encourage corporations to promote broad participation. To the extent that groups with 
low participation rates in voluntary programs are constrained by lower levels of 
discretionary income that could be used to invest in these plans, low interest loans 
provided by government agencies or employers, in exchange for tax benefits, could 
help lower income employees participate in these plans. However, ESPPs and 401(k) 
plans involve a cash investment and the acceptance of risk, which may make 
mechanisms such as stock options and ESOPs, in which employees do not need to 
make an investment up front and do not take on much risk, better avenues to promote 
broader participation in shared capitalism. In the absence of legislation, however, 
corporate managers, boards of directors, and compensation consultants can also play a 
key role in addressing unequal access to employee ownership. At a minimum, they 
should pay careful attention to how inequality in access to and benefits from shared 
capitalism affects the efficiency and productivity of the organizations they manage, 
and how opening up access can help their firms and clients achieve long-term success 
and lead to a more equitable distribution of the benefits of this success.  
 The analysis presented in this paper has obvious limitations. First, although the 
sample is comprised of rich individual level data, it only includes 14 companies. This 
lack of organizational level variation means that conclusions about the influence of 
organizational level mechanisms relating to how these plans are structured can only be 
made with a fair amount of caution. Second, certain demographic groups are 
underrepresented in the sample (Hispanics and Native Americans), and it is difficult to 
draw general conclusion about the outcomes for these groups. Third, the information 
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regarding participation and plan assets was collected from individual employees and 
may suffer from retrospective and other forms of recall bias. A more robust analysis 
would require collecting more reliable data regarding participation of these plans and 
the precise financial value of assets employees receive through corporate accounting 
records. Fourth, the analysis lacks specific information regarding how companies 
make decisions about participation and the allocation of assets through these plans. 
Finally, the summary picture presented by aggregating groups of plan participants 
across multiple organizations likely masks some interesting and important variations 
from the overall trends that have been the focus of this analysis. Our understanding of 
these anomalies and the overall trends will benefit greatly from future research that 
attempts to overcome these shortcomings. Despite these limitations, this paper 
provides a starting point for future research to examine such mechanisms and the long-
term impacts of employee ownership on broader patterns of social inequality. Gaining 
a better understanding of these trends is necessary not only for understanding the 
potential of economic democracy to mitigate income inequality, but also for 
expanding the existing theoretical frameworks on social stratification to incorporate 
new forms of compensation and wealth generation in the 21st century economy.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has examined the institutionalization and consequences of stock-
based compensation in the contemporary firm. The analysis has revealed that although 
the use of these practices is importantly shaped by strategic human resource 
considerations relating to hiring, retention, and employee motivation, like all 
organizational practices, they become institutionalized and are open to contestation 
through dynamic social, political, and cultural processes inside and outside of 
organizations.  
 For example, the diffusion of executive stock options was importantly shaped 
by the perceived need of shareholders to link executive pay to corporate performance. 
However, the corporate scandals challenged the legitimacy of the practice and focused 
attention on the ways in which executives have a great deal of power to extract rent 
from these arrangements. The actors challenging the system of executive 
compensation were effective at altering the levels of executive compensation and the 
dominance of executive stock options in the immediate wake of the scandals, but the 
system of corporate governance that determines these practices has retained its 
legitimacy even in the face of strong challenges. The extent to which these executive 
compensation-setting structures persist and the future trajectory of overall levels of 
executive compensation will partly be a function of how a diverse group of 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, regulators, and economic and social justice 
organizations, are able to strategically challenge the framing of executive 
compensation arrangement as efficient outcomes of arms-length transactions between 
executives and independent directors, and engage in collective action to alter corporate 
governance practices.  
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 Similarly, although the spread of different forms of employee ownership has 
been driven by the need for organizations to attract, retain, and motivate employees at 
all levels, the second paper shows how labor market conditions, organizational level 
resources, cultural perceptions, and a supportive institutional environment create the 
conditions for the diffusion of broad-based stock compensation. In addition, the 
second paper highlights the key role that human resources and compensation 
professionals play in translating the meaning of stock-based compensation from one 
setting to another and tailoring it to local conditions. Similar to the first paper, which 
focused on the agency of actors outside the organization in challenging the legitimacy 
of stock-based compensation, this paper reveals how the action of organizational 
members shapes the institutionalization of the practice.  
 While the first paper shows that the value of stock options for executives 
declined in the wake of the scandals, it also suggests that this decline was offset by 
increases in other the value forms of compensation. In contrast, the second paper 
reveals that for lower level employees in Indian technology companies, the stock 
market crash and the scandals led to a dramatic decline in the use of  broad-based 
stock options. This suggests that broad-based stock compensation plans may be much 
more sensitive to deinstitutionalization and change than stock compensation plans that 
benefit more powerful executives. This is a crucial insight for understanding the long-
term influence of stock-based compensation on income and wealth inequality. The 
analyses of executive stock options after the scandals and of the diffusion of employee 
stock options in the Indian technology sector both illuminate the complex 
organizational and organizational-field level forces that shape the emergence and 
long-term persistence of different forms of stock-based compensation.  
 In the same way that executives have been able to access an extremely 
lucrative new source of wealth through stock options, as different forms broad-based 
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stock compensation have diffused over the last three decades, they have created 
similar opportunities for nonexecutive employees and certain demographic groups that 
have historically faced substantial barriers to accessing economic opportunities. 
However, the diffusion of employee ownership has definitely not been as widespread 
as that of executive stock options. Just as important, the third paper reveals that 
because these new opportunities are usually tied to existing compensation systems, 
which themselves are stratified by occupation, gender, and race, the long-term 
consequences for these programs in reducing economic inequality, while promising, 
may have distinct limits. The ultimate implications for inequality will depend on how 
corporate managers design and alter stock compensation for different types of 
employees in the future, i.e., on how corporate managers decide which employees 
receive stock compensation and how much different groups receive. This dissertation 
has demonstrated that institutional theory represents a very productive framework for 
understanding the sociopolitical dynamics inside and outside of organizations that 
influence such decisions.  
 More generally, this dissertation has revealed how an institutional approach 
can help explain the development and persistence of other systems of compensation 
and organizational practices that play an important role in the distribution of economic 
wealth, power, and status within the contemporary capitalist firm. Future research on 
social stratification would benefit greatly from a renewed focus on how organizational 
practices that shape inequality become institutionalized through broad populations of 
organizations, and the conditions are under which these practices come under 
challenge by different field-level actors, and persist or are transformed in the process. 
Likewise, for institutional organizational researchers, examining more closely the 
diffusion of these practices represents a productive avenue for better understanding the 
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role of power, politics, and culture in the structuration of organizational practices more 
generally.  
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APPENDIX 
 
This appendix provides more detailed information about the data collection procedures 
employed for the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Data Collection in India: Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, I examined the incidence and processes shaping the institutionalization 
of ESOs in India through a series of interviews with informants in Pune, Hyderabad, 
and Bangalore, India. I obtained an initial list of 16 possible informants from the 
National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), a US-based nonprofit organization 
providing information and conducting research on broad-based stock compensation. 
This initial list included 10 compensation consultants and six human resource or 
compensation executives in both Indian based technology firms and multinationals 
operating in India. I contacted all of these people via email before going to India. 
Through personal connections established working for the NCEO between 1994 and 
2002, I emailed another five possible informants, three of whom were human resource 
managers in multinationals in India, and two of whom were Indian academics. I 
obtained seven positive responses from this initial list of people who were willing to 
be interviewed. These contacts provided information on three more possible 
informants, of which two were willing to be interviewed. Before going to India, I had 
set up 10 interviews with 14 informants (some of the initial nine contacts that had 
agreed brought in other people for group interviews). Once on the ground in India, I 
was able to set up four more interviews with five more informants. Hence, I conducted 
a total of 14 interviews with 19 informants in total. Table 18 provides more detailed 
information about my informants, the organizations they represented, and the 
interviews. 
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Table 18:  Descriptive Information, Informants in India 
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Informant 
Number 
Interview 
Number 
Title of 
Informant 
Nationality Type of Organization 
HQ 
Location  
Interview 
Length  
Interview 
Date 
1 1 Vice President India 
Compensation 
Consulting Firm 
India 
75 
minutes 
February 
25, 2005 
2 2 
President and 
Founder 
India 
Compensation 
Consulting Firm 
India 
42 
minutes 
February 
25, 2005 
3 3 
Chief Delivery 
Officer 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
Israel 
56 
minutes 
February 
28, 2005 
4 3 
Program 
Manager 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
Israel 
56 
minutes 
February 
28, 2005 
5 4 
General 
Manager, 
Investor 
Relations 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
India 
58 
minutes 
February 
25, 2005 
6 5 
VP-Talent 
Engineering  
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
India 
83 
minutes 
February 
28, 2005 
7 5 
Compensation 
Manager 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
India 
83 
minutes 
February 
28, 2005 
8 6 
Compensation 
Consultant 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
United 
States 
62 
minutes 
March 1, 
2005 
9 7 
Compensation 
and Benefits 
Manager 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
United 
States 
38 
minutes 
March 1, 
2005 
10 8 
Senior 
Executive, 
Human 
Resources 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
United 
States 
38 
minutes 
March 2, 
2005 
11 8 
Program 
Manager 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
United 
States 
38 
minutes 
March 2, 
2005 
12 9 
Professor of 
Management 
India University India 
44 
minutes 
March 3, 
2005 
13 10 
Professor of 
Management 
India University India 
75 
minutes 
March 4, 
2008 
14 11 Consultant India 
Human Resource 
Consulting Firm 
United 
States 
35 
minutes 
March 7, 
2008 
15 12 HR Director US 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
United 
States 
40 
minutes 
March 7, 
2005 
16 13 
Associate VP-
HRD  
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
India 
109 
minutes  
March 8, 
2005 
17 13 
Associate-
Compensation 
and Benefits 
India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
India 
109 
minutes  
March 8, 
2005 
18 13 HR Officer India 
Software/Information 
Technology Firm 
India 
109 
minutes 
March 8, 
2005 
19 14 Consultant India 
Human Resource 
Consulting Firm 
United 
States 
35 
minutes 
March 7, 
2008 
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 I conducted semi-structured interviews with these informants. I used a standard 
list of questions for all informants, which varied slightly depending on the role of the 
informant (company representative, consultant, or academic). I also had a set of 
additional questions that I could bring in, depending on the trajectory of the interview.  
 
Questions for Company Informants 
 
I. Standard Questions for All Informants 
 
1. How long have you been with this company? How did you get here?  
 
2. What is your background?  
 
3. How long have you been in your current role? What are the most difficult parts of it? 
What are the most rewarding parts?  
 
4. Does your company currently grant stock options to employees?  
 
5. If not, why did your company stop granting options? Did it replace it with other forms 
of equity, cash, and/or benefits? 
 
6. Do you plan on renewing grants in the future?  
 
7. When did your company implement its stock option program?  
 
8. Why did your company set up the plan?  
 
9. Can you describe the decision-making process that your company’s leaders went 
through before choosing to implement the plan? 
 
10. How does it/did fit in with your other HR strategies and practices?  
 
11. How would you describe your company’s current HR and compensation strategy?  
 
12. How does it attempt to address the competitive challenges faced by your  company?  
 
13. Has your HR strategy changed in the last five years? In the last two years?  
 
14. How has this effected your stock options strategy?  
 
15. What are the biggest HR challenges your company and industry face at this point?  
 
16. How have labor market and competitive concerns influenced your HR, compensation, 
and stock options strategy?  
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17. Who gets stock options?  
 
18. What percentage of employees at this organization are eligible to receive stock 
options?   
 
19. What percentage actually receives them?  
 
20. What is the lowest paid position that receives stock options? 
 
21. How often do you make option grants?  
 
22. How does your company decide who gets stock options and how many different types 
of employees receive? How did this process emerge? 
 
23. Where did your company get information about stock options in general and in plan 
design in particular?  
 
24. Why did you design this plan in this way?  
 
25. How has your approach to plan design changed over time the company has grown? 
 
26. Are there other important elements/perspectives you think I am missing?  
 
27. Are there other people I should talk to? 
 
II. Additional Questions (Optional) 
 
1. What have been the views of employees to having stock options?  
 
2. How does it differ between different types of employees? 
 
3. Have these views changed over time, particularly with the volatility of the stock 
market? 
 
4. Do you think the employee stock option plan has been successful in meeting its 
intended goals?  
 
5. What role do you think stock options/employee ownership/spreading the wealth has 
had in the growth of your company?  
 
6. Has it made employees more motivated?  
 
7. Do you think they act like owners? How do they view this in the abstract?  
 
8. What is the view of the company about employee ownership? Is it a core part of your 
culture?  
 
9. Has this view changed with the recent volatility in the stock market?  
 
10. How have has the use of stock options changed in India over time?  
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11. What do you think the general view about stock options in EO is in Indian IT firms at 
this point?  
 
12. How have you seen these views change over time?  
 
13. When and why did options emerge on the scene?  
 
14. What do you think are the most important factors that will affect the future of stock 
option practices/use of employee ownership in the India IT sector? 
 
15. Do you think EO/options will persist in India? Has it caught on?  
 
16. How does it connect with older traditions of employee ownership in India?  
 
17. There has been a lot of discussion about IT firms in India adopting management 
practices that are common in Silicon Valley firms, such as stock options. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with these assessments?   
 
18. Do you think that management models of Silicon Valley firms have influenced Indian 
firms? How so? To what extent were these different from Indian models or were there 
similarities?  
 
19. In addition to stock options, there is a lot of discussion in the US business media about 
IT firms having flatter hierarchies and that Indian firms have adopted these as well. 
Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not? 
 
20. How would you describe the organizational structure of your company?  
 
21. Would you describe the organization of work at your company as a flat hierarchy? If 
so, why is this the case?  
 
22. How has this organizational structure changed over time?  
 
23. Would you say that IT companies in India have fundamentally different types of 
organizational structures than older industries?  
 
24. To what extent do you believe that the growth of the high-tech sector in India has 
influenced traditional management and HR approaches?  
 
25. What are the typical sources for management ideas and practices among business 
leaders in India? Have these changed in the last decade? 
 
  
Questions for Consultant Informants 
 
I. Standard Questions for All Informants 
 
1. Tell me a little bit about yourself and your firm. What do you do? When did you start?  
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2. What types of clients do you advise? What types of issues do you advise your clients 
about? 
 
3. Can you sketch out the highlights of the history of stock option law and regulations in 
India?  
 
4. What have been the most recent regulatory changes?  
 
5. Why are your clients using employee stock option plans? 
 
6. What is the typical plan design? Who is getting options? How many and how often?  
 
7. How do plan design features connect with HR strategies and challenges? How have 
labor market and competitive concerns influenced their HR and compensation 
strategies?  
 
8. How has the use of stock options changed in India over time?  
 
9. What do you think are the most important factors that will affect the future of stock 
option practices/use of employee ownership in the India IT sector? 
 
10. How would you characterize the views of different about stock options and EO here in 
India?  What are the views of executives, HR people, entrepreneurs, regulators, and 
the media about stock options and employee ownership more generally?  
 
11. How have you seen these views change over time?  
 
12. When and why did options emerge on the scene?  
 
13. Are there other important elements/perspectives you think I am missing?  
 
14. Are there other people I should talk to?  
 
II. Additional Questions (Optional) 
 
1. There has been a lot of discussion about IT firms in India adopting management 
practices that are common in Silicon Valley firms, such as stock options. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with these assessments?   
 
2. Do you think that management models of Silicon Valley firms have influenced Indian 
firms? How so?  
 
3. To what extent were these different from Indian models or were there similarities?  
 
4. To what extent do you believe that the growth of the high-tech sector in India has 
influenced existing management and HR approaches?  
 
5. What has been driving this change?  
 
6. How do you see this changing in the future?  
 
 
 192 
7. What are the typical sources for management ideas and practices among business 
leaders in India? Have these changed in the last decade? 
 
Questions for Academic Informants 
 
Standard Questions for All Informants 
 
1. How would you characterize the stock options environment here in India? What is the 
view of executives, HR people, entrepreneurs, regulators, and the media about stock 
options and employee ownership more generally?  
 
2. More generally, why do you think high-tech firms in India have been using employee 
stock option plans? How do you see this changing in the future?  
 
3. Do you think stock options are a good thing or a bad thing for Indian workers and the 
economy?  
 
4. There has been a lot of discussion about IT firms in India adopting management 
practices that are common in Silicon Valley firms, such as stock options and flattened 
hierarchies. To what extent to you agree or disagree with these assessments?   
 
5. Do you think that management models of Silicon Valley firms have influenced Indian 
firms?   
 
6. To what extent were these different from Indian models or were there similarities?  
 
7. To what extent do you believe that the growth of the high-tech sector in India has 
influenced existing management and HR approaches?  
 
8. What are the typical sources for management ideas and practices among business 
leaders in India? Have these changed in the last decade? 
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Data Collection for Chapter 4: The Shared Capitalism Dataset 
The data analyzed in Chapter 4 regarding participation in and financial values 
acquired from different forms of employee ownership was based on survey responses 
from 46,907 employees that were collected between 2001 and 2006 in association with 
the Shared Capitalism Project of the National Bureau of Economic Research. The 
eight person research team conducted employee surveys in 14 U.S. companies with 
any of the following forms of employee ownership: employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs), broad-based stock option plans (BBSOPs), employee stock purchase plans 
(ESPPs), and 401(k) plans with employer stock as an investment option or company 
match. Some companies in the sample had one type of plan, while others had multiple 
plans. The response rates from employees averaged 52% across the 14 companies.  
 The sample of companies was generated through a master list of approximately 
100 firms acquired from the National Center of Employee and personal contacts of the 
researchers. The sample was chosen in order to create as broad a representation of 
industry, company size, and type of broad-based stock compensation plan as possible.  
Due to the length of the employee survey (approximately 45 minutes – 60 minutes), 
the final sample size was small. Table 19 provides more detailed information about the 
companies in the sample. Surveys were distributed either in person, via mail, or 
online. Different companies used different distribution methods or a combination of 
methods.  
 Each survey included a core group of approximately 80 questions on 
participation in stock-based compensation programs, financial value received through 
these programs, employee demographics, participation in different types of employee 
involvement practices, and employee attitudes towards their company, supervisors, 
and jobs. Companies were also given the opportunity to include their own questions  
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Table 19: Descriptive Information About Companies in the  
Shared Capitalism Sample 
 
Company Industry Ownership 
Type of Stock 
Compensation 
Plan* 
Total 
Employees 
Surveyed 
Employees 
Total 
Responses 
Response 
Rate 
1 Service Private 
ESOP, profit-
sharing, 
gainsharing 
1962 1962 854 44% 
2 Manufacturing Private ESOP 1150 1150 900 78% 
3 Manufacturing Private 
ESOP, 401k, 
profit-sharing, 
gainsharing 
3327 2387 1078 45% 
4 Service Private 
BBSOP, ESPP, 
401k, profit-
sharing 
10600 7246 803 11% 
5 High-tech Public 
BBSOP, ESPP, 
profitsharing 
35283 35383 6733 19% 
6 Manufacturing Private 
ESOP, profit-
sharing 
4500 3300 1570 48% 
7 Manufacturing Private 
ESOP, BBSOP, 
ESPP, profit-
sharing, 
gainsharing 
600 600 429 72% 
8 Manufacturing Private 
ESOP, 
profitsharing 
276 276 220 80% 
9 Manufacturing Public 
BBSOP, ESPP, 
profit-sharing, 
gainsharing 
300 300 230 77% 
10 
High-tech Private 
ESOP, profit-
sharing 
574 574 266 46% 
11 Manufacturing Private 
401k, profit-
sharing 
47321 47321 31830 67% 
12 Manufacturing Public 
BBSOP, ESPP, 
401k, 
profitsharing 
9600 2500 1584 63% 
13 Finance Private 
ESOP, profit-
sharing 
421 421 210 50% 
14 Service Private 
ESOP, profit-
sharing 
500 500 200 40% 
TOTALS 116414 103920 46907 45% 
 
*ESOP = employee stock ownership plan, 401k = 401(k) plan, BBSOP = broad-based stock option 
plan, ESPP = employee stock purchase plan 
 
about any other issues.  What follows is a list of the relevant survey questions that 
collected the data analyzed in Chapter 4. 
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SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
Which of the following best describes your type of job?    
□ production, maintenance, or delivery work (including production 
supervisors)  
□ administrative support staff (e.g., clerical, secretarial, record keeping)  
□ professional/technical staff (e.g., engineering, finance, marketing)  
□ sales staff  
□ management (including department heads, mid-level managers, and 
executive management)  
 
IF YOU ANSWERED “MANAGEMENT,”  
Would you say you are part of  
□ lower management     
□ middle management     
□ upper management     
 
 
How long have you worked for your company, at any location or job?  
 
___________     __________    
      Years                 Months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because this survey is part of a nationwide study, we would like to ask the 
following questions in order to be able to compare your answers with those of 
similar employees in other companies and the general population.  These 
background questions are for statistical purposes only.  No data will be used to 
identify any individual. 
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Age    ____________ 
 
Sex          □ Female     □ Male  
 
Marital status 
□ Married 
□ Living as married  
□ Divorced 
□ Separated 
□ Widowed 
□ Never married 
  
Total size of family living in your household (including yourself): 
 
____________ 
 
 
Number of children under age 18:     
 
____________ 
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Completed schooling: 
□ Less than 9th grade 
□ 9th to 12th grade, no diploma  
□ High school graduate or GED 
□ Some college, but no degree 
□ Associate degree in college 
□ Bachelor’s degree 
□ Master’s degree 
□ Professional school degree (such as MD or JD) 
□ Doctorate degree 
 
Hispanic or Latino background:   □  Yes        □   No  
 
Race:      □ White   □ Black   □ Asian   □ Native American    
□ Other ___________________________ 
 
 
Do you have a health problem or impairment lasting 6 months or more that 
limits the kind or amount of work, housework, or other major activities you can 
do?  
   □  Yes        □   No  
 
What was your annual base pay in 2003 (excluding any bonuses and 
commissions) BEFORE taxes and deductions? 
 
$__________  
 
If you receive overtime pay, how much did you earn in overtime in 2003? 
 
$__________   
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If you receive sales commissions, how much did you earn in commissions in 2003? 
     
 $___________   
 
People have various assets that constitute their wealth.  These include the value of 
their house minus the mortgage, plus their vehicles, stocks and mutual funds, 
cash, checking accounts, retirement accounts including 401(k) and pension assets, 
and so forth.  Taking account of all of these things would you say that the 
WEALTH of you and your spouse / partner is: 
□ Less than $5000 
□ $5000 to $20,000 
□ $20,000 to $40,000 
□ $40,000 to $75,000 
□ $75,000 to $100,000 
□ $100,000 to $150,000 
□ $150,000 to $250,000 
□ $250,000 to $500,000 
□ More than $500,000 
 
About what percent of your total wealth is in your employer’s stock?  
   
  ________% 
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Do you participate in the company ESOP? 
    □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
 
IF “YES,” 
 
What is the approximate total value of your accumulated  
assets in the ESOP? (a rough estimate is fine if you do not  
know the exact amount) 
 
   $_______________   
 
 
Have you ever been granted any stock options from your company?  
 □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
 
IF “YES,” 
  
  Have you ever exercised any of these stock options?  
  □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know  
 
  After exercising the stock options, did you keep any of the stock 
  you acquired through the stock option plan or have you sold it all?
  □ Kept some stock       □ Sold it all 
 
  What is the current total value of your company’s stock you now 
  hold—net of the purchase price--from having exercised these  
  options and kept the stock?  
 
   $_______________   
 
  How much money have you made during your employment at this 
  company by exercising stock options and selling the stock?   
   
   $_______________ 
 
Do you currently hold any of this company's stock options (vested or unvested)?  
 □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
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IF “YES,” 
 
  What is the total number of stock options (both vested and  
  unvested) that you have?   
 
  #_______________ 
 
  If you exercised today the options you currently hold, what would 
  be the total value of the stock you would own, net of the purchase 
  price?  
 
  $_______________ 
 
  If you exercised today the options you currently hold, what would 
  be the total value of the stock you would own, net of the purchase 
  price?  
 
  $_______________ 
 
Did you receive a grant of stock options from your company [last year]? 
 □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
 
IF “YES,” 
  
 What was the number of stock options in last year's grant?   
 
  #_______________ 
 
Did you receive any stock options this year?   
 □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
 
IF “YES,” 
 
  How many stock options did you receive this year?  
 
  #_______________ 
 
 
Have you ever purchased company stock through the company stock purchase 
plan?  
 □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
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IF “YES,” 
 
  What is the approximate total value of company stock you now 
  own through this plan?  
 
  $_______________ 
 
Have you ever sold any stock purchased through this plan? 
 □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
 
IF “YES,” 
 
  How much profit did you make from all the times you sold the  
  stock purchased through the Employee Stock Purchase Program?
  
  $_______________ 
 
  What is the approximate total value of company stock you now 
  own through these plans?  
 
  $_______________ 
 
 
Do you participate in the company 401(k) plan? 
    □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
 
IF “YES,” 
 
What is the approximate total value of your accumulated 
assets in the 401(k) plan? (a rough estimate is fine if you  
do not know the exact amount)  
 
  $_______________  
 
  Of your 401(k) assets, what is the approximate value of your  
  company’s stock? 
 
  $_______________ 
 
In your job are you eligible for any type of performance-based pay, such as 
individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?     
 □ Yes      □ No      □ Don’t know 
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IF “YES” 
 
What does the size of these performance-based payments depend 
on?  (mark all that apply) 
□Company profits or performance  
□Workgroup or department performance 
□Individual performance 
    
  Did you receive any of these payments in last year? 
    □Yes              □No    □ Don’t know   
 
   If no, what was the most recent year in which 
   you received these payments? ________ 
   
 What was the approximate total dollar value of these 
 various payments in that year?    (a rough estimate is fine if 
 you do know the exact amount) 
 
 $___________ 
 
 
12. How likely is it that you will decide to look hard for a job with another 
organization within the next twelve months? 
□ Not at all likely   □ Somewhat likely   □ Very likely   □ Already  
         looking 
 
16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?  “I am willing to 
work harder than I have to in order to help the company I work for succeed.”  
 
Strongly   Neither agree     Strongly  
Agree  Agree nor disagree Disagree Disagree 
 □   □   □   □   □ 
 
48. How much loyalty would you say you feel toward the company you work for 
as a whole? 
□ A  lot  □ Some  □ Only a little   □ No loyalty at all 
 
